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6.

Introduction

T

aims at exploring the crisis of the German socialist
movement which grew in intensity from the time of the open
split of the Social Democratic Party during the war until its
climax in the bloody fighting between the radical left and moder
ate socialists during the so-called Spartacist Uprising of January
1919. In the course of this primary pursuit, two subsidiary aims
are served: an analysis of the relationship existing between the
theory and practice of the German Communists during their
period of political infancy; and an examination of the impact of
the Communists on the course of the German Revolution.
The organization of this study can be summarized as follows:
Part I deals with the emergence of the left-wing socialists and
Spartacists, the forerunners of the German Communists, prior to
the outbreak of the November Revolution of 1918. Part II exam
ines the impact of the November Revolution upon the socialists,
and discusses the problems created by the different aims for the
revolution held by the various parties and factions of the socialist
movement. Part III presents the first major crisis of the German
labor movement in the post-World War I period, the Spartacist
Uprising. It also deals with the revolution in retrospect, indicat
ing the utilization by present-day German Communists of dis
torted versions of the revolutionary events of 1918-19 for the sake
of contemporary propaganda.
Since the importance of ideological concepts of young revo
lutionary movements is often underestimated, an effort has been
made throughout to relate the political theory of the left-wing so
cialists and Spartacists ( or Communists, as the case may be) to
HIS STUDY

the problems under discussion. It should be remembered that
during their early phase almost all revolutionary movements rely
heavily on theoretical foundations. The democratic liberal creed
was no exception. It is only at a later stage, after consolidation
has set in and the revolutionary party or movement acquires ma
turity, that the pragmatic approach to political problems gains
predominance, replacing the earlier ideological guidance and de
termining party actions.
The translations of German quotations in this study are this
writer's own. An effort has been made to keep them as close as
possible to the original text in order to retain some of the flavor
of the period in which they were written. This holds true parti
cularly for newspaper articles and transcripts of speeches. Ger
man words and names appearing in this book were hyphenated,
when required, according to German syllabication.
The phase of German political history into which this study
falls is marked by an abundance of source material. The author,
therefore, was faced with the problem of a proper selection of
representative sources and an evaluation of the highly subjective
accounts which were written for the most part within a few years
after the events. It is probably characteristic of highly controver
sial issues, such as the one under discussion, that they frequently
· become the subject of many authors who are less interested in a
scholarly treatment of the problem than in proving a particular
point of view and in justifying the actions and views of their own
affiliations. This lack of objectivity even holds true for such re
cent publications as Ruth Fischer's Stalin and German Com
munism. Convenient historical oversights and incorrect factual
premises are some of the means used frequently by these authors.
Fortunately the abundant documentary materials - some in spe
cific collections, but most of them widely dispersed in secondary
works - obviate the need to rely on these partisan accounts, ex
cept where an analysis of these biased views adds to the over-all
understanding of the events under examination.
xii

The Emergence
of the Spartacists

The Left Wing Within the
German Social Democratic
Party Prior to World War I

1.

The Growth of the German Socialist Movement

Many of the ideological concepts and organizational charac
teristics of the Spartacists, the forerunners of the German Com
munists, have their origin in the period which followed the unifi
cation of the Lassallean workers' organization with the Marxian
socialists in 1875. The end product of this fusion was the Social
Democratic Party of Germany ( SPD) . 1 In the decades following
the union, the SPD developed into a strong mass party and along
with its allied trade unions became a powerful factor in German
political life.
During this period, a number of political factions emerged
within the SPD. These were an outgrowth of basic disagreements
m major political and tactical issues, resulting partly from dif
.terent interpretations of Marxian doctrines and partly from the
.::onflicting objectives of an organization which regarded itself as
a proletarian party in a bourgeois state. The perpetuation of
these factions in a period of crisis caused by the outbreak of
World War I led eventually to a division of the German labor
movement into hostile camps, a situation which persists to the
present time.
1 The German designation for the Social Democratic Party of Germany is
fozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-

lands, or SPD. This abbreviation will
be used hereafter in this paper.
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The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the factors and con
ditions contributing to the growth of the political thought and
revolutionary tactical concepts of the radical left wing of the
SPD. This complex later became known, organizationally, as
the Spartacist League and eventually, on December 31, 1918, as
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). 2 An attempt has also
been made to analyze a selected number of concepts character
istic of the radical left wing of the German socialists.
Socialist ideas were abroad in Germany before 1848, but it
was not until that year that a genuine working-class movement
came into existence in the form of a number of workers' asso
ciations. The growth of organized labor was not impressive, how
ever, until the 1860s, when Ferdinand Lassalle brought life and
action into the movement. A group of professed Marxists with
a relatively small following was also active among the German
proletariat, but it did not succeed in increasing its strength sub
stantially until after the death of Lassalle.3
In 1875_ the two movements among the German workers
combined to form the united SPD, thus providing a more power
ful organization to fight for the interests of the increasing number
of German workers.• Thus, from its very inception the SPD car
ried within its organization two basically different creeds. Those
who held the romantic nationalism and democratic concepts of
2 The German term is Kommunis
tische Partei Deutsch/ands. The abbre
viation KPD will be used hereafter in
this study.
The Spartacist League (Spartakus
bund) was a loose organization of left
wing radicals; under the leadership of
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht,
it fought against the policies of the
SPD and the trade unions which were
designed to support the war effort.
The group adopted the name "Spar
takus," the pseudonym used for their
illegal publications. Spartacus was the
leader of a Roman slave revolt; his
name was selected to serve as a sym
bol for the revolt of the modern

"wage slaves." On December 31, 1918,
the Spartacists founded the Commun
ist Party of Germany (KPD).
3 For an excellent account of the
early phase of the German socialist
movement see Franz Mehring, Ge
schichte der deutschen Sozialdemokra
tie ( 4th ed.; Stuttgart; J.H.W. Dietz,
1909). See also Veit Valentin, Ge
schichte der deutschen Revolution von
1848-49 (Berlin: Ullstein, [c. 1930-3].)
• William S. Halperin, Germany
Tried Democracy (New York: T.Y.
Crowell Co., 1946), p. 16; Joseph A.
Berlau, The German Social Democratic
Party, 1914-1921 (New York: Colum
lin: E. Rowohlt Verlag, 1930), p. 52.

LEFT WING PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

the Lassallean group had complete confidence in the possibility
of improving the workers' lot by reforms within the framework
of the existing state. The other group accepted the Marxian con
cepts regarding the historic mission of the proletariat and the ulti
mate socialist revolution as the final stage of the inevitable class
struggle within the capitalist society. It was the second group
which gained dominance in the SPD and caused at least a tem
porary subordination of Lassalleanism. 5
After the unification of Germany was achieved by Chancellor
Bismarck and the subsequent rapid industrialization, the SPD
considerably widened its influence among the growing number of
German workers. Bismarck's concern with the rapid spread of
socialism among the workers prompted his anti-socialist law of
1878 which was intended to stop the growth of the movement.
But persecution only resulted in making the SPD stronger, and
Bismarck soon realized the futility of the provisions of the anti
socialist law. While keeping the law on the books, in the 1880s
he changed his policy toward the workers, in an attempt to give
them a definite interest in the perpetuation of the existing state
by promulgating progressive social legislation. Marx's famous
phrase in the Communist Manifesto that the proletariat has noth
ing to lose but its chains lost part of its significance for the German
workers as a result of the social policies of Bismarck.
After the fall of Bismarck in 1890 - the year which also
saw the end of the anti-socialist law - William II sponsored an
ambitious program of factory legislation. But even this did not
stop the steadily mounting strength of the socialist movement. 6
In the face of this development one could have expected that the
German government would follow one of two alternatives. One
was the brutal suppression of the socialists. However after 1890
- the year in which the SPD obtained almost one and a half
million votes and entered the Reichstag with thirty-five deputies
- apparently none of the leading German politicians were in5

Berlau, op. cit., p. 329.

6

Halperin, op.

cit.,

pp.16-17.

5
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dined to use the methods Bismarck had tried with so little suc
cess. The other alternative was to pursue a policy based on a
compromise with the political aspirations of the middle class and
the workers and gradually to transform Germany into a demo
cratic constitutional monarchy. William II and his chancellors
( Caprivi, Hohenlohe, and Buelow) followed neither of these
courses, but allowed the socialist movement to take its own ·
course.7
A few figures will illustrate the rapid strengthening of the
SPD and the trade unions during the prewar period. The only
figures available for the SPD prior to 1906 are the election re
sults. In 1871 less than three per cent of all votes cast went to
the SPD. In 1879 the number had risen to almost nine per cent.
During the anti-socialist law period there was a temporary set
back and the figure dropped to six per cent in the 18 81 election.
In 1890 the SPD received almost twenty per cent of all votes cast
and in the last election before the war the figure reached 34.8
per cent. 8 In actual votes the number grew from roughly 1,000,000 to 4,250,329 and the number of representatives in the
Reichstag increased to 110. In the elections for. the Reichstag on
January 12, 1912, every third man over 25 years of age voted
for the SPD. 9
Membership figures for the SPD run as follows: in 1906,
384,327 members; in 1910, 720,038; and in 1913, 982,850.
Even more impressive are the trade union figures. Here the in
formation goes back to 1891, the year after the anti-socialist law
was discarded. Membership in the trade unions increased from
277,659 in 1891 to 2,548,763 in 1913, and the financial assets
of the unions in the same period increased from 425,845 marks
to 88,069,295 marks. 10
7 Arthur Rosenberg, Die Entstehung
der deutschen Republik (2d ed.; Ber
lin: E. Rowohlt Verlag, 1930), p. 52.
8 Ossip Kurt Flechtheim, Die KPD
in der Weimarer Republik (Offenbach
a.M.: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1948), p. 2.

9 Gustav Noske, Erlebtesaus Aufstieg
und Niedergang einer Demokratie (Of
fenbach a.M.: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1947),
p. 37.
10 Internationaler Arbeiterverlag, Il
lustrierte Geschichte der Deutschen

LEFT WING PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

These figures tell only one part of the story. The SPD had a
highly disciplined organization - the first modern mass organi
zation in history - based on a large, thoroughly-trained party
bureaucracy, which gave the workers confidence in the strength
of their organization. They believed that their party was a bul
wark of peace and would make wars completely impossible.
Indeed the SPD had developed into a nationwide party with
an organization managed by about 4,100 professional party
officials and approximately 11,000 salaried employees. The
election results of 1912 had made the SPD a parliamentary power
of the first order, and its 94 newspapers assured the party of con
tinuous influence in large segments of the population. By 1914
the SPD had an investment of 20,000,000 Marks and thereby
had given evidence of the confidence the party had in the stability
of the state and economy. 11

It has also been asserted that in spite of the great expansion of
the party organization and its increased membership, the SPD
had lost none of its efficiency. 12 Organizational efficiency is not,
however, the only yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of a
political party. The tremendous growth of the SPD and the trade
unions plus their widespread vested interests were of utmost con
sequence for many of the changes within the party and for the
emergence of a revolutionary opposition faction fighting from
within against the increasingly pronounced middle class attitude
of the party aristocracy.

2.

The Emergence of Different Factions Within the SPD

The anti-socialist legislation of 1878 caused considerable
difficulties for the SPD. Party leaders were arrested and numer
ous limitations and restrictions were placed upon party news
papers and other activities. However, the strong-arm methods
Revolution (Berlin: Internationaler
Arbeiterverlag, 1929), p. 58 [hereafter
cited as lllustrierte Geschichte].
11 William Maehl, "The Triumph of
Nationalism in the German Socialist

Party on the Eve of the First World
War," The Journal of Modern History,
XXIV (1952), pp. 25, 27. See also:
Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 5.
12 Halperin, op. cit., p. 17

7
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used by the German government to suppress the socialists demon
strated to the workers better than any socialist propaganda could
to what extent Bismarck's state served the ruling classes
and perpetuated the status quo. Thus, one of the major factors
which transformed the SPD into a genuine revolutionary Marxist
party was this period of suppression of the socialists.
After the lapse of the anti-socialist law in 1890, the SPD felt
a necessity of restating its objectives as well as of clarifying the
methods to be used in the Party's coming struggle. At the Party
Congress held in Erfurt in 1891, the SPD developed a program
which incorporated many more basic Marxist dogmas than had
the Gotha Program of 1875, which at one time had been heavily
attacked by Marx himself. A materialistic interpretation of his
tory supplied the basis for many parts of the program, which as
serted that the class-character of the state determined the political
actions of the proletariat. The workers, it was emphasized, must
seize political control of the state in order to transform the capi
talist economy into a socialist one. The seizure of political power
as a prerequisite for the expropriation of the means of production
and redistribution of wealth was adopted as a tenet by the Con
gress.13
The formulation of the revolutionary Erfurt Program did not
go unchallenged. For example, the Bavarian party leader Georg
von Vollmar strongly opposed the revolutionary policies approved
by the Congress. He and his followers advocated without much
success a program directed at gradual reforms of the existing
social, political, and economic institutions. From the fact that
the SPD had again become a legal political party within the exist
ing state they concluded that it should fight for reforms in a1liance
with some of the political parties of the middle classes. Von
Vollmar's approach was rejected by the Erfurt Congress; thus de
feating this early attempt to revert to some of the reformistic
13 For a detailed discussion and
analysis of the Erfurt Program see Ber-

lau, op. cit., pp. 39-45.

LEFT WING PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

"revisionism" as this school of thought
Lassallean concepts
was later called. u
Just before the turn of the century another attack was made
by the reformists against the adherents of the revolutionary tac
tical principles inherent in the Marxist theories officially incor
porated in the party's program. This time the attack against Marx
ist dogmas was better organized and more systematized. At least
three factors contributed to the success which revisionism was
able to achieve as a result. First, there was the substantial attempt
by Eduard Bernstein and a number of other socialist leaders to
bring Marx's teaching up to date and into harmony with the ex
periences gained by the SPD. After Friedrich Engel's death in
1895, Bernstein started in the theoretical journal Neue Zeit a
literary offensive with the purpose of "revising" and "modern
izing" Marxism. 13 Bernstein's criticism centered on certain pre
dictions which Marx derived from his analysis of the "bourgeois,
capitalist society." He contended that Marx was only partly cor
rect in his prediction concerning the pauperization of the masses
and the inevitable cycle of economic crises. The social legislation
supported and often initiated by the growing parliamentary fac
tion of the SPD coupled with the tactical successes of the trade
unions in the period of general prosperity had materially im
proved the over-all social and economic situation of the workers.
This improvement of the workers' living standard together
with the general optimism caused by the industrial and economic
boom form the second reason for Bernstein's eventual success in
superimposing the views of the revisionists upon the revolutionary
tradition of the party. The revisionists held that society can gra14 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 61-62.
15 Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who
Made a Revolution (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1948), p. 142. See also: Peter
Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic So
cialism; Eduard Bernstein's Challenge
to Marx (New York: Columbia Uni
versity Press, 1952); Vladimir G. Sim
khovitch, Marxism Versus Socialism

(New York: Ginn & Co., 1912); Evan
F. M. Durbin, The Politics of Demo
cratic Socialism (London: G. Rout
ledge, 1940); and Carl E. Schorske,
German S o c i a l Democracy, 19051917; The Development of the Great
Schism (Cambridge: Harvard Univer
sity Press, 1955).

9
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dually grow into socialism and that the improvement of conditions
for the workers does not have to wait until the advent of a violent
revolution. This view found increased acceptance among a large
number of German socialists who came to believe in the SPD as
a "democratic-socialist reform party."16
A third factor contributing to the success of the revisionist
view was the changed social composition of the SPD. After the re
vocation of the anti-socialist law, the party broadened its base and
numerous non-proletarians, bourgeois elements, especially intel
lectuals, were able to enter the party. 11
Thus, the concept of evolutionary methods as a means of rea
lizing socialism was the result of the revisionist position. The aim
of the party henceforth was to be not armed uprising but the ob
taining of a majority in order to take control of parliament. 18
The revisionists, or reformists, formed the right wing of the
SPD. Bernstein and other leading revisionists such as Richard
Calwer, Eduard David, and Georg von Vollmar urged the SPD
16 See Berlau, op. cit., pp. 55-66; and
lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 62-63; Hugh
Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Malen
kov (New York: Praeger, 1953), p.
17; Wolfe, op. cit., p. 143.
According to Paul Froelich, in order
to prove the correctness of their
changed interpretation of Marx, the re
visionists invoked Engels' introduction
to Marx's The Civil War in France.
Froelich accuses the reformists of fal
sifying the statements of Engels by
omitting certain important phases of
the original text. Thus, Engels is quoted
as saying that German experience with
elections and the great technological
advances made in weapons force a
change in revolutionary tactics. The
struggle for a majority in the legislature
replaces the armed uprising. (Paul
Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, Gedanke
und Tat [Hamburg: Verlag Friedrich
Oetinger, 1949], pp. 64-66.)
17 It has been asserted that skilled
workers, of whom the SPD had a con
siderable number, as a rule influence

the nature of a labor party in the di
rection of a peaceful and democratic
movement. By contrast, when the so
cial structure is based on a primitive
and poor peasantry and on a small and
unskilled labor group, a revolutionary
and fanatical labor movement is likely
to develop. (Seton-Watson, op. cit., p.
11.)
Professor William Maehl believes
that four factors were responsible for
the victory of reformism within the
SPD. These were: (1) the rapid growth
of the party, (2) the rapid growth
of the trade unions, (3) the lack of
class-consciousness among the workers
- the result of a peculiar German his
torical development, and (4) the suc
cessful growth of German capitalism
prior to World War I. (Maehl, op. cit.,
pp. 22-23.)
is Walter Tormin, Zwischen Raete
diktatur und sozialer De mo k r a t i e
(Duesseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1954),
pp. 21-22.
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to give up its revolutionary theories and to concentrate instead on
objectives within the party's capabilities. These objectives ranged
from the abolition of the three-class electoral system in Prussia to
a popular control over the formulation and conduct of Germany's
foreign policy. 19
The party center or the so-called orthodox Marxist center led
by Karl Kautsky opposed the revisionists' theories. These cen
trists were well entrenched in the party's Executive Committee
and consequently controlled the actual policies of the SPD. As a
result, no changes in the official position of the party occurred
because of Bernstein's attack upon the revolutionary heritage of
the socialist movement, or at least none could be detected in the
public utterances of the party leaders.
The initial opposition of the orthodox Marxists to the op
portunism of the right wing gradually gave way to a more con
ciliatory attitude, and the political views of the revisionists were
judged by the party leadership on the basis of tactical considera
tions and not as symptoms of a basic cleavage. Kautsky, for ex
ample, regarded Bernstein's revisionism as a purely tactical prob
lem.20
This approach to revisionism allowed the party center under
certain circumstances to adopt some of the revisionist tactical
principles, such as advocating and fighting for specific reforms,
without the necessity of justifying these actions with a new set
of theories.21
Within a few years after the emergence of the reformists in the
SPD, another faction appeared. This group was the numerically
weak but extremely active radical left which formed itself around
those socialists who continued to advocate strict adherence to
Marxist principles. The outstanding leaders of the left wing were
Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, and Franz
19 Halperin, op. cit., p. 18.
20 Berlau, op. cit., p. 63.
21 Berlau analyzes this situation as
follows:
"The implications of the SPD atti-

tude toward revisionism indicated that
the party was, under certain conditions,
ready to jettison not only the practice
of political radicalism, but the Marxian
essence of its theory as well. All that

11
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Mehring. The radicals of the left accused the so-called orthodox
Marxists of the party center of following the opportunist program
in practice in spite of their revolutionary terminology and their
alleged opposition to the reformists. Thus, the radicals were
strictly opposed to the revisionists around Bernstein and to the
party centrists led by Kautsky. 22
The left wing of the SPD was by no means a homogeneous
group; important differences in Marxist interpretation were the
rule rather than the exception. Nevertheless all of its members
held certain views in common. All had the absolute conviction
that only a proletarian revolution would end the existing social
order and bring about socialism. All were more or less preoccu
pied with studying the means by which a socialist proletarian party
could accelerate the revolution. Finally, all were aware of the
contradictions existing between the official socialist theories pro
claimed by the SPD and the prevailing tactical moves of the
party.23

3.

The Influence of the Trade Unions
Within the trade unions there were tendencies similar to those
motivating the revisionist wing of the SPD. The continuous growth
of the unions gave their leaders confidence that it was possible to
fight for the economic objectives of the worker within the existing
framework of the state. Improvement of material conditions for
the workers was the main interest of the union leaders, who be
lieved that the achievement of this aim was not intrinsically conwas needed was an impelling external
stimulus, a sound need for a change in
tactics." (Berlau, op. cit., p. 65.)
22 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 6; lllus
trierte Geschichte, pp. 81-82.
23 Tormin, op. cit., p. 23.
Otto Grotewohl furnishes a Com
munist post-World War II interpreta
tion of the reasons behind the emer
gence of three factions within the SPD
in the early part of this century. Ac
cording to the Communists, the ap-

pearance of the revisionists triggered
the threeway split within the party. The
strict followers of the Marxist revolu
tionary doctrines were forced to fight
against the heretics and against the
conciliatory attitude of the majority of
the SPD and its leadership. In the pro
cess of this internal party struggle, the
three wings developed. (Otto Grote
wohl, Dreissig Jahre Spaeter [Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1948], pp. 37-42.)
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nected with the revolutionary struggle. Violent revolutionary ac
tion might even endanger the economic and social gains made so
far. The union leaders thus developed strong opposition to the
party's attempt to keep the unions as appendices to the political
organization. Gradually they achieved complete independence
from the political leadership of the SPD. Union animosity was
strongest toward the radical left group within the party, because
of their so-called revolutionary romanticism which, it was feared,
might disturb the gradual but steady improvement of the workers'
lot. 2,
In other words, the immediate interests of the workers were
of greater concern to the union leaders than was the emergence
of the socialist society of the future. This conservatism was not
restricted to political questions; other union decisions took a
progressively moderate turn. The unions eventually tried to avoid
large-scale strikes in order not to deplete their funds. Simultane
ously, internal bureaucracy developed into an autocratic ma
chinery denying the individual members certain democratic
rights. 25 Indeed, the union leaders came to regard the SPD as an
agency of political interest for the trade unions and not as a move
ment dedicated to the socialist revolution. 26
Rosa Luxemburg analyzed the interrelation of the unions'
views and those of the revisionists. The reasoning behind the
unions' claim for a position of equality, according to her, had a
familiar ring; it was based on the illusion that in peaceful periods
of the bourgeois society the entire struggle of the workers was re24 Halperin, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
25 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 61. The
attempt of the unions to reverse the
situation and to control the actions of
the SPD was ridiculed by Rosa Luxem
burg in a speech at the Party Congress
in Mannheim in 1906. She compared
the union-party relationship with a
curious marriage contract of a peasant
couple. This contract stated that the
will of the husband was to be carried
out in all cases in which the wife agreed
with him; however, when her will dif-

fered from his, then action would have
to be taken in accordance with her
views. (Rosa Luxemburg, "Reden auf
dem Mannheimer Parteitag der SPD,
1906," quoted in Rosa Luxemburg,
Ausgewaehlte Reden und Schriften
[Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1951], [here
after cited as: Ausgewaehlte Reden],
II, p. 260.)
26 John L. Snell, "Socialist Unions
and Socialist Patriotism in Germany,
1914-1918," The American Historical
Review, LIX (1953-54), p. 67.
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duced to the SPD's parliamentary fight for political reforms and
the unions' endeavors to obtain economic advantages for their
workers.
The theory of "equality" of the unions with the Social Democ
racy is then not a simple misunderstanding or confusion of terms,
but is the expression of the known position of the opportunistic
wing of the Social Democracy which indeed wishes to transform the
Social Democracy from a revolutionary proletarian party into a
middle-class reform party. 27

The opposition of the radical left to this development proved
to be futile. The weight of the unions was felt increasingly not
only in the period pr�eding August, 1914, but also during the
war. As a matter of fact, the attitude of the trade unions backed
by numerical and financial power proved to be one of the decisive
influences in the victory of revisionism over radicalism within the
SPD. 28
4.

Principal Political Concepts of the Left Wing
The process of challenging revisionist ideas played an im
portant part in the formulation of the political thought of the
radical left. However, the claim made by Communist interpreters
of the history of the German socialist movement that left wing
theories were primarily the result of the emergence and activities
of the revisionists cannot be supported by factual evidence. The
purpose behind this Communist effort to present the development
of theoretical concepts as specific responses to revisionist attempts
to falsify and dilute Marxist doctrines was to assert that the Com
munists alone were true followers of "scientific" Marxism as origi
nated by Marx and Engels.
At least three other major factors contributed to the growth
of the left wing faction and its body of revolutionary theories.
First, there was the preoccupation of socialists with a number of
27 Rosa Luxemburg, Massenstreik,
Partei wzd Gewerkschaft, quoted in

Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, I,
pp. 237-38. 28 Halperin, op. cit., p. 19.
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theoretical and tactical problems. They were concerned with the
type of organization best suited for a socialist party devoted to the
idea of changing the existing society. They wondered what part
the party was to play in a bourgeois state and what position it
should take toward liberal elements. They were further occupied
with an analysis of the practical means - available or potential
- to be used in the revolutionary struggle aimed at establishing
a socialist society. The revolutionary theories resulting from this
preoccupation were not caused primarily by polemics against re
visionism but by the interpretation given by revolutionary social
ists to the teachings of Marx and Engels. It appears, for example,
that Marx's doctrine of economic determinism had a much greater
influence on these theories than the fight against such concepts
of Bernstein's as the gradual or evolutionary change of society.
Secondly, the Russian Revolution of 1905 - especially the
mass action of the Russian workers and peasants - had a marked
impact on the political thinking of socialists everywhere. The
entire problem of the political mass strike or general strike as a
modern method in the revolutionary struggle was re-examined.
The creation of local revolutionary workers' councils as instru
ments for conducting revolutionary action was analyzed.
Finally, specific experiences of socialist parties in various
countries contributed to the development of radical theories, es
pecially those dealing with tactical methods in the fight for the
intermediate and ultimate aims of socialism. For example, in
Germany the fight for election reforms and the resistance offered
by the German government tended to give emphasis to the tac
tical doctrines developed by the left wing of the SPD. The radicals
were able to conclude that there was no real substitute for the
revolutionary struggle as conceived by Marx and Engels as soon
as proposed changes affected the prevailing power relations. Con
tinued oppression of the Social Democrats by the German gov
ernment served to prove the points made by the leftists. 29
29 As late as April, 1908, the German
Government passed a law prohibiting

persons of twenty years or younger to
attend political or trade union meet-
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The German example also indicated that a study of revolu
tionary theories must take into account the fact that varying con
ditions in different countries generate specific problems for the
socialist movement. In Russia, the severe oppression and social
stratification, particularly the large segment of unskilled laborers
and peasants, favored the development of conspiratorial ideas
rather than the legal recognition granted the SPD after the repeal
of the anti-socialist legislation.
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the left wing
of the SPD developed a number of important revolutionary con
cepts. These concepts were significant for two major reasons.
First, they determined to a considerable extent the political ac
tions of the left faction and subsequently those of the Spartacists.
Secondly, they had an important impact upon the official policies
of the SPD, which at times, at least in resolutions at party con
gresses and at international conferences, was forced to incorporate
revolutionary-sounding principles.
Many of the revolutionary theories of the German left were
clarified, formulated, and defended by Rosa Luxemburg, one of
the outstanding leftists within the German Social Democracy. Her
political thought was characteristic of many of the left-wingers
who, as pr<?fessed revolutionaries, subordinated all tactical and
strategic considerations to the final aim of the socialist movement,
the realization of socialism. This ultimate aim furnished the yard
stick for judging the usefulness of theories and actions. Even the
seizure of political power and the socialization of the means of
production were regarded only as a means serving the highest pos
sible end, the creation of the classless, socialist society. 30
Rosa Luxemburg's attitude toward reforms of any kind was
clearly influenced by this basic conviction. She strongly opposed
Bernstein's view that reform work within a bourgeois democracy
ings. The Social Democratic Youth or
ganization was dissolved, and political
work among the youth became illegal
from this time until the Revolution of

November 1918. (Wolfe, op. cit., p.
600.)
3 ° Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
13-14.
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was a substitute for the proletarian revolution, that in fact it was
a sort of "slow" revolution. The fallacy of this revisionist ap
proach, according to her, was that the ultimate aim of the socialist
movement - the socialist society - was lost in preoccupation
with reforming the existing capitalist society. Rosa Luxemburg
was not opposed to reforms as a matter of principle; she realized
that the fight for reforms could be used as a means of organizing
and training the workers. Her position was not reforms or revolu
tion but reforms and revolution. Important for her was that the
daily fight remain organically connected with the ultimate aim. 31
Karl Liebknecht was equally opposed to substituting for the
revolutionary aim the reform of existing conditions. He attacked
the so-called new method on three grounds. First, he pointed out
that this new method overestimated the benefits which the bour
geois democracy could bestow on the workers; secondly, it un
derestimated the irreconcilable cleavage between proletariat and
bourgeoisie; and finally, it limited the class struggle by the ab
solute non-violence principle which constituted a surrender of the
revolutionary method to the process of gradual reforms. Accord
ing to Liebknecht, it was foolhardy to believe that the capitalists
would •ever agree voluntarily to restrictions affecting their vital
positions. The so-called peaceful method was dangerous utopian
ism. He was convinced that as long as the government functioned
as "the executive committee of the ruling class" the state would
remain an instrument serving the perpetuation of existing power
relations. 32
Completely in agreement with the leftists' position with re
gard to reforms were their views concerning parliamentarianism
31 Rosa Luxemburg, Sozialreform
oder Revolution, quoted in Luxemburg,
Ausgewaehlte Reden, ll, pp. 126-28,
137; Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.

70-74. Luxemburg's strong opposi
tion to Bernstein's conscious intention
of transforming the SPD into a liberal
reform party led to her futile demands

for his expulsion from the party. (Froe
lich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 96.)
s2 Karl Liebknecht, Reden und Auf
saetze (Hamburg: Verlag d. Kommu
nistischen Internationale, 1921), [here
after cited as: Liebknecht, Reden], pp.
80-87.
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as a means for the class struggle. Again it was not absolute op
position which motivated Rosa Luxemburg; she regarded par
liamentarianism as one more way for the SPD to propagandize
the workers. Elections for parliamentary representatives were es
pecially suited for this purpose, and parliament itself could be
used as a convenient platform for reaching a great number of
people. But there were some restrictions on how far participation
could go without compromising the revolutionary creed. As a
matter of principle, the party was to remain in opposition under
all circumstances. Participation of socialists in a bourgeois gov
ernment, as practiced by Alexandre Millerand in France, was
treason to the working class. Representatives of the workers were
permitted to enter a bourgeois government only if they intended
to take over political power. Millerand's entry into the French
government of Waldeck-Rousseau highlighted the problem of
socialist participation in a bourgeois government. For the re
visionists this was no problem at all. It was perfectly in agree
ment with their theory of gradual introduction of socialism
through reforms. Revolutionary socialists who believed that so
cialism could come only after the breakdown .of the capitalist
order could hardly conceive of entering a bourgeois govemment
. for any purpose other than to destroy it from within. The ac
ceptance by a socialist of a position in the executive branch of the
government was considered impossible, because it was held that
oppositional policies could not be pursued within tl;le executive.
This limitation did not apply to the legislature. Rosa Luxemburg's
position toward parliamentarianism was in complete agreement
with her revolutionary concepts: the SPD in a bourgeois society
must remain the opposition party under all circumstances; it may
take over the government only when the bourgeois state breaks
down."4
33 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
83-87.
a4 Rosa Luxemburg, "Eine taktische

Frage," quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 60-64.
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Thus, the invasion of parliament was not a device to replace
the necessity of forceful revolution. Rosa Luxemburg followed
completely the doctrines of Marx and Engels concerning the
revolutionary method of seizing political power by the working
class. She claimed that only people like Bernstein wished to ac
complish the greatest change in world history, the change from
capitalism to socialism, by means of the bourgeois parliament.
Rosa Luxemburg's evaluation of parliament was based on her in
terpretation of the Marxist doctrines pertaining to the nature of
society and the state. Any bourgeois state, regardless of its form,
was an instrument of the ruling class and therefore directly op
posed to the interests of the working class.
Karl Liebknecht insisted on subordination of the parliament
ary struggle to the fight of the party and the workers outside the
legislature. He held that the party's power came not from the
representatives in parliament but from the masses directly. 35 The
real power relations operated outside parliament. The legislature
could serve as an excellent platform for addressing the masses,
but it was dangerous to create among the workers the illusion
that the class struggle could be carried on within parliament and
thus to replace the need for mass action in streets and factories. 3"
Rosa Luxemburg also stressed these same points. The real
power of the SPD was not the effect the representatives had in
the Reichstag but the power the people could muster in the streets.
She sympathized with the Social Democratic representatives who
had the difficult task not only of acting as instruments of an arti
culate opposition to the bourgeois government but also as repre
sentatives of a revolutionary class which intended to upset the
existing political, economic, and social arrangements. 37

35 Karl Liebknecht, "Gegen den Re
formismus," quoted in Karl Lieb
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, Briefe
und Aufsaetze (Berlin: Dietz Verlag,
1952), [hereafter cited as: Liebknecht,
Ausgewaehlte Reden], p. 169.

:;6 Liebknecht, Reden, pp. 22-26.
37 Rosa Luxemburg, "Sozialdemo
kratie und Parliamentarismus," quoted
in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden,
II, pp. 198-99.
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The great power embodied in the masses was demonstrated
in the fight for a new Prussian election law. For the first time the
SPD mobilized the German workers for a political offensive. The
masses responded to the call and held street demonstrations. But
the party became afraid of its own enterprising spirit and discon
tinued the mass action simply by failing to provide further direc
tives. Mass strikes, the logical sequence to the street demonstra
tions, could have pressed further the demands for election reforms.
But they were vigorously opposed by the trade unions which did
not sanction using the strike as a political weapon. 38
An analysis of the Russian Revolution of 1905 provided the
leftist, and particularly Rosa Luxemburg, with a basis for re
evaluating the mass strike as a method of furthering the class
struggle and the socialist revolution. Prior to 1905, the mass
strike was regarded by the international Social Democracy and
the SPD as a purely anarchistic and utopian concept. 39 Accord
ing to Rosa Luxemburg, the Russian Revolution had reversed
this view. In_ fact, the mass strike as used in Russia had opened
an entirely new era for the labor movement, because it had placed
a new and more powerful weapon in the hands of the workers. 40
Under the impact of the Russian Revolution, discussions on the
mass strike as a possible means in the revolutionary struggle be
came widespread in Social Democratic organizations. This in
terest proved to Rosa Luxemburg that the methods employed by
the SPD up to then had not achieved sufficient results nor satis
fied the revolutionary spirit of the party members. New methods
were needed to advance the cause. 41
38 The inequality of the election law
provisions is best illustrated by the
election results of 1908 when the SPD
received 6 seats with over 600,000 votes
while the Conservatives obtained 212
seats with over 400,000 votes. (Rosa
Luxemburg, "Was weiter?" quoted in
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II,
pp. 324-28; Froelich, Rosa Luxem
burg, pp. 205-06.
39 Rosa Luxemburg, "Reden auf dem

L o n d o n e r Parteitag der SDAPR,"
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte
Reden, II, p. 275.
-1° Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp. 15758. Rosa Luxemburg even thought at
one time that the mass strike might
have replaced the need for fighting at
the barricades, the means used by the
bourgeoisie in its revolts against feu
dalism. (Ibid., pp. 227-30.)
41 Luxemburg, "Der politische Mas-
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Many SPD leaders, revisionists, and trade unionists did not
share this interpretation of the Russian experience. Labor leaders
claimed that a mass strike entailed too many risks for the trade
unions. Rosa Luxemburg responded that all actions of a fighting
organization involve risks. She reminded the reluctant union
leaders that the trade unions gained in strength during the chal
lenging period of the anti-socialist law.4 2 Karl Legien's opinion
was typical of the union leaders' position. For him mass strikes
and general strikes were one and the same. He called them general
nonsense and regarded them as undertakings which could en
danger the very existence of the unions. Rosa Luxemburg, vigor
ously opposing this opinion, pointed out that the Russian experi
ence showed that the Russian unions were actually an outgrowth
of the revolution. 43
Liebknecht also endorsed the mass strike as an important
weapon for the workers. He asserted that election victories were
not enough and that mass actions were also needed. If strikes
proved themselves valuable in the economic struggle then there
should be no doubt that they could also serve political purposes.
He saw in the mass strike, which he believed to be the outgrowth
of the realization by the working class of its economic power, the
specific proletarian means of combat suitable for all phases of
the class struggle...
Rosa Luxemburg gained at least a formal victory when her
resolutions concerning mass strikes were adopted at the party
congresses in Jena ( 1905) and in Mannheim ( 1906) against the
opposition of the trade unions. The political strike was thus
sanctioned as a weapon of the SPD.45 Legien claimed that the
acceptance of the mass strike resolution was a careless move be
cause it revealed tactical plans to the enemies of the working class.
senstreik," quoted in Luxemburg, Aus
gewaehlte Reden, JI, pp. 442-43.
42 Luxemburg, Was Weiter? pp. 33334; and Massenstreik, p. 220.
43 Luxemburg, Reden auf dem Mann
heimer Parteitag, pp. 236-57.
44 Karl Liebknecht, "Ueber den po-

Iitischen Massenstreik," quoted in Lieb
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 8990; and Karl Liebknecht, "Fuer den po
litischen Massenstreik," quoted in Lieb
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden. p. 99.
45 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
124-25, 164, 166-69. In these resolu-
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Rosa Luxemburg countered that a modern proletarian mass move
ment does not decide secretly on its tactics.46
From the Russian events of 1905 Rosa Luxemburg inferred
the following characteristics of the mass strike. First, a mass
strike is not artificially created but comes as the result of a parti
cular situation during a specific phase of the class struggle. A
mass strike cannot be called by a decision of the party's executive
committee, just as revolution cannot take place upon command.
Second, a mass strike is not a substitute should parliamentary
action fail. Mass strikes are revolutionary weapons and cannot
be made harmonious with policies which place primary emphasis
upon parliamentary action. 41 Third, if a mass strike is to be suc
cessful, the broad masses must be drawn into the fight in order to
make it a real mass movement. It cannot be carried out by or
ganized workers alone. The trade unions must assist the party.
The mass strike is also not just a question of discipline and esti
mated costs but a genuine revolutionary class action. It is unwise
to overestimat� the role of the party and to underestimate the
revolutionary actions of the unorganized masses:•s The Russian
Revolution had shown that the mass strike was influenced by the
Social Democratic organizations, but that neither the party nor
the masses followed a pre-arranged plan. It was not an organized
action but rather a spontaneous uprising of the masses.4°
Nonetheless, Rosa Luxemburg emphasized the importance of
political leadership not only for the period of actual revolutionary
mass strikes but also for the valuable training which would pay
off in serious revolutionary situations. She synthesized her aptions, the mass strike was conceived
only as a defense against a possible
further limitation of voting rights.
Therefore, the mass strike still re
mained subordinate to the parliament
ary work of the party. (Luxemburg,
Massenstreik, p. 167.)
40 Luxemburg, Reden auf dem Mann
heimer Parteitag, p. 258.
47 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp.
163-66; and Der politische Massen-

streik, pp. 444-45.
48 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp.
220-22; and Was weiter? pp. 331-32.
49 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp.
179-88. By referring to the Russian
events, Rosa Luxemburg even attempt
ed to prove that it was not dialectical
to believe that strong organizations
must be available before the revolu
tion. In Russia the masses went into
the revolution with almost no unions
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predation of the "element of mass spontaneity" with that of the
role of the party." 0
Rosa Luxemburg's confidence in the creative power of the
masses, expressed for example in spontaneous mass actions, has
provoked many attacks especially from recent Communist inter
preters. She was accused of "worshipping spontaneity and negat
ing the role of the party."51
Paul Froelich, her biographer, claimed that her ideas were
purposely misinterpreted, that she never excluded the conscious
political leadership of the party; on the contrary, she desired it.
Possibly her mistake was that she did not grasp the extent of the
retarding influence which an organization, led by persons opposed
to revolutionary methods in the class struggle, could exert. Her
overconfidence in the masses is explained by Froelich as a typical
mistake of a genuine revolutionary. 52
Rosa Luxemburg's confidence in mass spontaneity and her
opposition to Lenin's ultra-centralism and conspiratorial concepts
as guiding principles for the organization of the party led to sharp
controversies between the two revolutionary leaders. 53 Her en
dorsement of the use of force in the revolutionary struggle brought
her into sharp opposition with the official policy of the SPD and
in particular with the revisionists who, like Eduard David, as-

and with only small socialist organi
zations. (Rosa Luxemburg, Reden auf
dem lenaer Parteitag der SPD, 1905,
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte,
Reden, II, p. 246.)
50 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp.
205-8, 223-25.
s 1 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 257; Rosa Lu
xemburg, "Nach dem ersten Akt,"
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte
Reden, II, pp. 217-18; Fred Oelssner,
Rosa Luxemburg, eine kritische bio
graphische Skizze (Berlin: Dietz Ver
lag, 1951), pp. 50-52. Grotewohl, op.
cit., p. 41.
52 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
173-76.

s3 Ibid., pp. 107-09. Rosa Luxem
burg had fought Lenin's party theory
since the split of the Russian party in
1903, believing that this split was detri
mental to the furtherance of the Rus
sian Revolution. (Franz Borkenau, Der
europaeische Kommunismus [B e r n :
Francke-Verlag, 1952], p. 25; Luxem
burg, Reden auf dem Londoner Partei
tag, p. 284.) For a brief discussion of
the differences between Rosa Luxem
burg and Lenin on party organization,
see Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German
Communism (Cambridge: Ha r v a r d
University Press, 1948), pp. 17-20.
Lenin's position is explained fully in
his What ls To Be Done? (Moscow:
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serted that the SPD must use only legal, parliamentary means in
its political fight. 54

5.

Nationalism Versus Internationalism
Some of the revisionists and many of the trade union leaders
had jumped on the German imperialist bandwagon. Their actions
were completely in accord with their acceptance of the bourgeois
state as the proper framework for their political, social, and eco
nomic reform policies. In addition to these nationalistic socialists,
many of the other SPD leaders also supported the expansionist
foreign policies of the German government. The SPD believed,
for example, that there was nothing objectionable to peaceful
penetration of colonial areas. Only the leftists retained an inter
nationalist position and continued to oppose the government's
nationalism and the nationalistic tendencies within the party. Rosa
Luxemburg declared that the Social Democracy must never par
ticipate in the foreign affairs of the Great Powers. The working
class and its representatives in all countries had their own foreign
policies based on revolutionary, international concepts which
certainly had nothing in common with the imperialistic plans of
their various governments.55
The intensification of imperialist designs displayed by the
Lierman government and by the governments of several other
countries alarmed the international Social Democracy or at least
parts of it, and made the socialists aware of the danger of an out
break of a large-scale European or world war. The Socialist and
Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1947)
and One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd.,
1941.) For the views of Rosa Luxem
burg, see her Reden auf dem Londoner
Parteitag. Lenin's concepts on party
tactics are contained in his Two Tac

tics of Social-Democracy in the Demo
cratic Revolution (New York: Interna

tional Publishers. 1935).
54 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
91-93. Luxemburg, Reden auf dem

Mannheimer Parteitag, p. 261. One of
the clearest formulations of the re
visionist position towar(j the bourgeois
state and the proletarian revolution is
a resolution prepared by Dr. Eduard
David and presented for approval to a
party meeting in Mainz on September
JO, 1906 (Luxemburg, Massenstreik,
pp. 238-39).
Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
199-202.
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Labor International dealt with the war danger at its international
congresses held in Stuttgart ( 1907) and in Basel ( 1912). 56
At the Stuttgart Conference, the position of the international
Social Democracy regarding the war issue was debated and clari
fied considerably. The decision that socialist deputies in the par
liaments of all countries were unconditionally pledged to vote
against any military expenditure required for colonial expeditions
had been on the records of the International since its conference
at Paris in 1900. 57 The socialists felt that stronger measures and
threats of actions were necessary to prevent an outbreak of a gen
eral war. The French and English delegates proposed the calling
of a general strike as a countermeasure in case of war. Rosa
Luxemburg opposed this motion, insisting that this type of action
program would remain only a resolution at best. She maintained
that individual Social Democratic parties would undoubtedly fail
to act in accordance with the Conference resolutions even though
they could expect support from the masses which were much
afraid of a war. 58
The resolution eventually adopted by the Stuttgart Congress
called upon all Social Democratic parties to employ every means
available to fight against the outbreak of war and for the preserva
tion of world peace. 59 This resolution did not seem adequate nor
realistic enough to Rosa Luxemburg. She therefore proposed an
important amendment which she had worked out with Lenin and
5r; The correct name for the Interna
tional was Socialist and Labor Interna
tional. Only after the Communist In
ternational was founded in March, 1919,
did the Socialist International become
referred to as the Second International
and the Communist International as the
Third. (Wolfe, op. cit., p. 92.) For a
brief sketch of the Second Interna
tional, see Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp.
15-16, and Paul Froelich, Zehn Jahre
Krieg und Buergerkrieg (2d ed.; Ber
lin: Vereinigung Internationaler Ver
lags-Anstalten), I, pp. 27-29.
57 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 598.

58 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 204.
For example, in debates at the interna
tional conferences many d e l e g a t e s
stressed the right to defend themselves
against an attack from without. The
recognized leader of the German So
cial Democrats, August Bebe!, stated
in Stuttgart that he did not see how the
SPD could get people for a mass strike
if, on the day the war breaks out, six
million men would be mobilized im
mediately. (Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp.
44-45.)
09 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 79-80.
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Martov. After some initial .difficulties with Bebel were ironed
out, the amendment was adopted. It read as follows:
If a war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the working class
and of its parliamentary representatives in the countries involved, sup
ported by the consolidating activity of the International Bureau, to
exert every effort to prevent the outbreak of war by means they con
sider most effective; which naturally vary according to the sharpening
of the class struggle and of the general political situation.
Should war break out nonetheless, it is their duty to intervene in
favor of its speedy termination and to do all in their power to utilize
the economic and political crisis caused by the war to rouse the peoples
and,thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule. 00

The position taken by the radical left of the SPD in regard to
the danger of a war and to the means designed to avert it was a
matter of record at the international congresses. Rosa Luxem
burg included in the immediate tasks of the Social Democracy the
propaganda activities directed at the working class in order to
make it aware of its historic mission in the class struggle and to
prepare it· to fight if necessary against war and militarism.61
Because the reformists held an opposite view on the issues of
nationalism and war, a new type of cleavage developed within
the SPD. The nationalistic attitude of some of the SPD leaders
had been apparent at the various conferences of the Second In
ternational. " 2
William Maehl traces the change of the SPD from its revo
lutionary and internationalist platform to its identification with
the interests of the German nation. At the party congresses of the
SPD at Chemnitz in 1912 and at Jena in 1913, the left wing
00 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 600. For an in
teresting discussion of the anti-war is
sue at the Stuttgart Congress, see ibid.,
pp. 591-600. Cf. also Rosa Luxemburg,
"Rede auf dem Internationalen Sozia•
listenkongress zu Stuttgart," quoted in
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II,
pp. 308-10. For information on the
International Congress at Basel in 1912

see Rosa Luxemburg, Die Krise der
Sozialdemokratie, quoted in Luxem
burg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, I, pp. 26668.
61 Rosa Luxemburg, "Militarismus,
Krieg und Arbeiterklasse," quoted in
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II,
p. 493.
62 Maehl, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
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radicals ( among them Kurt Geyer, Georg Ledebour, Wilhelm
Dittmann, Hugo Haase, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara
Zetkin, and Franz Mehring) fought vigorously against the na
tionalistic trend of the party. They fought a losing battle. In
Chemnitz the Party Congress approved the concept of national
defense measures because of the "Russian peril." At the Party
Congress in Jena, only six years after the International Congress
at Stuttgart, the SPD decided that it was not required under all
circumstances to vote against military appropriations. This com
plete reversal of the Stuttgart resolution was adopted by a vote
of 336 to 140. The other major issue, the general strike resolu
tion recommended by Rosa Luxemburg, was defated, 333 to 142.
Maehl correctly asserts that the SPD had made its great policy
change - the adoption of nationalism - long before the fatal
August of 1914. 63

6.

General Characteristics of the SPD on the Eve of
World War I

In the course of time, reformist concepts and trade union ob
jectives had come to determine the official policies of the SPD.
Under this influence, the party had undergone a gradual metaGB [bid., pp. 32-41. An excellent ex
ample of the "patriotic attitude" of the
SPD during the pre-war years was a
speech made in 1907 by the Social
Democratic Reichstag representative
Gustav Noske in a debate about the
military budget. Noske declared that
the SPD recognized the peace policy
the German Government was trying to
pursue. The SPD also wished to make
known that it was not the intent of the
party to undermine the discipline of the

Germany army. On the contrary, the
Social Democrats wished to see Ger
many militarily strong, and Noske gave
the assurance that, in case of war, the
Social Democratic workers would take
up arms and their patriotism would
not be surpassed by that of any other
class. A satirical German periodical,
the Lustigen Blaetter, published on
October 8, 1907, a poem dedicated to
the "new patriot," Noske.

Herve will Soldatenstreik,
Liebknecht spricht so aehnlich,
Ledebour zeigt sich dem Heer
Auch nicht sehr versoehnlich;
Doch der Hoffnung Jetzten Rest
Soll man nicht verlieren.
Eins steht heute bombenfest:
Noske wird parieren.

Herve wants a mutiny
Within the army's frame;
Liebknecht talks along this line
And Ledebour's the same.
But do not lose all rays of hope,
One thing stands firm today:
If army orders are sent out,
Then Noske will obey.
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morphosis from a revolutionary, proletarian party strictly opposed
to the bourgeois class state to a kind of liberal, working-class
party content with working for reform and political democracy
within the framework of the existing state. It had become a party
which had great respect for law and state authority, and even
an admiration for force. 64
Its leaders shunned serious political struggles fearing to de
stroy the advantages so laboriously acquired. Revolutionary
phrases were still heard at party congresses as part of the tra
ditional ritual, but the idea of a violent struggle would have hor
rified most of the party leaders. The SPD had become a power
in its own right. It could reward disciplined followers with po
sitions and promotions, and it could punish violators of party
Geht es mal in ferner Frist
Ans Kanonenfuttern,
Denkt so mancher Reservist:
"Nee,-ick bleib bei Muttern!"
Doch das soll uns Kampf und Schlacht
Nimmermehr vergaellen,
Denn es istheut' ausgemacht:
Noske wird sich stellen.
Kommandiert der Herr Maior:
"Feuer vorn und hinten!"
. Ruft ein arbeitsscheues Korps:
"Schmeiss mer fort die Flinten!"
Aber dennoch, Mut fuer Mut!
Lasst's euch nicht verdriessen,
Denn wir wissen absolut:
Noske, der wird schiessen!

If cannon-fodder is required
At distant time or tide,
Quite a few Reservists think:
"With mother I shall bide."
On this account our battle strength
Will not lack in beauty,
Because today we're sure that Noske
Will report for duty.
And if a Major then commands:
"Fire front and rear!"
But "Throw away the rifles,"
Shouts a unit filled with fear;
Then do not be downhearted,
Then do not show dismay,
Because we're absolutely sure
That Noske'll fire away.

Noske schnallt den Saebel um,
Noske geht aufs Ganze,
Noske feuert bum bum bum,
Noske stuermt die Schanze,
Noske schreit: Hurra! Hurra!
Noske haelt die Wachen,
Noske schiesst Victoria,
Noske wirds schon machen.

Noske straps his sabre on,
Noske's fire and vim;
Noske shoo�,bang,bang,bang,bang;
He storms the bulwark grim.
Noske shouts: Hurrah! Hurrah!
He guards us in the night;
Noske'll bring the Victory,
He'll fix things up all right.

(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 80.)

( translation by Robert Simmons,
Modern Language Department,
Marquette University)

64 Maehl, op. cit., p. 15; Carlo Sforza,
Europe and Europeans (London: Har-

rap&Co., 1936),pp. 82-85.
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discipline. Leftists such as Mehring and Liebknecht were dis
trusted, and revolutionaries of the caliber of Rosa Luxemburg
were regarded as sources of great annoyance and as alien intel
lectual trouble-makers. 65
No public repudiation of the old revolutionary doctrines of the
Marxian tradition was made by the party leadership, and the
controversies and factional strife were hidden behind a fac;ade of
party unity. To the non-socialist world the SPD appeared to be
a strong and unified party, while in truth it was composed of
three factions of unequal size and influence on party policies.
The party center continued to enjoy the unwavering loyalty of
the overwhelming number of German Socialists and party sym
pathizers. It was known neither to them nor to outsiders that
the SPD had assumed the characteristics of a reform party and
was using revolutionary terminology only to appeal to the workers.
The party was not anxious to assume political power, and was
content to criticize the existing situation without proposing a
political plan of its own. 66 The SPD became the party of the
"permanent loyal opposition," actually borrowing this term from
British political usage. Some leaders even came to believe that
the aims of the Social Democracy could be realized under a
monarchical form of government just as well as they could under
a republican system.
The tremendous growth in the number of party adherents re
sulted in the loss of its exclusive proletarian base. It has been
suggested that the SPD had developed into the only democratic
65 Sforza, op. cit., pp.86-87.Noske's
views on the "foreign" influence in the
SPD are illuminating:
"The attempt made by a number of
foreigners from Poland and Russia to
set themselves up as teachers of the
German workers caused resentment.
... It has nothing to do with anti
Semitism when one points out that the
'Marxists' of East European Jewish
background had a special aptitude for
transforming socialism into a dogma

and changing popular views into con
fessions of faith. They plotted a secret
[mysterious] science which always re
mained incomprehensible to the Ger
man workers. Only a few half-intel
lectuals brought discredit upon the
labor movement by their idle talk about
Marxism. I do not believe that I have
ever mentioned Marxism in a speech
or in an article...." (Noske, Erlebtes,
p. 27.)

66 Rosenberg, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

29

30

THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF

1919

people's party since Germany lacked a genuinely liberal middle
class party. "
It has been mentioned above that the SPD also showed con
siderable nationalistic tendencies. These flourished in spite of
SPD approval of resolutions at international socialist conferences
expressing opposite views.
Three major reasons have been suggested for the change of
character of the SPD during the period preceding August 1914.
( 1 ) With the ultimate aim set far in the future, the natural, human
reaction was to transform the social revolutionary movement into
a reform movement; (2) the realization of some demands in
evitably led to a more conciliatory attitude toward the ruling
group; ( 3) the highly institutionalized character of the organiza
tion resulted in its becoming the major concern of party officials
interested in perpetuating the existing situation and thus it lost
much of its revolutionary spirit. 68 All three of these factors
exerted influence. Count Sforza on the eve of the European war,
interestingly �escribed the SPD as nothing but "a gigantic ad
ministrative organization - the body tremendous, but the soul
very puny."09
7

67 Maehl, op. cit., pp.26-27. Count
Sforza, the internationally k n ow n
Italian statesman, would not honor the
SPD with the designation of a genuine
democratic people's party. He em
phasized that the SPD had absorbed
so much Hegelian thought with its
characteristic adoration of the state
that "the 'rights of man and of citizen'
faded into abstract 'principles'....
"
"Indeed, under the cover of the Marx
ist formula, considered more revolu-

tionary than any others, the German
Social Democracy merely continued
the special mentality of the old Ger
man imperialism. Just like the Liberals
who preceded them, the socialists were
so full of reverence for the technical
bounties of the state that they held any
encroachments on the personal rights
of citizens to be bearable annoyances."
(Sforza, op. cit., pp. 83, 84.)
es Flechtheim, op. cit., p.4.
69 Sforza, op. cit., p.85.

The Impact of World War I
on the German Socialist
Movement

1.

Support of the War Effort by the SPD and the
Trade Unions

The unanimous vote of the Social Democratic Reichstag fac
tion on August 4, 1914, in favor of granting the war appropri
ation requested by the German government indicated either that
the nationalistic elements within the SPD had succeeded in taking
control of the party or that the party had become overwhelmingly
patriotic. The vote was a strong declaration of faith in the exist
ing state. It also implied the belief prevalent among Social Demo
cratic leaders that the fate of the German workers was intimately
connected with the fate of the national state. The nationalistically
inclined socialists were convinced that military defeat would bring
disastrous results to the working class. 1
Prior to the outbreak of the war, the SPD expressed out
spokenly anti-war sentiments in its official pronouncements and
party newspapers. As late as the end of July, after Austria-Hun
gary had served its ultimatum on Serbia, Vorwaerts - the official
organ of the SPD - called on the workers to demonstrate against
the war danger and to exert public pressure on the German gov
ernment to desist from going to the aid of its Austrian ally. 2
1 Ludwig
Bergstraesser, Die Ge
schichte der politischen Parteien in
Deutsch/and (Munich: Isar Verlag,

1952), pp. 187-88.
2 For the text of the anti-war pro-

clamation in the July 25, 1914, issue of
Vorwaerts see, lllustrierte Geschichte,
p. 91. The Austrian-Hungarian ulti
matum to Serbia was dated July 23.
It was followed by a declaration of
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The International Bureau of the Socialist International met
in emergency sessions in Brussels on July 29 and 30. The war
had already started in the Balkans. The German socialists were
represented at the meetings by Karl Kautsky and Hugo Haase.
The assembled delegates unanimously adopted a resolution call
ing on the workers of all countries to intensify their demonstra
tions for peace. The International Congress, planned for August
23, 1914, in Vienna, was changed to August 9 and was to meet
in Paris. This was the total business accomplished at these meet
ings.
The last diplomatic meetings of the German and French so
cialists took place on August 1, 1914. The Executive Committee
of the SPD had sent Hermann Mueller to Paris to negotiate with
the French socialist leaders on coordinating party action in their
respective parliaments in order to prevent an outbreak of war
between the two countries.3 No results were achieved at these
conferences either. The French labor leaders requested assurance
from Hermann Mueller that the German trade unions and the
SPD would call a general strike and thus force the Kaiser to
keep Germany out of-the war. The French, in turn, promised to
do everything in their power to keep the French government from
· declaring war. Mueller was 1.mable to make these commitments
for the trade unions and the SPD. He was fearful that the German
government had already succeeded in convincing the German
people that their country was threatened by the "Russian peril."•
Besides not all SPD party leaders were opposed to Germany's
going to war. Some of the nationalistic revisionists supported the
German war policy even before August 1914. 5
war on July 28. Germany declared war
against Russia on August 1, shortly
after Russia had begun to mobilize its
military forces. War against France
was declared on August 3, and England
entered the conflict with a declaration
of war against Germany on August 4,
after German violation of Belgian neu
trality.
s Froelich, R o s a Luxemburg, pp.

237-42; Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 6364.
4 Albert C. Grzesinski, Inside Ger•
many (New York: Dutton & Co.,
1939). pp. 32-33.
5 Maehl, op. cit., p. 41. Among this
group of revisionists were such well
known leaders as Eduard David, Hein
rich Cunow, Wilhelm Kolb, Paul
Lensch, and Philip Scheidemann.
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When Germany declared war against Russia, the anti-war
faction within the Social Democratic leadership decreased con
siderably. The war appropriation question was discussed at a
meeting of the Executive Committee of the party on August 2,
1914. Scheidemann, David, and others were for the approval of
the government's forthcoming request; Haase and Ledebour op
posed it. No decision was reached. The decisive turn came the
following day in an executive meeting of the Social Democratic
members of the Reichstag. Eduard David argued that the fight
against Tsarism must be supported, for it might materially assist
the Russian Revolution. Of the one hundred and ten Social Demo
cratic deputies, only fourteen favored a policy of opposition to
the war. This minority was led by Hugo Haase, the chairman
of the SPD Reichstag faction. The opposition submitted reluc
tantly to the majority in the interest of party discipline and unity.
Thus, on August 4, 1914, the Social Democrats unanimously ap
proved the war appropriation. Even Karl Liebknecht, whose po
sition as an extreme leftist set him apart from the others, voted
with the majority. Haase read a statement on the floor of the
Reichstag explaining the action of the SPD. He declared that the
Social Democrats had worked against the international arma
ments race and imperialistic policies in general and that the re
sponsibility for the outbreak of the war rested entirely with those
who had pursued such policies. The present problem for the
Social Democrats was no longer the question of war or peace but
the danger which Germany faced because of the threat of foreign
invasion.6
An example of pre-war nationalist
sentiments displayed by leading Social
Democrats is an article written by
Friedrich Stampfer ( later editor-in
chief of Vorwaerts) which circulated
in many party newspapers on July 31
and August I. 1914. The article con
tained the following significant state
ment: "When the fateful hour strikes,
the workers will redeem the pledges
given on their behalf by their repre
sentatives; the vaterlandlosen Gesellen

will fulfill their duties and will in no
respect be surpassed by the patriots."
(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 97.) The
term "vaterlandlose Geselle" means a
person without a country. It is used by
Stampfer sarcastically. The socialists
were frequently accused by their po
litical opponents as "persons without
a country" because of their interna
tional ties and obligations.
G Maehl, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Halperin,
op. cit., p. 20; Froelich, Zehn Jahre,
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The majority of the SPD deputies who decided in favor of
the war appropriation may have been influenced by three im
portant factors. First of all, a wave of intense nationalism had
seized the German people of all social classes. The population
had fallen under a chauvinistic spell. No one seemed willing or
able to tell the people the truth about this "defensive" war. 1 Au
gust Winnig, the chairman of the construction workers' union
and a radical reformist ( who eventually was forced out of the
SPD), claimed that the attitude of the German workers actually
forced the SPD leaders, the Social Democratic Reichstag faction,
and the trade unions to support the nationalistic effort. 8
Secondly, there was the fear that the German government
would dissolve the party and the trade unions if the SPD should
oppose a war. This was a key argument in Eduard David's efforts
to get his fellow deputies to vote for the war appropriation. The
loss of legality was the worst thing that could happen to the
party bureaucracy. An order to dissolve the Social Democratic
organizations ':"as actually under consideration by the govern
ment as early as the spring of 1914. 9 Original plans of the War
Ministry included the arrest of all Social Democratic deputies at
the moment when a state of siege would be proclaimed. 10
pp. 67-70. For the text of the SPD
resolution, see lllustrierte Geschichte,
pp. 98-99.
7 Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 33; Maehl,
op. cit., pp. 40-41; lllustrierte Ge
schichte, pp. 95-96.
8 Tormin, op. cit., p. 33. August
Winnig, Das Reich als Republik (Stutt
gart and Berlin: Cotta'sche Buchhand
lung, J 930), pp. 99-100. Flechtheim as
serts that the action taken by the SPD
was not "treason pure and simple"
against the working class. as persist
ently claimed by the left wing radicals,
because the patriotic wave had broken
down all class barriers. (Flechtheim,
op. cit., p. 11.) Indeed, Social Demo
crats of all ages followed the call to
the colors and speedily enlisted. (Grze•
sinski, op. cit., pp. 33-34.)

9 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 98; Grze•
sinski, op. cit., p. 34.
10 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 96. In
spite of their strong aversion to il
legality, the Executive Committee of
the SPD believed that some precautions
should be taken. In August of 1914,
it sent the party treasurer, Otto Braun,
and Friedrich Ebert to Zurich, Switzer
land. with instructions to await further
development of the domestic political
situation in Germany. Should the party
be dissolved and the Social Democratic
leaders arrested, these two were free
to act on behalf of the party. Ebert and
Braun returned to Berlin a few weeks
later. (Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 35; Wolfe,
op. cit., p. 634.)
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The general nationalistic attitude of the trade unions was the
third factor. On August 2, 1914, before the SPD had decided on
its final position toward the war, an Executive Committee of the
trade unions agreed to stop all economic demands on behalf of
the workers for the duration of the war. To enforce this policy
of economic truce, the union leaders declared that no financial
support would be rendered to strikers. 11
The approval of the war appropriation and the non-strike
proclamation of the trade unions in August 1914 were only the
first steps made by the German socialists in support of the war.
Additional war appropriations were approved as the war pro
gressed.12
The SPD proudly proclaimed that it had done everything
within its power to support national defense. By its silence the
party had acquiesced in the proclamation on August 1, 1914, of
a state of siege which entailed such political restrictions as strict
est censorship. It had voted on August 4, 1914, for a whole
series of emergency laws, suspending the most important labor
protection laws, including the regulation of work for women
and children. In 1916, Social Democratic deputies voted for the
compulsory labor mobilization law ( Vaterlaendisches Hilfsge
setz) which aimed at forcing into the war economy all men be
tween the ages of seventeen and sixty who were not serving in
the army.1 3 Most important was the so-called Burgfrieden, the
voluntary cessation of political party strife for the duration of
11 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 98. Ber
lau believes that the action of the party
was "dictated by the pressure of pub
lic opinion, by the fear of governmental
retaliation, and by a sincere belief that
Germany was faced with foreign ag
gression." (Berlau, op. cit., p. 135.)
12 The approval of further war cred
its on December 2, 1914, was justified
by the fact that the borders of the
country were still endangered by enemy
troops. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 46.) David
even claimed that the situation of Ger-

many was then more precarious than it
had been in August. (Eduard David,

Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkriege

[Berlin: Vorwaerts Verlag, 1915], pp.
12-13.) War credits were also ap
proved on March 20, 1915, with the
justification that neither the aim of
security for Germany was reached nor
did the enemies show any peace ten
dencies. (/bid., pp. 16-17.)
13 Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 94-106;
lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 128.

35

36

THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF

1919

the war. For a socialist party this also meant the cessation of
the traditional class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat.14
The trade unions and their leaders also contributed whole
heartedly to the war effort. The early proclamation of the eco
nomic truce by the General Commission had a tremendous im
pact on the nationalistic attitude of the rank-and-file German
worker. In the course of the war, the union leaders were able to
prove valuable to the German war machine in a variety of ways.
During the first weeks of the war an economic crisis developed
following the sudden interruption of economic relations with
foreign countries. Unemployment rose in spite of the increased
draft for the army. The unions stepped in and made payments
to workers who were temporarily unemployed because of the war,
thus preventing the spread of mass disaffection. 15 The union
leaders discouraged economic and political strikes. The fact that
the economic truce brought very high profits to the manufacturers
did not seem to concern them.16
The uni�ns also proved to be one of the most effective instru
ments in the pro-war publicity campaign designed for domestic
consumption. The purpose of the propaganda effort was to keep
the workers' morale at the highest possible level in spite of the
deprivations imposed by the prolonged war. The Leitmotif was
the complete interdependence of the outcome of the war and the
living standard of the German worker. It was emphasized that a
military defeat would bring unemployment, destruction of the
trade unions, and reduction or complete loss of all social insurance
benefits. In recognition of the contributions rendered by the
union leaders, the German government exempted them from
military conscription. Their work within the unions was con14 The cooperation of the SPD was
the most important single contribution
to the establishment of the domestic
political and economic truce of the
Burgfrieden. (Bergstraesser, op. cit., p.
178.)
13 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 107;
Snell, op. cit., p. 69.

16 Froelich, Zehn Jahre. pp. 97-100.
The union leaders' lack of attention to
the high profits made by the industrial
ists was possibly caused by ignorance
or inexperience.
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sidered of greater significance to the over-all war effort than their
military service. 11
The original hostile attitude of the German government toward
the trade unions underwent a thorough-going change. An official
press communique of November 1915 illustrates this shift in
sentiment:
The free trade-unions have proved a valuable aid ... and [are]
almost indispensable to the economic and communal life of the nation.
They have made numerous valuable suggestions in the military, eco
nomic, and social fields, some of which were carried out. Their co
operation and advice were placed at the disposal of the military and
civil authorities, and were gladly accepted. The gratitude of the na
tion for the patriotic efforts of organized labor has been frequently
expressed by the responsible authorities....1•

Justifying their support of the German war effort on strictly
utilitarian and opportunistic grounds did not satisfy the SPD's
right faction which had achieved a position of predominance.
Exponents of this group were determined to prove that coopera11 Snell, op. cit., p. 71.
1a Quoted in Grzesinski, op. cit., p.
35. Another illustration of the pro-war
attitude of the trade union leaders is
given by Emil Barth who asserts that a
union functionary of the Berlin Metal
Workers, a certain Cohen, declared in
October 1914 that war meant salvation
for the union. Without war the ex
pected unemployment in the winter of
1914-1915 would have caused the fi.
nancial ruin of the organization. (Emil
Barth, Aus der Werkstatt der deutschen
R e v o l u t ion [Berlin: A. Hoffmann's
Verlag, 1919], p. 11.) An interesting
account on the nationalism of the trade
unions comes from John L. Snell who
investigated the causes for the well
known patriotic attitude of the SPD
during the war. He traced much of
this patriotism to the socialist trade
unions. There was a very close con
nection between the unions and the

party even though the unions claimed
to be independent of the SPD. The
General Commission of the trade
unions of Germany, the agency which
managed most of the activities of its
member unions, was composed of
thirteen members. Six of the thirteen,
including its chairman Carl Legien and
its vice-chairman Gustav Bauer, were
Social Democratic Reichstag deputies.
Of the 110 SPD deputies, at least 45
had held union positions and 19 were
full-time professional union function
aries. The trade unions attempted to
take a direct hand in party affairs when
anti-war radicalism emerged within the
SPD in 1915. Carl Legien requested
that union officials be given more func
tions within the party in order to fore
stall the spread of anti-war attitudes
among the workers. ( Snell, op. cit., pp.
66-67.)
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tion with the government on many war-time problems was not
nationalistic opportunism but was in complete agreement with
established Social Democratic principles. For example, by re
ferring to statements made by Marx, Engels, and Lassalle con
cerning the German cause in the war of 1871, Eduard David at
tempted to demonstrate that national and international concepts
were not mutually exclusive and that internationalism does not
necessarily involve anti-nationalism. 19
Throughout the war the majority of the SPD deputies and high
level party functionaries continued to support the German war
effort. They kept repeating the claim that Germany was fighting
a defensive war. They assured the workers that various long
postponed domestic political reforms, such as democratization
of the government and a badly needed election reform for Prussia,
would be forthcoming in the immediate future. However, when
dissatisfaction and unrest within the party became increasingly
stronger because of the effects of the prolonged war, many of the
SPD deputies in the Reichstag became more articulate in their
demands for a just peace without annexations.
In 191 7, one of the most significant domestic political events
in war-time Germany occurred. A coalition of several political
parties including the SPD was formed. Its ambitious program
was the draft of a peace resolution and proposals for immediate
constitutional reforms. 20
19 He pointed out further that the
Socialist International was organ1zed
on the basis of recognition of different
nations and was conceived as a de
fensive organization against the "gold
en international" of the bourgeoisie.
(David, op. cit., pp. 174, 181.) David's
entire book is dedicated to the purpose
of justifying the actions of the nation
alistic elements of the SPD on the war
issue. Other socialists of the same type
even went so far as to interpret state
intervention into the war-time economy
as steps in the direction of socialism.
(Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 188; Froe
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 106-08, 137.) For

the views of Paul Lensch, see his Drei
Jahre Weltrevolution (Berlin: S. Fi

scher Verlag, 1917).
20 Bruno Stuemke, Die Emstehung
der deutschen Republik (Frankfurt am
Main: Ehrig Verlag, 1923), p. 41.
This coalition can be considered as the
embryonic form of the Weimar Coali
tion which later was vital in adminis
tering the affairs of the new German
Republic SPD, Centrists, and Pro
gressives. For a discussion of the
"Peace Resolution of July, 1917," see
Halperin, op. cit., pp. 26-31. Professor
Friedrich Meinecke also observed that
the growing dissatisfaction among the
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The German government failed to take action on the pro
posals of the new parliamentary coalition. The opposition ele
ments took advantage of this situation to enhance their influence
among the dissatisfied population.

2.

The Opposition to the War Policies of the SPD

Within the framework of this study, it is not possible to trace
the genesis of all the groups which were opposed to the war poli
cies of the majority of the SPD leaders. It suffices to recognize
that the unanimity of the Social Democratic vote for the war ap
propriation on August 4, 1914, was the product of party dis
cipline only, and that from the very beginning of the war, dis
satisfaction with official policies was prevalent among certain lead
ers as well as among many local party units.2 1
At the outbreak of the war and for some time thereafter, the
oppositional elements within the SPD lacked organization and
found it difficult to carry on their work under the state of siege.
In the course of the war, however, these groups acquired their
own organizational identities, and by 191 7, in the third war year,
the German socialist labor movement retained little of its former
unity. The party had split into three major divisions. In spite
of changes in the grouping of personnel, these new divisions were
analogous to the three pre-war tendencies within the SPD. 22
In opposition to the program and actions of the Majority So
cialists ( as the members of the SPD became known because the
majority of the party leaders remained with the original organiworkers required continuous reassur
ance that Germany was fighting a de
fensive war and had no annexation
plans. Meinecke also stressed that from
a psychological point of view drastic
changes of the Prussian three-class
election system were required. The
working class felt that it was intoler
able that a rich war profiteer had a
more influential vote than a poor com
bat soldier returning from the front.
(Friedrich Meinecke, "Die Revolution;
Ursachen und Tatsachen," Handbuch

des Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. by Ger
hard Anschuetz und Richard Thoma
[Tuebingen: Mohr, 1930], I, pp. 9798.)
21 The opposition certainly was not
limited during the first few months of
the war to a small group of "SPD in
tellectuals" whose oppositional work
"was carried on unnoticed by out
siders," as Berlau claims. (Berlau, op.
cit., p. 138) See also Snell, op. cit., p.
72.
22 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 24.
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zation) were the powerful group of Independent Socialists and
various groups of revolutionary radicals. The most important
group among these radicals was the Spartacist League. Thus, the
left wing radicals were not the only socialists opposed to the war
policies of the SPD, and the division of the German Social Demo
cratic movement into anti-militarists and war supporters did not
follow the familiar line of demarkation between "revisionist op
portunists" and "revolutionary Marxists." This division into "so
cial patriots," pacifists, and revolutionaries was experienced by
all socialist parties of the belligerent countries of 1914. The social
patriots managed to form the overwhelming majority at the be
ginning of the war. The pacifists of the left and right wings con
stituted a much smaller group. However, as the war progressed,
this group increased in strength and significance as the population
and especially the working class became more and more dis
appointed with the war. The revolutionaries were a very small and
insignificant faction in all countries. 23 To understand the develop
ments within. the German labor movement, however, one must
realize that the split in the German Social Democracy was not
caused by the war alone. This issue only brought the pre-war
ideological controversies of the party to a climax.24
By the middle of 191 7, the SPD war policies were opposed by
a new Social Democratic mass organization, the Independent So
cial Democratic Party of Germany (USPD). 25 This center of op
position developed within the Social Democratic Reichstag fac
tion among the deputies who were against supporting the Gov
ernment's war policies. Originally these deputies were not op
posed to what they thought was a defensive war, but when the
imperialistic and annexationist designs of the German govern
ment became increasingly obvious, they first abstained from voting
and eventually cast their votes against further war credits. It has
been observed by some analysts of the German labor movement
23 Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
24 Flechtheim, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
25 Unabhaengige Sozialdemokrati
sche Partei Deutsch/ands, abbreviated

USPD. The abbreviation or the term
Independent Socialist will be used for
this party hereinafter.
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that there was really no fundamental difference between the po
litical outlook of the USPD and the SPD except in matters of
foreign affairs. Both were revisionists in practice, and neither had
repudiated the old Marxist concepts which were still useful in
appealing to the German workers.
The Independent Socialists were not a monolithic party but
were composed of several groups of various political shadings,
and personalities with such different political backgrounds as
Haase, Bernstein, and Kautsky. 26
Even though the break between the Haase group and the
SPD was primarily over the war issue, as soon as the USPD de
veloped a program of its own, it expressed not only strong op
position to the government's war policy but also the existing
autocratic regime. 21
26 Leonore O'Boyle, "The German
Independent Socialists during the First
World War," The American Historical
Review, LVI, No. 4 (July, 1951), p.
828; Meinecke, op. cit., p. 100. It is
doubtful if these Social Democrats
really intended to initiate a split from
the SPD, but their determination to
vote against the war credits which
caused a break in party discipline made
this development a necessity. For an
example, see the manifesto published
in the Leipziger Volkszeitung in June,
1915, signed by Haase, Kautsky, and
Bernstein, entitled "The Demand of
the Hour." In this article, the authors
requested a reversal in the policy of
war credit approval because of the an
nexationist plans the government was
pursuing. (Illu strierte Geschichte, p.
133.) For the development of the
voting record of the oppositional So
cial Democratic deputies, see Stuemke,
op. cit., pp. 21-28. The executive com
mittee of the SPD eventually expelled
the dissenters who then proceeded to
found their own party on April 6-7,
1917, at Gotha. Even before this time,
the oppositional deputies under Haase's
leadership had activated the Social
Democratic Cooperative Group (So-

zialdemokratische A r b e i t s ge m e in schaft) in order to protect their right

to meet in committees. The importance
of this step was that the anti-war pro
tagonists had parliamentary unity for
the first time. (Berlau, op. cit., pp. 14446; Stuemke, op. cit., pp. 30-31; Hal
perin, op. cit., p. 23.)
N oske did not regard the expulsion
of the Haase group as a split in the
party, although of course it became
that as soon as the USPD was formed.
Both Legien, the trade union leader,
and he appeared to be satisfied to sever
the ties with the oppositional elements.
Noske commented on the expulsion as
follows: "The German Social Demo
cratic Party did not break into pieces
when under the leadership of Haase a
part of the [Reichstag] faction left [the
party] because of the question of fur
ther war credits. The large majority
of the deputies remained steadfast to
the position [they had taken] in August,
1914. The seed, however, for the de
struction of the party had been sown."
(Noske, Erlebtes, p. 50.)
27 For a comprehensive account of
the history of the USPD, see Eugen
Prager, Geschichte der U.S.P.D. (Ber
lin: Verlagsgenossenschaft "Freiheit,"
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Because of the growing dissatisfaction among the Social
Democratic masses, the USPD rapidly became a second Social
Democratic mass party. The growth of the USPD was not greatly
influenced by the hostile attitude of the trade unions. After the
split occurred, the Genera] Commission quickly declared that
the unions would recognize only the old SPD. The USPD was
handicapped in its efforts to establish official control over the
unions because no general trade union congress was called during
the war. The only way it could gain control was from within. It
succeeded in this attempt in certain localities; for example, in Ber
lin and in Leipzig it was able to gain strong influence among the
unions. In other places, the hostile union officials managed to
keep USPD influence to a minimum. 28
The anti-war issue had worked within the SPD to break up
the unity of the party. The pre-war theoretical and tactical dif
ferences among the various factions had not seriously threatened
party unity. Once the question of supporting the war had divided
the German S9cial Democracy, however, many other items of dis
agreement re-em�rged and helped create different political plat1921). This shift in the domestic pol
icy of the USPD is interesting because
as late as December, 1916, when twen
ty of the oppositional deputies voted
against the war credits their justifica
tion for the negative vote revealed no
revolutionary motivation. They ex
plained that the general war situation
was such that Germany was secure
from enemy invasion. In other words,
ii was not their basic anti-war concept
which prompted them to vote against
the credits but the fact that the borders
of Germany were secure. (Bergstraes
ser, op. cit., p. I 85; Rosa Luxemburg,
Entweder-oder, quoted in Luxemburg,
Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 535-36;
Karl Liebknecht, "Die Dezembermaen
ner von 1915," quoted in Liebknecht,
Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 336-43.)
28 Snell, op. cit., p. 72. There are no
reliable figures available for the war
period which might permit a compari
son of the strength of the SPD and the

USPD. The SPb's membership has
decreased considerably - primarily
because of military service before
the USPD became a competitive or
ganization. Flechtheim c o Il e c t e d
strength e s t i m a t e s from various
sources. According to one source, the
SPD had about 248,000 members and
the USPD about 100,000 after the
split. Another source estimates the
respective membership figures as 170,000 for the SPD and 120,000 for the
USPD. The number of newspapers
and subscription figures which changed
sides after the split relates only part
of the shift. The SPD possibly was
able to hold on to many more papers
than its actual strength because its
officials were in strategic controlling
positions. Flechtheim relates that from
88 SPD newspapers with 870,000 sub
scribers, 14 newspapers with about
125,000 subscribers changed to the
USPD. (Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 28.)
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forms and tactical concepts for the various parts of the former
SPD. The critical war-time conditions tended to speed up this
process and accelerate the development of pre-war political fac
tions into full-fledged political organizations and parties.
At the time of the break between the oppositional Reichstag
deputies and the SPD which led to the founding of the USPD in
April 1917, the revolutionary or left wing opposition also emerged
as several small organizations. All of them together could not
approximate the size of either of the two major Social Democratic
mass parties. Throughout the war, these revolutionary groups
remained insignificant in membership, and had very little influence
upon the masses of the German workers, with the possible ex
ception of the Spartacists and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards.
The left wing opposition to the war policies of the SPD was
of a different kind from that of the USPD. The revolutionaries
did not regard the actions of the SPD leadership as tactical mis
takes. The leftist opposition evaluated the actions of the party
and their justifications by people like David as the final and ulti
mate proof that the SPD had completely accepted the revisionist
concepts, even though it still had failed to repudiate its Marxian
camouflage. All of these revolutionary groups shared a professed
confidence in international socialism in contrast to the narrow
nationalism which had taken possession of the SPD leadership.
Even after the left wing opposition had recognized this definite
change in the SPD, its adherents did not leave in order to form
a new party which would be guided by the old revolutionary con
cepts and by those which developed as the result of the changing
situation. They remained, electing to work within the party to
bring it back to pre-war platforms which had been codified at the
various party congresses. When these attempts failed, however,
they either joined the new USPD or remained as unattached revo
lutionary socialist groups. None of them, with the exception of
the Spartacists and the Left Radicals ( Linksradikalen) who
joined the Spartaci-;ts in October 1918, ever formed a political
party of any significance. Even the Spartacists did not become a
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party until two months after the German Revolution had started.
The failure of the left wing opposition to create a revolutionary
mass party prior to that time was later sharply criticized by Com
munists of the Lenin school. They asserted that this omission de
prived the German workers of the leadership of a revolutionary
party during the initial period of their social and political up
heaval.
Among the revolutionary oppositional groups was the Spar
tacist League (Spartakusbund). In spite of its relatively small
numbers, it was a nation-wide organization, and was led by such
outstanding pre-war revolutionary leaders as Rosa Luxemburg
and Karl Liebknecht. It was probably the most articulate and ac
tive of the several leftist oppositional groups. On December 31,
1918, the Spartacist League became the German Communist
Party which, in turn, played a decisive part during the period of
consolidation of the German Revolution. 29
The Spartacists met in January 1916 for their first national
conference. At this time they adopted a program which subse
quently guided their policies and activities. 30 At this conference,
it was decided to publish the political tracts which subsequently
became known as the Spartacist Letters. 31
29 The estimates of Spartacist mem•
bership vary from several hundreds to
several thousands. (Ibid., p. 29.) The
origin of the Spartacists goes back to
shortly after the outbreak of the war
and the collapse of the Socialist Inter•
national. On August 4, 1914, a num
ber of revolutionaries gathered around
Rosa Luxemburg and decided to con
tinue their fight against the imperialist
war, against the war policies of the
SPD, and for the principles of the Jn.
ternational. One of the first actions of
this group was the publication of a
declaration signed by Rosa Luxem
burg, Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring,
and Clara Zetkin, in the Swiss Social
Democratic press (September, 1914)
announcing to the world that not all

the German Social Democrats had suc
cumbed to the war policies of the SPD.
(Liebknecht, Reden, p. 363; 11/ustrierte
Geschichte, p. 115.)
so Ibid., pp. 135-37; for a discussion
of this program see below pp. 55-56:
31 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 18. The
Spartacist Letters eventually gave the
group its name. Before their appear
ance, the group was called "Group Jn.
ternational." This latter designation
was derived from the publication, The
Internationale, which appeared only
once in April, 1915 and then was pro
hibited under the censorship. (Berg
straesser, op. cit., pp. 180-8 l.) For a
description of its contents see ll/us
trierte Geschichte, pp. 130-3 l, and
Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 148-49.
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Prior to this time, the group around Rosa Luxemburg and
Liebknecht attempted to provide political guidance for opposi
tional elements within local party organizations. The dissemina
tion of propaganda material was a most difficult task considering
the restrictions imposed by the state of siege. Nevertheless, some
Social Democratic newspapers and periodicals which happened
to be under the management of radicals continued for some time
to print articles inspired by the opposition. 32 Until the fall of 1915
collaboration with the group around Ledebour and Kautsky was
maintained. 33
The Spartacist League joined the USPD but only because it
felt that the new party would afford a protecting roof to the illegal
organization of the Spartacists. The League representatives who
participated in the founding congress made certain that it was
clearly understood that the Spartacists would retain their own or
ganizational identity as well as their freedom of action.3•
Another group in opposition to the SPD policies was the
organization of Julian Borchardt, the International Socialists
of Germany (Internationale Sozialisten Deutsch/ands- ISD).
Their official organ was the Lichtstrahlen which Borchardt started
in 1914. In April 1916, it was prohibited.
32 lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 114-16.
33 This collaboration was not in
tended to consolidate the opposition to
the official war policies of the SPD, but
was to provide the left wing radicals
with a better opportunity to gain in
fluence among the workers. ([bid., pp.
131-34.) The practice of penetrating
other organizations for the purpose of
recruiting members from within is still
a standard operating procedure of the
Communists.
34 (Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 23. ll
lustrierte Geschichte, pp. 147-48.) Per
tinent are the contents of a letter written
by Leo Jogiches, who had taken over
the leadership of the Spartacists after
the arrest of Rosa Luxemburg and the
induction of Liebknecht into the army.

The letter was addressed to members
of the Spartacist group in Wuertten
berg who were reluctant to join the
USPD. Jogiches frankly explained to
the Wuerttenberg comrades what ad
vantages the new party provided for
the Spartacists. They could work un
der the cover of the party, undermine
its leadership, and submit its members
to the influence of the Spartacist
League. (Ibid.)
Liebknecht was even more blunt in
stating why the Spartacists had joined:
"We belonged to the USPD in order
to drive forth [the party], to keep it
within the reach of our whip, [and] to
pull the best elements out [for us]."
(Karl Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte Re
den, p. 522.)
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The International Socialists were a small group of radical so
cialists who never assumed any particular significance in the revo
lutionary movement in Germany. Borchardt believed that he
had views similar to the Bolsheviks led by Lenin; however, his
theoretical concepts were much more in line with those of the
anarchists. He was convinced of the futility of parliamentarianism
and of the inadequacy of any type of political leadership. The
masses themselves, he asserted, were capable of handling all po
litical matters. Eventually he despaired because he had become
convinced that the masses lacked revolutionary initiative.""
Most of his followers moved over to the Left Radicals ( Links
radikalen), a group very active in Bremen under the leadership
of Johann Knief. This group consisted of several hundred mem
bers who originally came from a radical faction of the SPD or
ganization in Bremen. Even before the war, they were strongly
under the influence of Karl Radek and Anton Pannekoek. In
May 1916, Paul Froelich and Johann Knief started the legal
weekly pubHcation, the Arbeiterpolitik, whose main contributor
was Radek. Through Radek, this group maintained close re
lations with the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, in parti
cular with Lenin and Zinoviev. The Left Radicals, like the ISD,
stressed revolutionary mass action as the means for political and
social changes. In contrast to the latter they did not reject par
liamentarianism entirely but considered it as auxiliary to mass
action. Unlike the Spartacists, who for a long time attempted to
influence the party from within, the Left Radicals advocated from
the beginning a split of the revolutionary socialists from the re
formist SPD. In this respect, their views were much closer to the
Bolshevik ideas than those of the Luxemburg-Liebknecht group.
(After the Russian October Revolution the Left Radicals immedi
ately declared their approval of the revolutionary practices of the
Bolsheviks.) The Left Radicals were opposed to the new USPD
and refused to join forces.
35 Tormin, op. cit., p. 40 Froelich,

Zehn Jahre, p. 155.

36 Tormin, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 155-56; Berg-
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The differences between the Spartacists and the Bremen Group
did not prevent the two organizations from cooperating. The
legal weekly paper of the Bremen Group, the Arbeiterpolitik was
used by the Spartacists in political discussions. The underground
Spartacist Letters were utilized by both groups for active revo
lutionary propaganda among the masses. In questions of tactics,
the numerically weaker Left Radicals subordinated themselves to
the Spartacist League. 37
In contrast to the revolutionary groups discussed above, the
Revolutionary Shop Stewards (Revolutionaere Obleute) emerged
not from the SPD but from the trade unions. As early as 1914,
union functionaries in certain Berlin factories who were opposed
to the official policies of the SPD and the trade unions organized
themselves into small groups. Their purpose was to work from
within the unions, mobilizing the workers to fight for a termination
of the war. Their membership was highly selective and restricted
to union functionaries with adminstrative and political experi
ence. 38
Experiences gained through the political mass strikes during
the war and the spread of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards to
other industrial centers resulted in an elaborate clandestine or
ganization which advocated increasingly the use of conspiratorial
methods for the coming revolutionary struggle. Until his induc
tion into the German army, Richard Mueller was the leader of
the Shop Stewards. In February 1918, he was succeeded by a
revolutionary hothead, Emil Barth, who was replaced in the sumstraesser, op. cit.. p. 183; Illustrierte
Geschichte, pp. 142-45.
Eventually on October 7, 1918, the
Left Radicals consolidated with the
Spartacists in a "combat partnership"
(Kampfgemeinschaft) for the forth
coming revolution. (Froelich, Zehn
Jahre, p. 222.)
"7 Froelich suggests that the dif
ferences between the two groups arose
from certain characteristics of their
respective leaders. The Left Radicals
were of the younger generation who

had no personal connection with the
veteran leaders of the SPD and there
fore did not hesitate to sever relations.
On the other hand, the leaders of the
Spartacists were personalities of the
old International who were not ready
to break the ties with their comrades
so quickly even though they might
deeply disagree with them. (Ibid., p.
156.)
38 Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser
reich :wr Republik {Berlin: Malik-Ver
lag, 1925), I, p. 125.
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mer of the same year by Ernst Daeumig. The latter was simul
taneously a leading member of the USPD and of the Shop Stew
ards. It was the intention of the Shop Stewards to remain the
cadre of leaders for the future socialist revolution and not to be
come a mass organization. 39
Politically, the Shop Stewards occupied a position between the
USPD and the Spartacist League. Originally they retained their
individual memberships in their respective unions; later they also
joined the USPD. The Shop Stewards intended to remain the
revolutionary activists and therefore avoided ( unlike the Sparta
cists and Independent Socialists) lengthy, theoretical discussions. • 0
The differences between them and the Spartacists were primarily
of a tactical nature. They were opposed to mass actions and dis
carded them as useless "revolutionary gymnastics."41
In order to strengthen their influence on the USPD and the
Spartacists, the Shop Stewards pressed for a common meeting of
the revolutionary opposition. The Executive Committee of the
USPD delayed. such a meeting for some time. Eventually the
persistence of the Shop Stewards - and possibly the general
revolutionary climate - led certain USPD leadets to participate
in the secret meetings of the Shop Steward organization in Berlin.
· From October 1918, representatives of the Spartacist League also
attended these meetings. •2
39 Ibid., pp. 125-27. The influence
of the Shop Stewards upon the events
of November, 1918 has been greatly
exaggerated as the result of Emil
Barth's Aus der Werkstatt der deut
schen Revolution. For example, see
Erich Otto Volkmann, Der Marxismus
und das deutsche Heer im Weltkrieg
(Berlin: Verlag Hobbing, 1925), pp.
210-13. Volkmann bases many of his
views on the information obtained from
Barth's book. Barth describes in de
tail the revolutionary preparations
made by his group, the organization of
highly d i s c i p 1 i n e d and well-armed
shock troops, the procurement of
weapons, and the placement of confi-

deuce men in sensitive strategic posi
tions. Richard Mueller d i s m i s s e s
Barth's claims as pure nonsense. (Rich
ard Mueller, Vom Kaiserreich, pp. 12627.)
40 Volkmann, op. cit., p. 210; Hal
perin, op. cit., p. 79.
41 Tormin, op. cit., pp. 42-44.
42 Rosenberg, Die Entstehung, p.
245. While Barth's statements must be
read with great caution, his descrip
tion of his attempts to bring unity into
the revolutionary movement prior to
November, 1918 are of interest: "The
most difficult position was in relation
to the Spartacists and Left Radicals.
They believed that revolutionary per-
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3. The International Anti-War Effort
Although the Socialist International had collapsed at the out
break of war, European socialists who continued to oppose
their countries' war efforts had not given up hope that some com
mon international action might help bring an early end to hos
tilities.43 Nothing ever came of the various international efforts,
although discussions at conferences did help clarify the political
alignment within the socialist movement and possibly laid the
foundation for the Third International.
The anti-war protagonists among the international Social
Democracy were divided into the social pacifists and the revolu
tionary anti-militarists. The pacifists, who included such well
known personalities as Eduard Bernstein (German) and Ramsay
MacDonald (British), wished only a return to the peaceful co
existence of nations and classes in order to continue their "peace
ful" struggle for social reforms. By contrast, the revolutionaries
declared themselves not satisfied with a compromise peace
solution between the warring countries since this would only
strengthen the bourgeois rule. The revolutionaries intended to
exploit the situation created by the war to overthrow the existing
power relations and to bring an end to the hegemony of the
bourgeoisie.••
The "revolutionary anti-militarists" were divided into two fac
tions. The left wing under the leadership of Lenin and Zinoviev
advocated the "transformation of the present imperialist war into
ception, motivation, and action can be
produced by leaflets and revolutionary
gymnastics .... Conspiratorial activity
was not to their liking." (Barth, op.
cit., p. 29.)
43 Even the social patriots pretended
that the International was continuing.
Possibly they were satisfied with the
explanation offered by Kautsky who
stated that the International was an in
strument of peace and not war. (Rosa
Luxemburg, "Der Wiederaufbau der
Internationale," quoted in Luxemburg,

Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, p. 518.)

Shortly after the beginning of hostili
ties, the Socialist Bureau was moved
from Brussels to Amsterdam and
claimed that it was continuing the busi
ness of the old International. It was
headed by the Belgian socialist Vander
velde who became Belgian Minister of
War a few weeks later. This new office
did not require him to give up his po
sition in the Socialist Bureau. (Volk
mann, Der Marxismus, p. 114.)
H Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 50.
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civil war" aimed at the overthrow of the bourgeoisie!" Lenin also
proposed severing relations with the social patriots within the na
tional parties as well as with the remnants of the Socialist Inter
national as soon as possible. 4G Lenin's opponents among the
revolutionary antagonists to the war held views similar to those
of Rosa Luxemburg. Luxemburg, like the pacifists, emphasized
the fight for peace, although she understood peace as that which
would serve the interest of the working class and therefore ipso
facto would have to be achieved through the proletariat itself.
She stressed neither revolution nor civil war as the method to be
used in achieving this kind of peace. Her reference was to the
revolutionary class struggle only. Rosa Luxemburg found her
self in disagreement with Lenin on the question of breaking off
relations with the moderate pacifists or even with the social
patriots. She believed that as long as the party provided enough
internal freedom of action which could be used to enlighten mem
bers and make them return to the socialist internaHonal concepts,
such a break would hurt the revolutionaries. She was convinced
that the . propaganda work, especially that directed at the Social
Democrats, was far more effective from within the.party than from
outside. On the other hand, she believed the split between war
. supporters and revolutionaries to be inevitable, although she
placed the time of this event after the end of the war. 47
The three-fold division of the anti-war socialists became quite
apparent at the two international conferences held in Switzerland:
( 1 ) The social pacifists of the type of the German representatives
45 Lenin made this statement as
early as November 1, 1914, in an ar
ticle entitled "The War and Russian
Social-Democracy," Selected Wo rks
(Moscow, Leningrad: Co-op. Pub. So
ciety, 1935), V, pp. 123-30.
46 See V. I. Lenin, The Collapse of
the Second International (Moscow:
Foreign Languages Pub.House, 1949).
47 In her views concerning the re
storation of the International, Rosa
Luxemburg also emphasized the fight
for peace: "... the first step in this di-

rection is action for a quick end to the
war ..." (Luxemburg, Der Wieder
aufbau, p. 526.) Luxemburg con
sidered the fight for peace the essence
of her political actions while Lenin re
fused to accept this. Luxemburg was
thinking in terms of mass appeal, while
Lenin restricted his concepts to the
small group of revolutionaries trained
to deal with theoretical problems.
(Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 248253.)
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from the Ledebour-Bernstein group; (2) the revolutionary anti
militarists of the Lenin-Zinoviev faction (subsequently known as
the Zimmerwald Left) ; and (3) the anti-militarists who placed
the class struggle for the proletarian type of international peace
at the center of their program. The Spartacist delegates belonged
to this last group.
The first of the two international conferences took place at
Zimmerwald from September 5 to 8, 1915. The German dele
gation included Georg Ledebour and Adolf Hoffmann, Social
Democratic opposition; Ernst Meyer and Bertha Thalheimer,
Luxemburg-Liebknecht group; and Julian Borchardt, Interna
tional Socialists of Germany. Only Borchardt joined the Zimmer
wald Left, the radical group sponsored by the Russian Bolsheviks.
The Spartacist delegates did not give their support to the resolu
tion of the Zimmerwald Left which demanded an immediate break
from the reformists of the Social Democrats. 48
At the second Zimmerwald Conference at Kienthal during
Easter of 1916 a decisive shift toward the left was apparent. A
resolution was adopted making it obligatory for the participating
organizations to vote in their respective parliaments against fur
ther war appropriations. The main debate, however, centered
around the question of whether or not a break should be made
with the Socialist International. No final decision was reached.
48 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 134-37.
For part of the resolution of the Zim
merwald Left see ibid., p. 136; Froe
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 158-59. Accord
ing to Liebknecht, the delegates to the
Zimmerwald Conference had two im
portant missions to fulfill; (1 ) to settle
accounts with the deserters of the In
ternational; (2) to clarify the position
of the revolutionary proletariat in re
gard to the war. In his letter to the
Zimmerwald Conference, he expressed
his concept of an action program:
"Civil war, not Burgfriede (armistice)!
Practice international proletarian soli
darity, fight against the pseudo-nation-

alistic, pseudo-patriotic class harmony,
utilize the international class struggle
to achieve peace and realize the so
cialist revolution." (Karl Liebknecht,
"An die Z i m m e r w a l d Konferenz,"
quoted in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte
Reden, pp. 315-17.)
Also see: Merle Fainsod, Interna
tional Socialism and the World War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1935); Eduard Bernstein, Die Inter
nationale der Arbeiterklasse und der
europaeische Krieg (Tuebingen: Mohr,
1916); Karl Kautsky, Die Interna
tionale und der Krieg (Berlin: Buch
handlung Vorwaerts, 1915); and Ray-
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In a compromise solution, the social patriots were severely con
demned.49

4.

Characteristic Political Thought of the Spartacists
In the preceding pages of this chapter an attempt has been
made to examine the reactions of the oppositional socialists to
the war-time policies and actions of the SPD. This analysis has
shown that the fundamental diversity of basic principles eventu
ally destroyed the organizational monopoly of the SPD within the
German labor movement. A few new organizations emerged.
For the Spartacists, the question of organization - beyond
the point of getting established as an entity of some kind - did
not become a problem until almost two months after the begin
ning of the German Revolution when the Communist Party of
Germany was founded. In spite of their distinct revolutionary
concepts, they preferred to remain within the fold of a Social
Democratic party. (First, the SPD; later, the USPD.) 50
mond W. Postgate, The International
during the ·War (London: The Herald,
1918).
49 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 148;
Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 1.59-60. For
the text of the Kienthal resolution see
Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 238-40. There
was a third Zimmerwald Conference
at Stockholm in September, 1917. The
differences between the pacifists and
the revolutionaries could not be re
solved any longer. No results could be
achieved. In the meantime, the fight
in Russia between the Mensheviks and
Bolsheviks had almost reached its cli
max. The Zimmerwald International
continued to exist in name only until
it was dissolved when the Communist
lnternational was founded in March of
1919. The above described Stockholm
Confe rence must not be confused with
another international conference held
in Stockholm about the same time. The
latter conference was arranged by neu
tral Dutch and Scandinavian socialists
and was eventually called by the Exe
cutive Committee of the Workers' and

Soldiers' Council of Petersburg for the
purpose of unifying the international
proletariat for a peace without annexa
tion and compensations and based up
on the right of national self-determina
tion. None of the aims the conference
had set for itself were accomplished.
(Ibid., pp. 196-98; Fischer, op. cit.,
p. 12.)
50 There were also impatient Spar
tacists who believed that remaining in
the SPD had become intolerable. They
wanted to form a new revolutionary
party. Rosa Luxemburg was strongly
opposed to this. She admitted that the
aim must be a revolutionary party, but
she emphasized that the Social Demo
cratic masses must not be abandoned
and left to the treacherous leaders. Her
organizational aim was not the creation
of a revolutionary sect separated from
the masses but the maintenance of a
strong faction comprised of the revo
lutionary elements working for their
aims from within the party. (Froelich,
Rosa Luxemburg, p. 26.5.)
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An analysis of the political thought of the Spartacists as it
crystallized in the course of the war is essential for an understand
ing of their actions and views in relation both to pre-revolutionary
mass events and to the German Revolution. The political con
cepts of the Spartacists during the war were the product of several
factors. First and most fundamental was the revolutionary Marx
ism of the Spartacist leaders as early as the pre-war period. 51
Second, there was the influence of the war-time experiences. This
factor included the support of the war by the SPD as well as the
various challenges which a crisis situation presents. Germany
experienced an economic crisis resulting from the continuous
drain caused by the war. Politically, the country was ruled by a
military dictatorship. A growing revolutionary attitude strength
ened the desire to change the situation quickly because of de
privations, inefficient management of practically everything, loss
of confidence in the government, in military leadership, and in
political parties, and finally the abandonment of hope in ultimate
victory. The third factor was the impact of international events,
primarily the Russian Revolutions of March and October 1917
and the international conferences mentioned before.
Oppositional views were reflected in articles appearing during
the early part of the war ( e.g., the articles in the Internationale),
speeches made by Liebknecht in the Reichstag, and leaflets dis
seminated among the SPD members. As early as August 1914
Liebknecht attacked the axiomatic party unity, declaring that
clearness of concepts was more important than unity.52 In May
1915, the important underground leaflet "The Main Enemy Is In
Our Own Country" attempted to explain to the masses that the
war must be fought on an international basis.
The main enemy of the German people is in Germany: German
imperialism, the German war party, German secret diplomacy. The
German people must wage a political fight against this enemy in its

.

51 Cf. above, chap. I, sec. 4.

52 Liebknecht, Reden, pp. 109-11.
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own country in cooperation with the proletariat of other countries
whose fight must be directed against their own native imperialists. 53

For Liebknecht the focal point of revolutionary activity was the
struggle against war itself. " ... the anti-militarist fight is the in
tensified form of the class struggle against the war and against the
violent domestic power politics of capitalism. "54
The principal political impulses, however, came from Rosa
Luxemburg. The fact. that she spent most of the war years in
prison did not reduce her influence among the left wing radicals.55
Rosa Luxemburg was strongly opposed to the notion expounded
by some Social Democratic leaders that the war had changed the
entire concept of the class struggle.
The proletarian tactics before and after the outbreak of war are
supposed to be totally different; they are even to pursue opposite pur
poses. That presumes that the social conditions [ which constitute]
the bases for o�r tactics, are basically different during peace and war.
According ro historic materialism, as expounded by Marx, history is
the history of class struggles. According to Kautsky's revised ma
terialism, it must be added: except during war times.... The political
class rule of the bourgeoisie does not cease during the war; on the con
trary, because of the suspension of constitutional rights it develops
into brutal class dictatorship. 56

53 Karl Liebknecht, Der Hauptfeind
steht im eigenen Land, quoted in Lieb
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 301.

The great aim of the international pro
letariat must be the international gen
eral strike, at least an international
strike in the ammunition and armament
industries. (Karl Liebknecht, "Anti
militarismus," quoted in Liebknecht,
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 333.)
04 Liebknecht, Antimilitarismus, p.
323.
55 Fischer, op. cit., p. 14. A contem
porary Communist evaluation of Rosa

Luxemburg's h i s t o r i c revolutionary
mission during the war summarized it
as follows; "Her first task was to tear
apart the falsehood of the defense of
the Fatherland which the Social Demo
cratic leaders used to cover up their
betrayal.... The second task consisted
of exposing the untmth of the alleged°
war against Tsarism ... her third mis
sion was to reveal the betrayal of the
Burgfrieden. (Oelssner, op. cit., pp.
I 10-112.)
56 Luxemburg, Der Wiederaufbau,
pp. 523-25.
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Not until January 1, 1916 when the "Guiding Principles for
the Tasks of the International Social Democracy" were adopted
at a secret meeting of the opposition in Liebknecht's apartment
in Berlin, did the Group International have a program which in
corporated their theoretical concepts -- as conceived by Rosa
Luxemburg. 57
The Junius pamphlet is the most concise statement of Rosa
Luxemburg's anti-war views. In it she also re-emphasized many
of her previously expressed political concepts which according to
her were confirmed by the experiences of the first war years. She
stressed the fact that one of the most important lessons was that
the proletariat in this war could not identify itself with any military
side. According to her, there was no such thing as a "national"
defensive war:
. . . in the present imperialistic milieu, a defensive war fought on
a national basis is completely impossible; any socialist policy which
disregards this detem1ining [ influence of the] historical milieu and
which in the midst of the world chaos permits itself to be guided by
the isolated point of view of one country, is a priori built on sand. 58

While it might not be possible under the existing circumstances
to start a revolution or even to incite mass strikes because "great
popular movements are not made with technical recipes from the
pocket of the party offices. . . . " the party must provide the
masses with clear political directives and make them understand
their political mission and interest. Most important is her distinct
07 Flechtheim, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
Fischer, op. cit., p. 13. The "'Guiding
Principles" were the annex to Rosa
Luxemburg's most significant political
writing during the war, "The Crisis of
the Social Democracy." This piece was
written in April, 1915 while she was in
prison but was not printed and circu
lated until one year later. "The Crisis
of the Social Democracy" is also known
under the pseudonym used by Lu-

xemburg, "Junius," the name of the de
fender of the English Constitution
against the attacks of the absolutist
George III. (Froelich, Rosa Luxem
burg, pp. 257-58; Luxemburg, Die
Krise.)
58 Ibid., pp. 359, 386-97. For an ex

planation of Rosa Luxemburg's con
cept concerning the historic necessity
of imperialism, see ibid., pp. 389-91.
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restatement of the interrelation of political mass activity with the
over-all situation:
When large mass demonstrations and mass actions in one form
or other transpire, they depend upon many economical, political, and
psychological factors, upon the prevailing tension [created by J class
antagonism, the degree of political understanding [of the masses] , and
the intensity of the fighting spirit of the masses, something impossible
to figure out or to create artificially through party [commands] . 59

The "Guiding Principles" asserted that these were not new
concepts but actually "apply the principles of the Erfurt Program
to the present problems confronted by international socialism."
Thus, the international proletariat must base its revolutionary
fight upon the class struggle within each country regardless of
peace or war. It must fight against imperialism through par
liamentary means and labor union action. In fact, all activities
of the labor movement must be synchronized with the interna
tional class struggle against imperialism. 60
The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917 trans
formed many of the theoretical problems of the European so
cialists into burning issues. All Social Democratic factions felt
pressed to take a position toward the events in Russia and toward
59 lbid., pp. 374-75. This concept
was never repudiated by Rosa Luxem
burg. She always remained opposed to
any form of Putsche. According to
her, they were bound to fail because
they were isolated events superimposed
on existing social, political, and eco
nomic realities.
60 Ibid., pp. 394, 398-99. The men
tion of parliamentary means in the
class struggle against imperialism was
clearly a reference to voting against
further war appropriations and to
making use of parliament as a platform
from which the masses could be
reached. Liebknecht used both types
of parliamentary fight. His basic po-

sition in regard to parliamentarianism
as a substitute for other means in the
revolutionary struggle became appar
ent in his opposition to the Haase-Le
debour group whom he accused of hav
ing too much confidence in the par
liamentary approach and of "parlia
mentary cretenism." (Karl Liebknecht,
"Nicht die alte Leier, sondern das neue
Schwert," in Spartakusbrief, No. 2.,
November, 1916, quoted inLiebknecht,
A usgewaehlte Reden, p. 4 5 l.) See also
Karl Liebknecht, "Liebknechts kleine
Anfrage," in Politische Briefe des Spar
takusbundes, No. la, January, 1916,
quoted in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte
Reden, pp. 346-47.
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the methods employed by the Bolsheviks in establishing and
maintaining their power. For the right wing socialists, this posed
no particular problem, since they were opposed to anything con
nected with violent revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat.
Within the left wing groups, however, heated discussions took
place on two interrelated questions: the first was to what extent
could Bolshevik policies and actions be accepted as valid for
Russia; the second was to what extent - if at all
could Bol
shevik strategy be used in other countries. Gl
The Spartacists themselves were divided on these issues. Some
of the ultra-radical members were eager to give approval to every
thing the Bolsheviks did; others were more reserved and were
reluctant to approve, for example, the dissolution of the Russian
Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks. Clara Zetkin and Franz
Mehring belonged to the first group.'32 Rosa Luxemburg was
critical of parts of the Bolshevik program. In the fall of 1918
while still in prison, she started a comprehensive critique of Bol
shevik policies. The outbreak of the German Revolution and her
own intense participation in it prevented her from finishing it. 03
Her critique concentrated on four specific issues: ( 1) the
agrarian question, (2) the Bolsheviks' nationality policy, (3) the
problem of democracy, and ( 4) the use of terror. Rosa Luxem
burg argued that the distribution of land immediately achieved
two things of benefit to the revolution: the destruction of large
estates and the support of the peasants. On the other hand, this
tactic would make it much more difficult later on to nationalize
61 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 26.
Ibid., p. 28.
63 Paul Levi, who in the spring of
1918 assumed leadership of the Spar
tacist League after the arrest of Leo
Jogiches, published the fragments of
the critique in 1922. He was violently
attacked for this action by the Com
munists; they alleged that it helped the
charges of the right wing socialists
against the Soviet system. The Com
munists furthermore asserted that Rosa
Luxemburg subsequently changed some
62

of the views expressed in this paper
when, in the course of the German
Revolution, she became convinced of
the correctness of the Bolshevik ap
proach. This assertion was made par
ticularly in reference to her opposition
to the Bolshevik dissolution of the con
stitutent assembly, since she eventually
fought against the USPD's views of co
existence of the council system with the
parliament. (Froelich, Rosa Luxem
burg, pp. 284-91; Oelssner, op. cit., pp.
125-26.)
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the agricultural holdings and, therefore, the original measure was
wrong. She ventured to predict that Lenin's agrarian reform cre
ated a new and powerful social class which constituted a strong
potential enemy to socialism. Its resistance to nationalization
would be much more dangerous and tenacious than that encoun
tered from the former aristocratic land owners.
Her opposition to the national self-determination policy of
the Bolsheviks was of long standing. She had already fought this
doctrine in the program of the Russian Social Democracy. 6'
The most significant part of her critique dealt with the prob
lem of democracy. Rosa Luxemburg was greatly alarmed by the
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and by Bolshevik state
ments on the uselessness of any popular representation elected
during a revolution. The Bolsheviks claimed that democratic in
stitutions were slow and could not keep pace with political de
velopments. Rosa Luxemburg disagreed, and countered that the
sluggish mechanism of democratic institutions had a powerful
corrector in the constant pressure of the active mass movement:
". . . the cure· which Trotsky and Lenin found
putting an end
to democracy - is much worse than the evil .it is supposed to
correct."
Lenin and Trotsky have put the Soviets as the only true repre
sentatives of the working masses in the place of representative bodies
produced by popular election. However, with the suppression of po
litical life in the entire country, the life within the Soviets, i.e., within
the councils must also become weaker and weaker. Without popular
elections, unrestricted freedom of the press and assembly, free ex
pression of opinion, life dies in any public institution; it becomes a
semblance of life wherein only the bureaucracy remains the active
element. 65
There can be no doubt that Rosa Luxemburg was greatly op
posed to the concentration of power in the hands of the few Bol64 Rosa Luxemburg, Die russiche
Revolution ([Berlin]: Verlag Gesell-

schaft u. Erziehung, 1922), pp. 81-97.
65 Ibid., pp. 97-117.

IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I 59

shevik politicians ( she referred to this situation as "the dictator
ship of a handful of politicians") and to the exclusion of the
initiative and control of the masses.6G
Finally, she turned against the "extensive use of terror by the
Soviet government." She recognized the need for strong measures
during revolutionary upheavals directed against domestic and
foreign counter-revolutionary efforts. However, she considered it
dangerous to make a virtue of necessity and to offer it to the in
ternational proletariat as a model of socialist tactics. 67
Rosa Luxemburg shared the opinion of Lenin and Trotsky
that the Russian Revolution could not survive without the help
of the international proletariat. In the Spartacist Letter No. 8
published in January 1918, this same view was expressed. 08 The
Spartacists readily admitted that the Russian Revolution had
given them considerable moral support and had inspired them to
follow the Russian example.
The acceptance of the Russian pattern also became apparent
at the Reich Conference of Spartacists and Left Radical delegates
held in Berlin on October 7, 1918. Under the impact of the Soviet
example, the delegates decided to work for the establishment of
workers' and soldiers' councils in Germany which, following the
Russian experience, were to serve as the main revolutionary agen
cies in the period of transition. 69
66 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 291.
67 Luxemburg, Die russiche Revolu
tion, pp. 117-18. For a pro-Luxemburg
analysis of her "Die russiche Revolu
tion," see Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg,
pp. 284-97. For an anti-Luxemburg
view, see Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 122-26.
68 Kommunistische Partei Deutsch
lands, Spartakusbriefe (Berlin, 1920),
pp. 154-55. Hereafter cited as Sparta
kusbriefe. In the Spartacist Letter No.
11 of September, 1918 entitled 'The
Russian Tragedy," it was asserted that
only a revolt of the German proletariat
could save the situation in Russia.
(Spartakusbriefe, p. 186.) Cf. the text
of a Spartacist leaflet quoted in Walter
Ulbricht, D e r Z u s a m m e nb r u c h

Deutsch/ands im ersten Weltkrieg und
die Novemberrevolution (Berlin: Dietz

Verlag, 1951), p. 11. While the Spar
tacists were eager to point out that
they were not imitating the Russian
Bolsheviks, they did look upon the Bol
shevik Revolution as the beginning of
the proletarian world revolution. (Spar
takusbriefe, p. iv.)
69 A very comprehensive evaluation
of the entire problem of the council
system in Germany and the part it
played in the revolutionary period pre
ceding the military collapse and during
the Revolution proper may be found
in Tormin, op. cit. The Reich Confer
ence led to a consolidation of the forces
of the Spartacists and Left Radicals.
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The Relation of the Spartacists to the Major Revolution
ary Events During the War
Throughout the war, the Spartacists remained a very small
and uninfluential group of revolutionaries who advocated the
revolutionary method of bringing the war to an end. They wished
to utilize the intensified class struggle, brought about by the crisis
conditions, to achieve their next aim, the seizure of political power
by the workers. However, because of the great influence of the
two major Social Democratic parties, the SPD and the USPD, the
Spartacists were able to reach only a relatively small segment of
the population. 70 Thus, the major revolutionary events in war
time Germany which became progressively more challenging for
the government and the military leaders, were only slightly, if at
all, influenced by Spartacist propaganda. These events occurred
as the result of such external circumstances as the deterioration
of the economic situation or the increasingly hopeless situation at
the front, rather than as a result of a revolutionary propaganda. 71
The anti-war demonstration led by Liebknecht on May 1,
1916, was one of the very few independent Spartacist actions.
Even the few protest strikes which followed his arrest were di
rected not by the Spartacists but by Richard Mueller and a num. ber of Revolutionary Shop Stewards from some large factories
in Berlin. 12
It was generally agreed among the dele
gates that the revolutionary fermenta
tion in Germany had entered its last
phase and therefore the left radical
groups should work harmoniously for
the revolution. In addition to the
adoption of a resolution to create work
ers' and soldiers' councils all over Ger
many, the delegates further decided to
increase their propaganda among the
armed forces and to work out a com
mon program of action. The proclama
tion of the Reich Conference which
was widely distributed contained the
action program discussed in Chapter
III, Section 1. (Ibid., pp. 193-94; Froe
lich, Zehn Jahre, p. 222; lllustrierte

Geschichte, pp. 176-78.) For the text
of the proclamation of the Reich Con
ference signed by the Spartacists and
the Left Radicals, see Ibid., pp. 176-78.
There seems to be a difference of opin
ion as to when this conference took
place. The II I u s t r i e r t e Geschichte
places it on October 1, 1918; however,
most other sources such as the Spar
tacist Letter No. 12 give October 7,
1918, as the date.
70 Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 182.
71 Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 100.
72 Barth, op. cit., pp. 15-16; lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 140-42; Froe
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 151-53.
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The extensive leaflet propaganda of the Spartacists was in
tended to familiarize the workers with the political concepts of
the radical left. It also served to "enlighten" the people on how
the Spartacists interpreted the war and the actions of competitive
socialist organizations. Some of the leaflets used current, sharply
debated issues, such as the arrest of Liebknecht or a strike, as a
point of departure for a discussion of political concepts. 73 After
the Russian Revolution, Spartacist propaganda was further inten
sified, partly because of the material assistance given by the
Bolsheviks."'
Spartacist participation in the revolutionary events in Ger
many was motivated and conditioned by ideological concepts.
Those events began in 1915 on a very moderate scale and grew
in frequency and intensity until they culminated in the November
Revolution of 1918. 75 The first major work stoppage occurred
73 For examples of Spartacist leaflets
see: "2½ Jahre Zuchthaus" and "Auf•
ruf zum Proteststreik" quoted in Froe
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 242-43. Rosa
Luxemburg, "Was ist mit Liebknecht!"
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte
Reden, II, pp. 563-66. Rosa Luxem
burg, "Wofuer kaempfte Liebknecht
und weshalb wurde er zu Zuchthaus
verurteilt?" quoted in Luxemburg, Aus
gewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 572-80. Ernst
Meyer, Spartakus im Kriege (Berlin:
Vereinigung Internationaler Verlags
anstalten, 1927), contains a very ex
tensive collection of these leaflets.
74 Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 189-92.
For a thorough survey of Bolshevik
propaganda disseminated with the as
sistance of German radical socialists,
see E. Drahn and S. Leonard, Unter�
irdische Literatur im revolutionaeren
Deutsch/and waehrend des Weltkrieges
(Berlin: Verlag Gesellschaft u. Erzie
hung, 1920). Included in the Russian
activity was a large-scale effort at front
line propaganda by means of news
papers and leaflets. (Ibid., pp. 139-40.)
The following are a few examples of
this type of literature which reached

Germany in considerable quantities:
"Thesis about the socialist revolution
and the missions of the proletariat dur
ing its dictatorship in Russia"; "The
councils - the form of government of
the workers"; "The bloody monster is
dying. Kill it, you German workers,
you German Soldiers." (Ibid., pp. 15158; 167-68; 171-77.) It is also noted
that not all revolutionary propaganda
from outside Germany came from Bol
shevik Russia. The Western Allies re
sorted to revolutionary socialist pro
paganda in order to break down Ger
man resistance. (Ibid., pp. 188-89.)
75 Barth reported that as early as
1915 the workers in Berlin had dis
carded the idea of an economic truce
for the duration. He believed that this
development was significant because it
placed the workers in opposition to
their leadership. (Barth, op. cit., p.
12.) In the course of 1915, there were
several demonstrations against food
shortages: in October the so-called
"butter revolt" and in December the
"potato unrest." (Froelich, Zehn Jahre,
p. 185.)
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in April 1917, when 300,000 workers went on strike in Berlin
alone. The immediate cause was the reduction of the bread ration.
The Spartacists tried to capitalize on this strike, formalizing the
workers' demands and combining them in a leaflet with political
demands:
1. The release of all political prisoners and persons kept in cus
tody for political reasons as well as the abrogation of all po
litical trials.
2. The end of the compulsory labor service law.
3. The end of the state of siege.
4. The restoration of unrestricted freedom of association, press,
and assembly.
5. The creation of a representative body composed of delegates
of all factories to direct the fight of the workers and to or
ganize the working class in order to enforce peace and genuine
political freedom. 76

The next major revolutionary event in war-time Germany was
the revolt of the German navy at Kiel in Augus� 1917. The ad
miralty dealt most severely with the mutinous sailors. Their two
ring leaders were executed. The Spartacists claimed that the
sailors had maintained contact with members of the Group In
ternational even before Reichpietsch, one of the executed leaders,
established liaison with the USPD. 77
The largest German war-time strike occurred in January 1918.
The struggle against the continuation of the war had become a
genuine mass movement. In Vienna, a general strike had broken
out on January 14. Workers' councils were elected which di
rected the strike operations. One week later, on January 28, the
general strike of the Berlin armament industry started. Over
70 I/lustrierte Geschichte, p. 154.
77 Ibid., pp. 157-59. Professor Mei
necke stated that the revolutionary im
pact of the USPD upon the sailors has
not been proved. However, the Rus-

sian example and the tendency to lean
toward the party with the most radical
peace program were of influence.
(Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 104.)
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500,000 workers participated in Berlin alone. The strike spread
quickly to other industrial centers. The organizational prepara
tion was chiefly in the hands of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards
and the USPD. 78 The strike had two significant aspects. Poli
tically, it was a protest against German policies in the peace nego
tiations in Brest-Litovsk and against the official attitude toward
the peace feelers extended by the Western Allies. Secondly, the
workers struck without consulting their union leaders, who found
themselves in a difficult position. They wished to remain neutral
but were afraid that they would thereby permanently lose their
leadership to the USPD. Eventually union officials managed to
take over the strike movement and to push the newly-formed
workers' councils aside. The General Commission of the trade
unions, however, refused to take part in it and declared its strict
neutrality. The strike movement broke down, and by February
3, 1918, the government had the situation well in hand. Large
numbers of strikers were drafted and sent to the front where they
assisted in spreading defeatist propaganda among the soldiers. 79
The masses of the German workers had proved that they could
start a large-scale mass action without their traditional organiza
tions. It was a demonstration of the changed attitude of the Ger
man people toward the war and everything connected with it. It
is interesting to note, moreover, that the early resistance moveFlechtheim, op. cit., p. 25.
Snell, op. cit., p. 73; lllustrierte
Geschichte, pp. 160-63. In addition to
the demands for an immediate peace
without annexations and indemnities
- as proposed by the Bolshevik peace
d e I e g a t i o n at Brest-Litovsk- the
strikers also requested domestic poli
tical changes. For the text of the sum
mons to the general strike, see Froe
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 245-46; and
Stuemke, op. cit., pp. 72-73. These de
mands are similar to those made dur
ing the April strike of 1917. It is often
asserted that one of the reasons why
the strike failed so quickly was that the
78

79

SPD participated in the strike com
mand. As a matter of fact, Ebert later
claimed that the SPD had entered the
strike with the express purpose of end
ing the strike promptly. (Hermann Ma
tern, "Die Politik der KPD und der
SPD in der Zeit der Weimarer Re
publik" [Wissenschaftliche Beilage des
Forum (Berlin)], Teil I [September 15,
1952], p. 3); lllustrierte Geschichte, p.
162. Also see Barth, op. cit., pp. 20-23
for an interesting account of the J anu
ary strike, which could have been in
terpreted as a warning sign for coming
events. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 76.)
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ment in Germany grew independently in form and content from
the Russian Bolshevik ideas. 80
The failure of the strike movement in January 1918 greatly
impressed the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and certain leftist
elements within the USPD with the fact that other means of class
combat were required. 81
By October, 1918, the revolutionary fermentation had be
come visible all over Germany. Demonstrations, stormy meet
ings, and political strikes showed the growing strength of the dis
satisfied population and the declining power of the government
forces. 82 General opposition to the war had not remained with
the socialist workers alone. As early as 191 7, the Catholic work
ers in various parts of Germany ( e.g., the Ruhr and the Rhine
land), who formed the bulk of the Center Party, had begun to
conduct active propaganda for an immediate peace settlement.
The Spartacists did not agree with the conspiratorial prepa
ration of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards. They did not share
the belief that a handful of well-armed and well-disciplined revo
lutionaries could start a revolution. During the various meetings
between the Spartacists and the Shop Stewards which occurred
with greater frequency throughout 1918, the Spartacists declared
. themselves for mass actions. The Shop Stewards, in turn, accused
the Spartacists of "revolutionary gymnastics." 83
On the other hand, the Russian Revolution exerted both di
rect and indirect influences on later revolutionary developments
in Germany. It set the pattern of the workers' and soldiers' coun
cils as revolutionary agencies. It also encouraged the German
strike movement which gradually changed its emphasis from eco
nomic to political issues.84 Much has been written about the supso Fischer, op. cit., p. 16.
81 Berlau, op. cit., pp. 162-63. For
information concerning the prepara
tion for the revolution by the Revolu
tionary Shop Stewards, see Barth, op.
cit., pp. 46-53.
82 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 181.
83 Barth, op. cit., pp. 30, 36-40.

s4 Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 65, 68.
Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1953), I, pp. 16-19. A
study of the strikes which occurred
during World War I was made by the
German Labor Front of the Nazi gov
ernment in 1943. This study examines
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port given to the revolutionary groups by the Bolshevik ambas
sador in Berlin, A. A. Joffe. It appears that Joffe not only dis
tributed revolutionary literature but also allotted considerable
sums of money to the USPD. 85 He was formally expelled from
Germany on November 5, 1918; he and his staff left the following
the number of strikes in the various in
dustries and locales during the war.
For example, in 1917 Berlin led with
one-third of all strikers; in 1918, per
sons who participated in political
strikes outnumbered those who en
gaged in economic strikes. (Arbeitswis
senschaftliches Institut der Deutschen
Arbeitsfront. Die Streiks im 1. Welt
krieg 1914-1918 [Berlin: Deutsche Ar
beitsfront, January, 1943].)
85 Arthur Rosenberg. A History of
the German Republic (London: Me
thuen & Co., 1936), p. 326; Eduard
Bernstein, Die deutsche Revolution
(Berlin: Verlag fuer Gesellschaft u.
Erziehung, 1921), pp. 22-23. Diplo
matic relations had been established
under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Louis Fischer admits that Joffe's mis
sion was not merely diplomatic. More
than ten Social Democratic newspapers
were directed and supported by the
Soviet e m b a s s y in Berlin. (Louis
Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs
[Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1951], I, p. 75.) Fischer describes the
activities of the Soviet Ambassador as
follows: "The embassy bought infor
mation from officials in various Ger
man ministries and passed it on to
radical leaders for use in Reichstag
speeches, in workers' meetings and in
the Press. Anti-war and anti-govern
ment literature was sent to all parts of
the country and to the front. Tons of
literature were printed and clandestine
ly distributed by Joffe's office. 'It is
necessary to emphasize most cate
gorically,' Joffe wrote in an almost un
known memorandum, 'that in the pre
paration of the German revolution, the
Russian Embassy worked all the time
in close contact with the German So
cialists.' Leaders of the German In-

dependents discussed most matters of
revolutionary tactics with Joffe, who
was an experienced conspirator. In a
radio message, dated December 15,
1918, broadcast by Joffe to the revo
lutionary soviets of Germany, he ad
mitted having paid 100,000 marks for
the purchase of arms for the revolu
tionaries and announced that he had
established in Germany a 10.000,000
ruble fund for the support of the revo
lution, which was entrusted to Oskar
Cohn, a Socialist deputy." (Ibid., pp.
75-76.) For the text of Joffe's radio
message see Bernstein, op. cit., p. 69.
Louis Fischer's information about
Joffe's activities is partly based on a
_personal meeting with Joffe and about
which Fischer reports in an earlier
book.
"Lenin's envoy, Adolf A. Joffe, was
new as a diplomat but experienced as
a revolutionary, one of the founders
of the Soviet regime. According to the
cold official formula, he was persona
grata to the German imperial govern
ment. Actually, he endeavored to over
throw it. ... Years later he told me the
story; it was in 1927 when Joffe was
forty-four years old. Soviet develop
ments had filled him with anguish and
he had decided to commit suicide in
demonstrative protest against Stalin's
policies. Before he killed himself he
asked me to come see him. I had never
met him, and had not requested an
appointment. But he sent me a mes
sage through a mutual friend. He
wanted to talk to an outsider for the
record. What he revealed was con
firmed by his 1919 reports which he
took from his files and showed me:
His embassy in Berlin, he said, served
as staff headquarters for a German
revolution. . . . 'We wanted to pull
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day. 86 After the November Revolution of 1918, the policy initi
ated by the Imperial government was continued for some time,
and diplomatic relations with Moscow were not resumed until
1922.

down the monarchist state and end the
war,' Joffe said to me. 'President Wood
row Wilson tried to do the same in his
own way.' ... 'In the end, however,'
Joffe commented ruefully, 'they, we,
accomplished little or nothing of per
manent value. We were too weak to
provoke a revolution.' "
(Louis Fischer, Men and Politics. An
Autobiography. [New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, 1941], p. 26.)
Sb The immediate reason for the ex
pulsion was the discovery of revolu
tionary literature in a case of diplo
matic mail which was purposely broken
open at the Friedrichstrasse railroad
station in Berlin. The Austrian Social

Democratic publication Klassenkampf
described this incident nine years later,
on December 1, 1927: "[the discovered
revolutionary circulars] were neither
written, nor printed, nor packed, nor
dispatched from Russia. They were, in
fact, inserted into the diplomatic box
by the Imperial (German) police; they
were written in Germany by Comrade
Levi." Louis Fischer adds: "Many
other statements tend to confirm the
suspicion that, although Joffe was
heavily laden with revolutionary guilt,
these particular circulars in his diplo
matic mail originated with the Prus
sian Police." (Louis Fischer, op. cit.,
p. 77.)

The November Revolution
and the Spartacists

The Impact of the
November Revolution

1. Failure of Parliamentarization, October 1918
During the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the
November Revolution of 1918, two major domestic developments
took place within Germany. First, under the impact of the mili
tary reversals suffered by the German army and the continuous
political and economic mismanagement of domestic affairs, large
segments of the population became progressively discontented.
The majority of the population, weary of the situation which be
came more hopeless from day to day, desired an immediate ter
mination of hostilities. The masses were convinced that they
could not trust their government to bring about the desired peace,
since in the past the government had demonstrated its lack of
responsiveness to the people's demands. For example, various
political promises, such as the one pertaining to the antiquated
Prussian election law, had never been fulfilled. 1 As discontent
ment grew, so did the desire of the masses to see the situation de
cisively altered, even if this involved the direct participation of
the people.
The second important development during this period was
caused by the sudden decision of the Imperial authorities to in
troduce significant changes in the prevailing governmental sys1 Reich Chancellor Herding had
given his assurance to trade union
leaders that he would stand or fall on

the requested change of the Prussian
election law. (Stuemke, op. cit., p. 76.)
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tern. These changes laid the basis for reforms which transformed
Germany into a parliamentary monarchy similar to that in Bri
tain. This action was a conscious attempt to ward off a revolt of
the discontented masses by a "revolution from above," as this
process was appropriately called by the German Foreign Secre
tary, Admiral von Hintze.2
Germany's military defeat had been accomplished and was
so admitted by the two top military leaders, Hindenburg and
Ludendorff. They succeeded in convincing the Emperor and von
Hintze that two things had to be accomplished without delay: an
immediate armistice and a change of the political system within
Germany. Ludendorff, in particular, was convinced that the gov
ernment of Hertling was not able to handle the storm expected
from below. For all practical purposes, the government could
assume one of two alternative forms: it could establish itself as
a military dictatorship - a solution favored by the Conservative
Party - or it could become a parliamentary government. The
second alternative was adopted after Ludendorff strongly rec
ommended it to the Emperor. Ludendorff believed that par
liamentarization would necessarily broaden the popular base of
the government and therefore would regain the unity and co
.operation of the people so urgently needed to conduct the last
phase of the war and the forthcoming peace negotiations. He
also emphasized that a democratic form of government would
stand a better chance of obtaining easier peace terms from the
Allies.
The Emperor accepted the resignation of Hertling and ap
pointed Prince Max von Baden as the new Reich Chancellor. The
2 Alfred Niemann, Revolution von
Oben
Umsturz von Unten (Berlin:
Verlag fuer Kulturpolitik, 1927), pp.
98ff.
3 For information on the precarious
military situation of Germany follow
ing the summer of 1918, see Rosen
berg, Entstehung, pp. 220-22, and Prinz
Max von Baden, Erinnerungen und
Dokumente (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-

anstalt, 1927), pp. 283-88. The Con
servative Party proposed the establish
ment of a military dictatorship under
a General. (Bergstraesser, op. cit., p.
198.) For a discussion of the decision
concerning the parliamentarization of
the Imperial government, see Rosen
berg, Entstehung, pp. 226-29, and
Stuemke, op. cit., pp. 76-79.
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latter enjoyed a reputation of liberal-democratic leanings and was
acceptable to liberals and socialists whose cooperation would be
needed by the new government. 4 Thus, the first parliamentary
government in Germany was, as Rosenberg correctly pointed out,
not an achievement of the Reichstag, but the result of a "com
mand" by Ludendorff. 5
In order for the revolution from above to achieve its first major
objective - the broadening of the base of government -- it was
essential to secure the cooperation of the Majority Socialists.
Prince Max made as a condition for his acceptance of the position
of Reich Chancellor that the Majority Socialists join his cabinet. 6
The SPD was not unprepared for this occasion. As early as
September 23, 1918, foreseeing the coming crisis of the Hertling
government, the SPD Reichstag faction and the Party Committee
had met and decided in favor of participating in a future German
government, provided that this government would incorporate a
number of SPD demands in its platform. 1 Prince Max agreed to
4 Halperin, op. cit., pp. 56-57. The
letter from the Emperor accepting
Hertling's resignation contained the
following statement which laid the
groundwork for the coming parlia
mentarization: "It is my wish that the
German people participate more ef
fectively than heretofore in determin
ing the fate of the Fatherland. It is
therefore my will that men who enjoy
the confidence of the nation should
partake extensively of the rights and
duties of government." (Ibid., p. 56.)
5 Rosenberg, Entstehung, p. 227.
6 Hermann Mueller, Die November
Revolution (2d ed.; Berlin: Verlag
Der Buecherkreis, 1931), pp. 9-10;
Stuemke, op. cit., p. 87.
7
Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 1011. Some of the Majority Socialist
leaders believed that it would be a tac
tical mistake to join a bourgeois gov
ernment which most likely would be
come the caretaker government for the
defeated nation. However, Friedrich
Ebert, the leader of the SPD, declared
prior to the vote on this issue: "If, at

this time, you do not wish to come to
an agreement with the bourgeois par
ties and with the government, then we
are forced to let matters take their own
course. Then we will resort to revolu
tionary tactics, depend solely upon
ourselves, and leave the fate of the
party to the outcome of the revolution.
Whoever saw what happened in Russia
cannot, in the interest of the proletariat,
wish to see the same development
here. On the contrary, we must throw
ourselves into the gap. 1f it is possible
for us to obtain sufficient influence to
carry out our demands and also to
combine them with the salvation of our
country, then it is our damned duty
to do it." (Froelich, Zehn lahre, p.
220.) Also see the discussion in Ber
lau, op. cit., pp. 198-202 pertaining to
the SPD views concerning participa
tion in a coalition government prior to
the November Revolution. The de
mands of the Majority Socialists which
were formulated on September 23,
1918, are discussed in Prinz Max, op.
cit., pp. 321-322.
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these demands, and, on October 4, 1918, the Majority Socialists
formed a coalition government with the Progressives, the Center,
and the National Liberals. The SPD sent Philip Scheidemann
and Gustav Bauer, the deputy chairman of the General Commis
sion of the Trade Unions, as their representatives to the cabinet. 8
Neither Prince Max nor the SPD realized the gravity of the
military situation. The Supreme Command had even prepared
for the new Chancellor the wording of the request for an ar
mistice. 9
Therefore, the new government was faced from the begin
ning with the two difficult problems of effecting an armistice and
of accomplishing domestic political reforms. On the day the
coalition government was formed, Prince Max forwarded a mes
sage to President Wilson, formally accepting the latter's Four
teen Points as the basis for peace negotiations and requesting the
armistice as demanded by Ludendorff. 10 Supported by the depu
ties of the political parties in his coalition, Prince Max set about
to accomplish. the promised democratic reforms. The reform
work commenced on October 8, 191 8, and was completed by
October 26. The new constitution came into force on October
28, 1918. On that day, Germany became a parliamentary mon
archy. Only a few powers remained with the Emperor. The
Reich Chancellor became responsible to both houses of par
liament (the Reichstag and the Bundesrat [Federal Council]),
8 Stuemke, op. cit., p. 87. When the
Majority Socialists entered the Govern
ment of Prince Max, they demanded,
possibly for tactical reasons, that all
members of the USPD who were in
prison for their radical activities be re
leased. This demand included Lieb
knecht. (Ibid., p. 101.) The Vorwaerts
announced shortly and confidently
after the coalition government was
formed: "The aim of a German demo
cracy will be reached within a short
time by means of a peaceful change."
(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 172.)
9 Prinz Max, op. cit., pp. 335-52.
Hermann Mueller even doubts that the

majority of the SPD leaders would have
agreed to the entry of Majority Social
ists into the cabinet of Prince Max if
they had known how hopeless the mili
tary situation was at the end of Sep
tember, 1918. (Hermann Mueller, op.
cit., p. 12.)
10 Prinz Max, op. cit., pp. 353-509.
Prince Max's account of the long ex
change of notes between his govern
ment and that of the United States is
most detailed. His statements concern
ing the change of the German Con
stitution is unfortunately extremely
brief.
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and the military became subordinate to the civilian authorities.
On October 27, 1918, Prince Max notified the President of the
United States that peace negotiations could now be conducted
by a genuine representative government of the German people. 11
The period immediately preceding the November Revolution
witnessed another important event: the development of the SPD
into a government party. The entrance of the Majority Socialists
as a minority into a bourgeois coalition government headed by a
prince can be interpreted as the culmination of the reformist poli
cies pursued by the party throughout the war. The official SPD
explanation for this step - that the crisis situation of the German
nation required the cooperation of all Germans regardless of
party and class - does not change the fact that the Majority So
cialists had become a party which participated in the formulation
and execution of governmental policies at the highest level. 12
The SPD, like the other parties represented in the cabinet of
Prince Max, had a proprietary interest in the perpetuation of the
state organization they helped to create. An evaluation of the
11 Rosenberg, Entstehung, pp. 23234; Stuemke, op. cit., p.100.
12 On October 18, 1918, the follow
ing pronouncement of the Executive
Committee of the SPD appeared in the
Vorwaerts:
"At the present time, the situation
of our country is extremely serious.
The South-East Front has collapsed
and on the West Front the mass armies
of the Allies . . . storm against our
troops with tremendous superiority in
manpower and material.
"Germany and the German people
are in danger of becoming the victims
o f t h e English-French chauvinists'
thirst for conquest and of the conquest
politicians.
"We have declared on August 4,
1914: 'In the hour of danger we do not
leave our fatherland in the lurch' [and
that promise] is even more valid to
day .... " (Quoted in Prinz Max, op.
cit., p.451.) Noske stated in his Reichs-

tag speech of October 25, 1918: "At
the moment we consider the collabora
tion of the Social Democrats in the
government as an emergency action.
The people and the country are in the
greatest danger. We intend to prevent
total collapse by mustering all our
strength. We wish to prevent the Ger
mans from fighting against Germans,
while the country is being attacked
from outside." (Bernstein, op. cit., p.
58.) An illustration of the accept
ability of the SPD leaders even by the
Emperor after they had joined the co
alition government of Prince Max is
an alleged statement by the Emperor to
the Reich Chancellor: "I would also
like to work together with Mr.Ebert.
. ..I have absolutely nothing against
the Social Democracy, only the
name, you know, the name should be
changed." (lllustrierte Geschichte, p.
171.)
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subsequent actions of the SPD must make proper allowances for
this fact.
The parties of the coalition were justified in considering
October 1918 as the month in which they achieved most of the
political objectives which the majority of the German people had
been demanding. By the end of October the cessation of hosti
lities was expected in a matter of days. Traditional military in
terference in domestic affairs had been removed. Ludendorff had
fled the country. The military leaders were divested of their for
mer authority and had been placed under the supervision of the
Reichstag. The new election law for Prussia was assured. A gen
eral amnesty had liberated many political prisoners, among them
Karl Liebknecht. 18
However, there remained an opposition to the policies of the
Reichstag majority: the die-hard Conservatives on the right and
the USPD and Spartacist League on the left, which was unalter
ably opposed to any bourgeois government because of their strong
conviction concerning the socialist state. Thus, the revolution
against the coalition government could have originated only from
these oppositional elements of the right or left However, since
these forces were in a relatively small minority, their revolutionary
attempts could have been defeated by the great masses of the
· middle class and workers who were represented in the coalition
government and who had just experienced the realization of their
immediate political aims.
Nevertheless, a nation-wide revolution did occur. The very
masses which one could have expected to stand behind the po
litical parties of the coalition government, revolted. Unconscious
ly, they revolted against their own government. For this reason,
Rosenberg calls the November Revolution the most amazing of
all revolutions. 14 What were the reasons or the motivating forces
13 Liebknecht was released on Octo
ber 23. Rosa Luxemburg was not af
fected by the amnesty because she was
not a political prisoner at that time.
She was held in "protective custody."

She was not freed until November 9,
1918, as a result of the revolution.
(Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 303.
305.)
14 Rosenberg, Entstehung, p. 238.
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which caused the revolutionary events of November 1918? Sev
eral explanations have been offered. 15 Numerous accounts per
mit the conclusion that, during the month of October 1918, revo
lutionary propaganda had been intensified but had remained con
centrated in Berlin and in the major industrial centers where the
radical wing of the USPD and the Spartacists already had their
greatest influence. rn
Revolutionary activities had received impetus and direction
from the Reich Conference of the Spartacists and Left Radicals
which met on October 7, 1918. 17 The delegates to that conference
decided that in view of the situation, created by the growing revo
lutionary attitude of the masses and by the attempted deception
of the people through the parliamentarization process of the gov
ernment, the German proletariat must fight for the following:
( 1) Immediate release of all persons who because of their fight
for the interests of the proletariat are suffering in prisons and
jails, in protective custody or serving a sentence ....
(2) Immediate abrogation of the state of siege.
(3) Immediate cancellation of the compulsory labor law.
Beyond these, the proletariat must request:
( 1) Annulment of all war loans without compensation.
(2) Expropriation of the entire bank capital, mines and foun
dries; substantial reduction of working hours, establishment
of minimum wages.
(3) Expropriation of all large estates and middle-sized estates.
Transfer of the direction of production to the delegates of
agricultural workers and small farmers.
15 At this point, the validity of the
claim that revolutionary activities con
ducted by the left radical organizations
caused the revolution will be evaluated.
For a discussion of the causes and
driving forces of the November Revo
lution see Chapter III, Section 2.
rn See, for example, the extract of
the Tagebuch eines Spartakisten by

Fritz Rueck which contains interesting
details about the propaganda work in
Stuttgart during October and Novem
ber, 1918. (lllustrierte Geschichte, pp.
182-84.) Rueck also refers to the pub
lic meetings which could have been the
result of the relaxed domestic policies
of the coalition government.
11 See above, p. 59.
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( 4) Decisive changes in military affairs, such as:
a. Granting to soldiers the right of free association and as
sembly for matters pertaining to official and non-official
business.
b. Abrogation of the right of military superiors to discipline
subordinates; discipline will be maintained by soldier
delegates.
c. Abrogation of courts-martial.
d. Transfer of military superiors by majority decision of the
subordinates.
Transfer
of the distribution of food to representatives of the
( 5)
workers.
( 6) Abolition of individual states and dynasties.
Proletarians, the achievement of these demands does not mean
the realization of your aims; this is only the acid test to determine if
the democratization which the ruling classes and their agents are tell
ing you about is genuine. The struggle for real democratization does
not revolve around parliament, election law or ministers who can
simultaneously retain their deputy status in the Reichstag, and other
swindles; [ the fight] is directed against the real foundation of all
enemies of the people: ownership of landed property ·and capital, con
trol over the armed forces and over the judiciary .... 18

In the intensified propaganda carried out by leaflets, news
papers, workers' meetings, and word of mouth, the Spartacists
emphasized more and more the necessity of creating workers'
and soldiers' councils as the only type of revolutionary agencies
which could serve the interest of the proletariat. In a number of
locations, they succeeded in establishing these councils. The
Spartacists' demands were directed increasingly toward the trans
fer of political power from the bourgeois government to revo
lutionary institutions. For example, in the first issue of Die Rote
Fahne (The Red Flag) published on November 5, 1918, in Stutt18 /llustrierte Geschichte, pp. 177-78.
Froelich attached so much significance
to the Reich Conference of the Spar-

tacists and Left Radicals that he called
it the "War Council of the Revolution."
(Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 302.)

IMPACT OF THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION 77

gart, the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Stuttgart demanded
an immediate armistice and peace to be obtained through the
offices of the representatives of the proletariat. The Council also
requested the resignation of the Emperor and of other dynasties,
the dissolution of all legislative bodies in Germany, including the
Reichstag, and the transfer of all power to an assembly composed
of the elected representatives of the workers, soldiers, small farm
ers, and agricultural laborers. 19
In addition to the propaganda activities carried out by the
left wing radical elements, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards also
increased their conspiratorial preparation for their planned revo
lution. They even succeeded in extending their system of con
fidence men to the military barracks in Berlin. Beginning on
November 1, 1918, the Shop Stewards held meetings at which
they discussed the day they would "make" the revolution. Lieb
knecht and Wilhelm Pieck, who represented the Spartacists at
these meetings, and a number of USPD functionaries could not
agree with the proposal of the Shop Stewards. The USPD wanted
to postpone the revolution until after peace had been assured.
Liebknecht proposed revolutionary mass actions. The Shop Stew
ards themselves were divided as to the starting date of the revo
lution. Their radical elements such as Barth, Daeumig, and Le
debour wanted to set the date for November 4, while Richard
Mueller, who represented the moderates among the Shop Stew
ards, opted for November 11. Only the Shop Stewards were en
titled to vote on this issue. A vote of 21 to 19 set the beginning
of the revolution on November 11. However, because of the revo
lutionary events in Kiel and the fact that a number of Revolution
ary Shop Stewards were arrested in the midst of their preparatory
work, Barth believed himself to be the only leader of the con
spirators left on November 8. He called a meeting of the heads
of his assault units, temporarily assumed dictatorial powers, and
proposed that the revolution begin the next day. None of the per19 Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 183.
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sons present disagreed, and Barth took this as a sign of approval.
The next day was November 9, 1918. 20
There is rather general agreement that neither the revolution
ary preparations of the Shop Stewards nor the revolutionary pro
paganda conducted by the Spartacists had any significance in the
developments which led to the revolt in Kiel and from there
throughout Germany until it reached the capital on November 9,
1918. Berlau correctly summarizes this aspect of the German
Revolution as follows:
... The chronological sequence of revolutionary preparation and
the event of the revolution is not identical with causality. No causal
relation can in fact exist where the actual revolution took place under
certain crucial conditions which were outside the control of the groups
carrying on the revolutionary activity, and which could not have been
foreseen by them.21
It has also been _argued that if the radical movement had been the
decisive element, the revolution would have started in Berlin
where preparations had been made. In fact, the eapital fell after
the revolution had been victorious throughout Germany. The re
.volt in Kiel which started the revolution was without a leader
until Noske was sent there from Berlin. 22
20 Barth, op. cit., pp. 46-53; Froelich,
Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 304-05; Richard
Mueller, Vom Kaiserreich, pp. 138-42;
Volkmann, Der Marxismus, pp. 20613. The Majority Socialists did not
participate in any revolutionary pre
paration or propaganda activities. Au
gust Mueller, an SPD leader, claimed
that he was thoroughly acquainted with
the aims of the SPD during the period
preceding the fall of the old regime.
He declared emphatically that the SPD
carried on absolutely no propaganda
among the soldiers, did not advocate
force, did not participate in the arming
of the workers or in any other action
which prepares for an uprising. The

SPD did nothing to bring about the fall
of the government and considered it
self completely innocent in regard to
revolutionary events. {August Mueller,
Sozialisierung oder Sozialismus? [Ber
lin; Verlag Ullstein, 19191, pp. 27-28.)
On the contrary, the SPD attempted to
use its influence to pacify the workers
as many newspaper articles, wall post
ers, and leaflets indicate. See, for ex
ample, lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 181.
Cf. Rosa Luxemburg's critique on the
SPD actions in the Spartacist Letter
No. 12, Spartakusbriefe, pp. 193-94.
21 Berlau, op. cit., p. 166.
22 lhid., p. 167; Stuemke, op. cit., p.
128; Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 199.
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2.

The November Revolution in the Reich

The coalition government of Prince Max could have expected
the support of the majority of the German people provided the
parties which were represented in his government had retained
their influence among the electorate. Popular support of the gov
ernment did not materialize because the people were not con
vinced that a genuine change in the governmental system had
taken place. 23 The fundamental changes in the domestic political
situation remained unnoticed by the masses in spite of the fact
that many of their demands had been fulfilled or were in the pro
cess of being carried out. 24 Tht? attitude of the people toward
the new coalition cabinet was the product of several political and
psychological factors: ( 1) The complete confidence of the Ger
man people in their military leaders and Supreme Command sud
denly vanished under the impact of the military defeat, producing
a severe, national shock. The negative sentiments toward the
military were transferred to the civilian governmental authori
ties. Not only the workers but also the middle class and the civil
servants lost their confidence in the government and therefore
were psychologically unprepared to come to the defense of the
old ruling group. (2) For over four years the people had been
Erich Wollenberg is of the same
opinion. He wrote: "The revolution
which broke out in November, 1918
had only very little in common with
the conspiratorial activity [of the Shop
Stewards and other left wing radicals].
Imperial Germany broke down under
the impact of military defeat which led
to a mass revolt of the workers and
farmers in uniform. When millions of
people march in the streets, storm mili
tary barracks and governmental build
ings, one cannot do much with a few
hundred pistols and a few dozen rifles
which were in the secret weapon depots
of the conspirators." (Erich Wollen
berg, "Der Apparat
Stalins Fuenfte
Kolonne," Ost-Prohleme, 3. Jahrgang,
No. 12 [1951], p. 575.) Professor Mei-

necke believed that the influence of
propaganda from the radical left began
to have some effect after the external
conditions, i.e., the conviction that a
military victory was impossible, fa
vored the reception of those ideas.
However, he thought that the socialist
parties contributed more to the revo
lution through what they represented
than what they actually did. (Meinecke,
Die Revolution, p. 111.)
23 The diplomatic exchange of notes
between the German and United States
governments during October, 1918 in
dicated that the Entente also was not
convinced of the basic constitutional
changes in Germany.
24 Tormin, op. cit., p. 54.
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totaUy absorbed with the activities of their nation. They had
identified themselves intimately and personally with the fate of
the state, and had willingly accepted and endured great hardships
in its interest. The realization of military defeat drove home the
fact that all their sacrifices were in vain. This conviction caused
the violent reaction of demanding the immediate termination of
hostilities and the removal of any obstacle in the way of peace.
The people wanted peace. 25 ( 3) Until the beginning of the war,
the workers' organizations in Germany had been in continuous
opposition to the state, and in turn had been distrusted by the
government. This mutual lack _of confidence had changed during
the war, although no closer relations between the workers and the
old German state had resulted. In addition to the recognition of
military defeat and the conviction that the workers had been de
ceived, the traditional distrust of the workers toward governmental
authorities returned. ( 4) the firm refusal of the government to
carry out domestic political reforms during the war gradually
alienated the workers. Reforms could have demonstrated that
the workers were a part of the nation with civil and political rights
equal to those of other social classes. When political reforms
finally were introduced, they came too late. The revolutionary
· fermentation had by then progressed too far and the government
had become politically isolated from the masses. 26
The government not only failed to convince the masses of the
great political changes which had taken place, but it actually ag
gravated the situation by making numerous mistakes. The enu
meration of constitutional achievements in the press and in proc
lamations alone did not suffice to prove to the people that political
transformation had occurred. The masses could be impressed
25 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 16;
Konrad Haenisch, "Die Ursachen der
deutschen Revolution," Handbuch der
Politik (Berlin: W. Rothschild, 1920),
II, pp. 256-57.
26 lbid., pp. 257-58. Konrad Hae
nisch, who later in 1918 became the

Prussian Minister for Education and a
leading SPD official, was convinced
that a timely modernization of the
German constitutional system would
have brought an organic evolution in
stead of a forceful revolution.
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only by actions which would bear out these claims. The people
saw only that Count Hertling, the Reich Chancellor, had been
replaced by a prince. Vice-Chancellor von Payer and the Prussian
ministers remained in office. Tue Minister of War was a general
as in the past. No apparent changes had been made in either the
army or navy. The successor of Ludendorff was General Groener
who was hated by the Berlin workers from the time of the strike
in the armament industry because of his rigorous actions which
were evaluated by most of the Socialists as "labor-hostile" and
not merely the acts of a policeman maintaining order. Matters
which the people could observe daily had changed little. The
state of siege was not abolished and censorship and political re
strictions continued as before. In the Prussian provinces and in
the constituent states, the commanding generals were still the
highest authorities. In Berlin, the commanding general was von
Linsingen, who continued to control domestic affairs, pass or
dinances, prohibit workers' meetings, order arrests, and apply
censorship regulations to the press until November 9, 1918. 21
Considering the ill effects of these aspects of the rule by the
"people's government" upon the population and especially the
workers, one might conclude that it was a mistake to continue the
state of siege with all its restrictive provisions. It is also difficult
to understand why the new government permitted the long ad
journments of the Reichstag during this transitional period. A
Reichstag in permanent session would have added power to the
cabinet's position. 28
27 Hermann Mueller, who was known
as a moderate Social Democrat, refers
to the political rule by these command
ing generals, who implemented the
provisions of the state of siege, as mili
tary dictatorship. (Hermann Mueller,
op. cit., p. 15.) An example of the
method used by the commanding gen
eral of the Greater Berlin District, Gen
eral von Linsingen, is the following
official announcement, dated Berlin,
November 7, 1918: "Following the
Russian example, certain circles intend

to create workers' and soldiers' coun
cils in violation of the law.
"These institutions are in contradic
tion to the existing State institutions
and constitute a threat to public safety.
"By authority of paragraph 9b of
the Law Concerning the State of Siege,
I, herewith, prohibit the organization
of such associations and participation
in them."
(Froelich, Zehn Jahre, p. 224.)
2s After the coalition cabinet was
formed, the Reichstag adjourned from
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Thus, the masses were not encouraged to expect radical
changes in the prevailing domestic conditions. In regard to the
termination of the war, the conviction developed that the people
must take matters into their own hands the same as during the
great strikes in January of the same year. 29
"Germany was like a powder-keg - one spark was needed
to set off the explosion. "'1° The revolt of the sailors in Kiel in the
first days of November 1918 provided this spark. In spite of the
peace offers made by the government of Prince Max, the German
Naval Command assembled the German fleet in late October for
an operation against the British ships off the coast of Flanders.
The naval command officers decided to die fighting rather than
surrender the fleet. The sailors' revolt climaxed their refusal to
participate in this futile and costly military gesture. A general
strike of the workers in Kiel came in support of the mutinous
sailors. On November 4, the elected workers' and soldiers' coun
cils seized political power from the officials of the imperial regime
who offered very. little resistance. 31 The Majority Socialists still
October 5 to October 22; and again
after the passing of the constitutional
changes, it adjourned from October 26
until November 9. (Rosenberg, Die
Entstehung, pp. 239-42.)
29 Bergstraesser believed that the
government had lost confidence in it
self in view of imminent military de
feat. (Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 199.)
Troeltsch blames Prussian militar
ism as one of the most significant con
tributory factors in the formation of
the revolutionary attitude from below.
He suggests that the development of
militarism into a dominant political
institution was one of the main reasons
for the lack of flexibility of the entire
Imperial system and its resistance to
democratization. When reforms were
finally initiated to counteract the in
creased pressure from below, it was too
late to stop the growing revolutionary
sentiments. (Ernst Troeltsch, Spek
tator-Briefe [Tuebingen: Verlag J.C.B.
Mohr, 1924], pp. 1-12.)

Wilhelm Keil's description of the
situation in Wuerttemberg at the end of
October, 1918 is a good example for
this period which was characterized by
an increase in revolutionary mass ac
tion. (Wilhelm Keil, Er/ebnisse eines
Sozia/demokraten [Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1948], II, pp. 27-40.)
30 Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser
reich, p. 134.
31 Harry R. Rudin, Armistice 1918,
pp. 246-54; Rosenberg, Die Entste
hung, pp. 249-50; Bernstein, op. cit.,
pp. 14-16; Noske, Erlebtes, pp. 8-54;
Prinz Max, op. cit., pp. 572-79 and 58488; Das Werk des Untersuchungsaus

s c h u s s e s der Verfassunggebenden
Deutschen Nationa/versammlung und
des Deutschen Reichstages 1919-1928

(Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft
fuer Kultur u. Geschichte, 1928), X,
pp. 198-207 and 282-315.
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remained strictly opposed to the revolutionary actions in Kiel;
they believed that a revolution in Germany would be a great mis
fortune. 32 The coalition government sent the Social Democratic
Reichstag deputy Gustav Noske and the leading member of the
Democratic Party, Secretary of State Conrad Haussmann to Kiel
to re-establish order and to prevent the spread of the movement.
But it was too late. The military revolution spread rapidly through
out Germany. On November 5, it had reached Hamburg; on the
following day, general strikes started in Bremen and Luebeck.
Newly formed workers' and soldiers' councils assumed political
power everywhere and encountered no real resistance.
The revolutionary movement spread like a fire out of control.
Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Magdeburg, Brunswick, Frankfurt,
Cologne, Duesseldorf, Hanover, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart were in
the hands of workers' and soldiers' councils on November 7 and 8.
Everywhere the revolution took place without serious fighting. The
police and military authorities surrendered without resisting and the
bourgeoisie, who seemed paralyzed with fear, remained idle in the face
of events. In Munich the movement went beyond [the scope of the
revolution elsewhere] under the leadership of Kurt Eisner. During
the night of November 7-8, the dynasty of the Wittelsbach was dis
posed of, the republic proclaimed, and the Workers', Soldiers', and
Peasants' Council installed. 33

The revolution, however, could not be regarded as complete
so long as the central imperial authorities had not been replaced
by revolutionary institutions. On November 9, the revolution
finally reached Berlin.34 The rapid spread of the revolution, its
uniform organizational pattern, and the orderly nature of the
32 Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 14.
33 Prinz Max, op. cit., p. 137; Gus
tav Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp (Berlin:
Ve r I a g fuer Politik u. Wirtschaft,
1920), pp. 8-50. For a detailed ac
count of the revolutionary events dur
ing the period from November 4 to 9,
see Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 2341. See also Illustrierte Geschichte, pp.
190-94.

34 Ulbricht believed that Berlin was
"behind schedule" because of the con
centration of imperial forces in the
capital. He also believed that the Ma
jority Socialists were more effective in
Berlin than elsewhere in delaying the
outbreak of the mass uprising. (Ul
bricht, Zur Geschichte, p. 24.)
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transfer of political and military powers might lead to the con
viction that it was a centrally directed and controlled mass opera
tion. In reality, the opposite was the case. It was a spontaneous
mass movement lacking any central leadership. Its systematic
creation of workers' and soldiers' councils which took possession
of the executive power everywhere did not follow any pre-con
ceived plans. 35 The Spartacists and radicals of the left wing of
the USPD would have liked to superimpose their revolutionary
concepts on the mass movement during the initial phase of the
revolution, but their influence was as negligible then as it was
during the period immediately preceding the revolution, with the
exception of a few localities. The position of the Majority So
cialists, who might have been the only party with a sufficiently
large following to bring about a mass uprising, was a matter of
record. The SPD was a government party and remained abso
lutely opposed to revolutionary methods. After it had failed to
prevent the outbreak of the revoluticm, its leaders did everything
possible to re-establish law and order quickly. 36 Grzesinski, who
held a leading party position in Kassel, summed up the situation
as follows:
Sheer absurdity to assume, as has so often been claimed, that the
revolution of 1918 had been carefully planned! No agreement what
soever existed between the leaders of the Social Democracy and of the
trade-unions regarding the proper procedure to be followed. Nothing
was prepared. Everything happened unexpectedly. Not even the lead
ers of the Social Democracy, the most advanced political movement
of Germany, had thought of an overthrow of the entire governing
35 Berlau, op. cit., p. 193; Flecht
heim, op. cit., p. 33.
"6 For example, in a proclamation
of the Executive Committee of the
SPD dated November 4, 1918, the
party pleaded with the workers not to
u n d e r t a k e rash actions. ( Richard
Mueller, Vom Kaiserreich, pp. 21819.) Prince Max wrote in his memoirs:
"Day after day, the 'Vorwaerts' plead-

ed with the workers not to be drawn
into revolts." (Prinz Max, op. cit., p.
569.) Also see a leaflet addressed to
the sailors and workers prepared by the
Vorwaerts and signed by Prince Max
as Reich Chancellor, Philip Scheide
mann, as Secretary of State, and Ritter
von Mann, as Secretary of State in
charge of naval affairs. (Ibid., pp. 57273.)
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system and of its replacement by a democratic republic. In truth they
had not even desired it. 37
The lack of political leadership also explains the vague and
minor part political demands played during the mass uprising, a
fact which Communist interpreters of the events completely dis
regard. The German Revolution was definitely not inspired by
socialist ideas. As has been pointed out before, its purpose was
to secure peace; only as a secondary issue was it ready to destroy
those institutions which were regarded as obstacles to the realiza
tion of its primary goal. Gradually, the masses came to believe
that the Emperor himself was one of the main obstructions and,
therefore, must be removed.38 A proclamation of the Workers'
and Soldiers' Council at Kiel, dated November 7, 1918, clarified
its aims as follows: "Our aim is a free, social people's republic.
. . . Our main task is to secure peace and to make up for the
damages inflicted by the war." 39 As seen in this light, the Ger
man Revolution assumes the character of a military revolt of
sailors and soldiers, who, under the impact of the military defeat,
seized the initiative in order to terminate the war.40
The German Revolution was strangely enough a very orderly
process. As soon as the workers' and soldiers' councils had es
tablished themselves in place of the former imperial authorities,
they used their power to re-establish and maintain law and order.
The Soldiers' Council of Luebeck announced on November 5,
1918:
...the power in Luebeck is in our hands....It had become nec
essary to clean up the corrupt conditions and remove the military die37 Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 49.
3S Prince Max remarked about the
demands of the revolting sailors:
"Only a minor part of the demands
of the people were of a political nature.
They requested right of assembly, per
mission to receive all newspapers, abo
lition of the duty to salute superior
ranks when not on duty, same rations
[for officers and enlisted personnel],
and a revision of the penal order ..."

(Prinz Max, op. cit., p. 603.)
39 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 3738.
40 Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 26. "The
break-down of October and November
was in a sense a general strike of a
hopelessly defeated army against the
madness of its leaders." (John W.
Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemes is of
Power [London: MacMillan, 1953], p.
15.)
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tatorship of yesterday. The purpose of our action is immediate armis
tice and peace. We shall not interfere with the organs in charge of
maintaining order. Everything will continue in its usual manner. We
are expecting the co-operation of the population of Luebeck. Military
authority was transferred without bloodshed, and we hope this will
continue. We give warning that rioting, plundering, and robbery will
be punished by death. The distribution of food remains the task of
the civil administration.41
41 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 17. The
Workers' and Soldiers' Council of the
town of Stendal publicly announced
that "The council accepts its obliga
tion to maintain law and order." (Her
mann Mueller, op. cit., p. 40.) The or
derliness of the transfer of power in
Kassel is also the leitmotif of Grzesin
ski's description of the November
events. Because of the lack of an over
all plan and in the absence of any di
rectives from SPD leadership, the lo
cal party functionaries were forced to
use their own initiative. A workers'
and soldiers' council was also formed
in Kassel. It was composed of 600
delegates, half of them representing
the SPD, USPD, and trade unions and
the second half comprised of soldiers'
delegates. The workers' and soldiers'
· council was intended to function as the
law-making body. A Workers' and
Soldiers' Committee with Grzesinski as
chairman was formed as its executive
organ. SPD and USPD shared on an
equal basis the responsibilities in the
revolutionary d i s t r i c t government.
(Grzesinski, op. cit., pp. 49-52.)
Also see Keil, op. cit., pp. 84-122 for
an account of the peaceful changes in
Wuerttemberg. A provisional coalition
government was formed there which,
beginning with November 11, even in
cluded members from the bourgeois
parties. There was also a workers' and
soldiers' council in existence. However,
the Provisional government did not
give much attention to its activities.
See also the description of the Nov
ember events in Bielefeld by Carl Se
vering. Severing suggested the name

"People's and Soldiers' Council" for
the new revolutionary administrative
body in order to indicate dedication to
democratic principles and negation of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Se
vering also stated that the new revolu
tionary agency did not create difficulties
for the regular administrative offices.
All civil servants remained in office.
The People's and Soldiers' Council
acted less as an administrative agency
than as a controlling or supervisory
authority. (Carl Severing, Mein Le•
bensweg [Koeln; Greven Verlag, 1950],
I, pp. 225-29.
A recent evaluation of the character
of the councils was made by Walter
Kleen, the director of the Special
School (Sonderschule) "Rosa Luxem•
burg" of the Socialist Unity Party SED
located at Erfurt. Kleen also supports
the concept that the councils were not
socialistic institutions inspired with
revolutionary zeal. Based on a study
of documentary records of the council
of Erfurt and that of Arnstadt and
vicinity, Kleen comes to the conclusion
that the councils were "power instru
ments of the bourgeoisie." He con
tends that the nature of the councils,
except in some localities such as Leu
na, was due to the "destructive and ef
fective influence of the Right-wing
leaders of the Social Democracy, which
expressed itself among the workers and
soldiers particularly in their parlia
mentary illusions as well as in the lack
of a leader of the revolution in the
form of a Marxist-Leninist workers'
party." The documents used by Kleen
prove indeed that the workers' and
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3.

The November Revolution in Berlin

The revolutionary attitude of the masses in Berlin was the
product of the same factors which created the movement else
where in Germany. But two further aspects lent additional sig
nificance to revolutionary developments there. In the first place,
Berlin occupied a unique position as the capital and the seat of
the central government of Germany; secondly, each of the so
cialist parties and groups made a concentrated effort in Berlin to
utilize the spontaneous mass movement for the realization of its
specific political aim.
The left wing radicals were not able to "make" a revolution
in Berlin any more readily than elsewhere. The opponents of the
revolution recognized that there was a good chance that the
Spartacists, Revolutionary Shop Stewards, and leftist elements of
the USPD might succeed in supplying leadership to the rebellious
masses and subsequently might be able to drive the revolution
further. The forces opposing the revolution were comprised not
only of the bourgeois political parties, the military leaders, and
the governmental officials, but also of the leaders of the Majority
Socialists. The SPD was the only one of the opponents to the
revolution which could claim a large following among the masses
which had already been seized by the revolutionary fever. The
Majority Socialist leaders soon realized that if they openly op
posed the demands of the masses or remained neutral, they would
most certainly alienate the people. Thus, after some initial hesi
tation, the leaders of the SPD in Berlin decided to attempt to
bring the mass movement under their control in order to prevent
the radicals on the left from using it to bring about their avowed
aim, the socialist republic. This decision was the outcome of
soldiers' councils of Erfurt and Arn
stadt and vicinity were not socialist
but considered themselves as tempor
ary authorities with the important task
on their hands of keeping peace and
order until the still to be elected Na
tional Assembly would take over legi-

timately p o l i t ic a l control. (Walter
Kleen, "Ueber die Rolle der Raete in
der Novemberrevolution," Zeitschrift
fuer Geschichtswissenschaft, 4. Jahr
gang, Heft 2 [Berlin, Soviet Sector,
1956], pp. 326-31.)
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lengthy deliberations among the leaders of the Executive Com
mittee of the party and of the Reichstag faction; it was considered
the best way out of the dilemma in which the party found itself
as the result of the spontaneous uprising. On the one hand, the
SPD was a party of the coalition cabinet and therefore was ex
pected to defend the political status quo which, according to the
sincere conviction of the Majority Socialist leaders, contained all
the possibilities of transforming Germany into a genuine demo
cratic system under a monarch. Furthermore, the party had em
braced ideological reform concepts which were opposed to the use
of violence and force in domestic politics. On the other hand,
inaction would mean the surrender of the people to the exclusive
influence of the left wing radical elements. Thus, the Majority
Socialists made themselves the spokesmen for the masses, adopt
ing their demand for the abdication of the Emperor and the Crown
Prince. 42 From this moment on, the history of the German Revo
lution assumed the character of a tug-of-war among the socialist
parties and groups fighting for control over the masses.
The Majority Socialists realized that it would not be possible
to retain their representatives in the coalition government. They
also knew that their withdrawal from the government of Prince
Max would create a crisis which most likely would end with the
fall of the cabinet. This in turn would create a situation in which
the tasks of government would become a responsibility of the
opposition. This was a development which the SPD did not want,
because its leaders were neither willing nor psychologically pre
pared to take over the responsibilities of government. An exami
nation of the revolutionary events in Berlin must distinguish be
tween two distinct but interrelated developments: ( 1) the with
drawal of the Majority Socialists' support from the coalition gov
ernment, and (2) the revolutionary uprising of November 9 as a
42 August Winnig states that the de
cision of the SPD was based on the
recognition that the revolution could
not be prevented any longer. The
party capitulated to the principles it

had fought for years and joined the
revolutionary forces in order to gain
control over them. (Winnig, op. cit.,
p. 139.)
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joint enterprise of all socialist parties and groups. The effects of
the resignation of Gustav Bauer and Philip Scheidemann from
the cabinet and of the pressure of the revolutionary activities con
tributed to the first development. In the end, Prince Max ap
pointed Friedrich Ebert as his successor as Reich Chancellor:1 3
After the Majority Socialists took over the government from
Prince Max on November 9, they were uncertain as to the strength
of their influence among the masses. 44 They were not sure if the
workers' and soldiers' councils - the real power factor in Ger
many at the moment -- would be willing to co-operate with the
new government or would consider the cabinet to be in unwar
ranted competition with their own revolutionary governmental
institutions. 45 Shortly after Ebert had assumed the chancellor
ship, he invited the USPD to participate in a coalition cabinet.
43 The appointment of Ebert by
Prince Max involves a legal fiction in
contemporaneous German constitu
tional law. According to this fiction,
after the abdication of the Emperor,
Prince Max became the only authority
vested with the power to appoint a
Reich Chancellor. Prince Max acted
as a trustee for the monarchy. The im
portance of this fiction was that it gave
a degree of legitimacy to the transfer
of power from Prince Max to Ebert.
This question of legitimacy was of con
siderable significance for the numerous
civil servants and other officials of the
imperial authorities because it per
mitted them to cooperate with the new
men without having to violate their
oaths to the Emperor. (Prinz Max, op.
cit., p. 642.) For adequate accounts
of the events which led to the ultimat
um of November 7 requesting the ab
dication of the Emperor and eventually
the withdrawal of the SPD members
from the coalition cabinet, see Ibid.,
pp. 605-29; Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 1928; Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 4148. A conservative point of view about
the abdication of the Emperor is pre
sented by one who remained faithful
to him, Graf Kuno von Westarp, Das

Ende der Monarchie am 9. November
1918 (Berlin: H. Rauschenbusch Ver
lag, 1952). Ebert's first two proclama
tions addressed to the German people
and civil servants also emphasized the
legality of the transfer of political
power from Prince Max to the leader
of the Majority Socialists. For the text
of these two proclamations see Her
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
44 The interpretation s u p p l i e d by
Friedrich Stampfer for the Majority
Socialists' overestimate of the strength
of the USPD and of the radical ele
ments which was the reason for seeking
their collaboration is as follows: No
general elections had taken place for
the six preceding years. The few elec
tions for substitutes did not permit
conclusions about the political disposi
tion of the people. Furthermore, po
litical attitudes change rapidly during
r e v o l u t i o n a r y periods. (Friedrich
Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre der
Deutschen Republik [2d ed.; Offenbach
a. M.: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1947], p. 60.)
45 F. W. von Oertzen, Die deutschen
Freikorps 19/8-1923 (2d ed.; Muen
chen: Bruckmann, 1936), pp. 235-36;
Stuemke, op. cit., p: 138.
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He even expressed willingness to include Karl Liebknecht in the
government.4° However, the USPD was not willing to join the
SPD in a coalition government without first arriving at a working
agreement with the Majority Socialists concerning political aims
and the distribution of offices. Ebert's offer disclosed the division
of opinion within the USPD. There was a strong minority of In
dependent leaders in Berlin, dominated by the Revolutionary
Shop Stewards. They sided with the Spartacists and strongly op
posed collaboration with men like Ebert and Scheidemann, the
revisionist "traitors" to the cause of socialism. 47
The moderates among the Independents, for example, Haase
and Dittmann, wanted to join the SPD in an "all-socialist coalition
government," provided the Majority Socialists would agree to
transform Germany into a "social" republic, would drop for the
time-being their plans for an election of a national assembly,
would give their consent to turn over all legislative, adminis
trative, and judicial functions to the councils, and would also agree
to keep representatives of the bourgeois parties out of the new
government. · The SPD replied that it also wanted a social repub
lic, but that only the future national assembly, as the elected in
strument of the people, could decide this issue with authority. The
Majority Socialists plainly refused to transfer to the councils the
functions demanded in the USPD proposal, because, according
to the SPD, the councils represented only minority groups. Also
the exclusion of bourgeois representatives was not feasible because
it would aggravate the very difficult task of feeding the population.
The negotiations between the two parties resulted in an uneasy
4,; Rudin, op. cit., p. 375. Meinecke
believed that Ebert's offer to include
Liebknecht was made for tactical rea
sons. Ebert intended thereby to neu
tralize the radical elements. However,
L i e b k n e c h t' s counter-demands ex
cluded any possibility of collaboration.
(Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 113.)
See also Willi Muenzenberg et al., Karl
Liebknecht (Berlin: Verlag der Ju
gendinternationale, 1931), pp. 59-60.

47 Ledebour, Barth, and R i c h a r d
Mueller were strongly opposed to a
coalition government with the SPD.
lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 210-11. In
his book, Barth included Haase in the
group opposed to working with the
SPD. Barth himself advocated that the
USPD take over the government by
itself. (Barth, op. cit., pp. 58°59.)
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compromise. Both parties agreed to form a provisional govern
ment on the basis of parity. The USPD showed a conciliatory at
titude by dropping its original three day time-limit for the coalition
but stubbornly remained pledged to support the council system
and to fight the summoning of a constituent assembly until after
the gains made by the revolution were consolidated.48
A six-man provisional cabinet, the so-called Council of
People's Commissars, was formed on November 10. It was com
posed of Friedrich Ebert, Philip Scheidemann, and Otto Lands
berg, all Majority Socialists, and of Hugo Haase, Wilhelm Ditt
mann, and Emil Barth, all lndependents.4° In addition to the
socialists who were members of either the SPD or the USPD, the
Centrists and the Liberals also participated in the new govern
ment. They headed a number of important ministries, such as the
Foreign Office ( State Secretary Dr. Solf), War Ministry ( State
Secretary Scheuch), and Ministry of Interior (Dr. Hugo Preuss.) 50
The program of the new government was published shortly
thereafter. It clearly illustrated that Germany had in its People's
Commissars a liberal, democratic government in spite of the oc
casional use of socialist terminology. The significance of the proc48 Berlau, op. cit., pp. 222-23; Illus
trierte Geschichte, pp. 210-11; Her
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Bern
stein, op. cit., pp. 34-36, 45-49; Stamp
fer, op. cit., pp. 60-64. The original
conditions of the USPD are quoted in
lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 210. For the
text of the reply of the SPD, the state
ment of acceptance by the USPD, and
a complete compilation of all offices
of the new government occupied by so
cialists of both parties, see Bernstein,
op. cit., pp. 35, 45ff.
4" Bernstein, op. cit., p. 48.
The
usage of revolutionary terminology for
the newly formed governmental agen
cies such as the Council of People's
Commissars was an indication of the
Majority Socialists' intention of com
promising with the left wing of the so
cialist movement and with the masses

about whose real aims very little was
known. The choice of terms which re
sembled closely those used in the Rus
sian Revolution was as far as the Ma
jority Socialists were concerned, only
part of their over-all tactical effort of
bringing the revolution under their
control.
50 Rosenberg, Die Entstehung, p.
256; Bernstein, op. cit., p. 48. Thus,
there was a certain amount of truth in
the charge of the left wing radicals that
the Provisional government failed to
destroy the old state machinery and
that some of the imperial ministers re
mained in their positions. According
to the left wing radicals, only Dr.
Preuss could be considered a democrat
while all the others were reactionaries
of long standing. (Illustrierte Geschich
te, p. 222.)
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lamation of November 12, 1918, was that it provided the basis
for the work of the coalition government, i.e., for the Majority
Socialists and the moderates of the USPD, who considered this
program as a realistic approach to the problems facing them at
that time.
To the German People!
The government created by the revolution, whose political leader
ship is purely socialist, has assumed the mission of carrying out the
socialist program. Even at this [early] time, the government announces
the following to be law:
(1) The state of siege is over.

(2) The right to organize and assemble is not subject to restriction, not excepting civil servants and government employees.
3
Censorship
ceases. Censorship for theaters is suspended.
( )
( 4) Freedom of speech and press [ is guaranteed] .
(5) Freedom of religion is guaranteed. No one can be forced to
participate in religious activities.
( 6) An amnesty is granted to all political offenders. Trials pend
ing for (political] offenses will be suspended.
(7) The compulsory labor service law is suspended, with the ex
ception of those provisions which deal with the arbitration
of controversies.
( 8) Regulations dealing with servants and emergency law con
cerning rural laborers are suspended.
( 9) The labor protection laws which were suspended at the be
ginning of the war are re-instated. Additional social-political
ordinances will be forthcoming in the near future. Not later
than January 1, 1919, the eight-hour normal working day
will be in force. The government will do everything to obtain
sufficient employment opportunities. A decree concerning
unemployment insurance has been prepared. Its financial
burden is being distributed among the Reich, State, and com
munity. In the field of health insurance, compulsory insur
ance will be extended beyond the present limit of 2,500
Marks. The shortage of living quarters will be relieved by
making apartments available. A regulated [ system J for food
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maintenance for the population will be instituted. The gov
ernment will keep up orderly production, protect property
against infringement by individuals, and will protect per
sonal freedom and safety. All elections for public offices
will henceforth be subject to the equal, secret, direct general
election law, based on proportional representation, for all
men and women above twenty years of age. This election
law will also apply to elections of the constituent assembly,
about which further information will be forthcoming.51

Parallel in time with the formation of the socialist coalition
cabinet was a second development, the revolutionary mass actions
of the workers and soldiers of Berlin. This followed the estab
lished pattern of the German Revolution: general strike, frater
nization of workers and soldiers, and formation of workers' and
soldiers' councils as the organizational institutions of the revolu
tion. 02 Many of these councils were fonned in the Greater Berlin
area, and a great number of them were under the strong influence
of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and Spartacists. The council
system appeared to the radical elements as better suited to carry
the revolution further than the cabinet which was in the process
of being organized. Therefore, the revolutionary elements, while
trying to influence the program and aim of the cabinet during the
51 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 8384. The following is a comment of one
of the leading Majority Socialists,
Friedrich Stampfer, about this procla
mation:
"The proclamation contains at the
beginning an unclear statement refer
ring to the realization of the socialist
program. Otherwise it is clear and
simple. It does not put into effect the
socialist program, but it brings the ful
fillment of all the timely demands of
the Social Democratic program ... "
(Stampfer, op. cit., pp. 67-68.)
52 The revolutionary events of Nov
ember 9, 1918, in Berlin are fully de
scribed and analyzed in the following:
Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.46-53;
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 29-33; Rosen-

berg, Die Entstehung, pp. 254-55;
Volkmann, Der Marxismus, pp. 23243; lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 204-08.
The revolution in Berlin took place
when the question concerning the ab
dication of the Emperor had reached
its climax. Thus, the Berlin revolu
tion is usually given more credit than
deserved for the proclamation of the
German Republic.When Scheidemann
announced to the people that Germany
had become a republic, "he established
a historical fait accompli." (Grzesinski,
op. cit., p. 50.) However, he only rec
ognized a situation which had become
almost unavoidable at that time. The
text of his famous proclamation is
quoted in Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p.
53.
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period of negotiations between the SPD and USPD, sought to
utilize the revolutionary spirit of the councils for their own pur
poses. Their first tactical aim was to create a central revolutionary
government which would base its complete authority on the
workers' and soldiers' councils. On November 9, through the
initiative of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, a meeting of the
left-oriented workers' and soldiers' delegates of the various coun
cils took place in the Reichstag building. Barth was appointed
chairman. The meeting assumed for the assembled delegates,
which considered themselves the "Provisional Workers' and
Soldiers' Council of Berlin," the authority to call a plenary meet
ing of the workers' and soldiers' councils of Berlin for the follow
ing day to elect a central provisional government for Germany.
It was further decided that on the morning of November 10, prior
to the plenary meeting, new delegates were to be elected, one
deputy for each one thousand workers or soldiers. It was a serious
attempt of a determined revolutionary minority to create another
central govern�ent in competition to Ebert's. The Majority So
cialists recognized the danger inherent in these moves and were
determined to prevent the formation of another central executive
agency. 0'i
With the substantial assistance of non-political soldiers' dele
gates, the SPD succeeded in bringing under its control the an
nounced plenary meeting of about 3,000 deputies at the Circus
Busch, a large auditorium located in the eastern part of Berlin.
Ebert's announcement that his party and the USPD had come to
an agreement and had formed a coalition cabinet found over
whelming approval. This completely destroyed the plans of the
Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Spartacists for the creation
of a central revolutionary government. The left wing radicals,
recognizing defeat, changed tactics. They proposed an "Execu
tive Council of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Berlin"
53 Stampfer, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Her
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 58ff; Barth,
op. cit., pp. 60-61; Bernstein, op. cit.,

pp. 36-37, 45; Otto Braun, Von Wei
mar zu Hitler (2d ed.; New York; Eu
ropa Verlag, 1940), pp. 16-17.

IMPACT OF THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION

composed exclusively of Independents and Spartacists as the con
trolling body for the Provisional government of Ebert and Haase.
Even this attempt failed because, following the example set by
the Provisional government, the soldiers' delegates, under SPD
leadership, insisted on an Executive Council based on parity
among the Majority Socialists and Independents. The soldiers
also insisted on having as many delegates as the workers. Six
Majority Socialists, six Independents, and twelve soldiers were
elected to the new Executive Council. The leaders of the Spar
tacists, Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who were nominated
as representatives for the Independents, absolutely refused to
serve in the same body with Majority Socialists. 54 The Circus
Busch meeting then promptly gave its official sanction to the Pro
visional government which became known as the Council of
People's Commissars. 55 Thus, the high hopes with which the revo
lutionary elements had approached the first assembly of the work
ers' and soldiers' delegates had come to nothing. Even the unani
mous adoption of a lengthy proclamation (prepared in advance
54 The six Majority Socialists were
B u e s c h e 1, Heller, Hiob, Juelich,
Maynz, and Rusch. The Independents
were represented by Barth, Eckert,
Ledebour, Richard Mueller, Neuen
dorf, and Wegmann. Soldiers' repre
sentatives were Bartusch, von Beer
felde, Bergmann, Echtmann, Gerhardt,
Hase, Hertel, Koehler, Lampert, Bru
tus Molkenbuhr, Walz, and Wumpel.
(Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 71.)
"" Ibid., pp. 71-72. The approval of
the coalition cabinet by the Circus
Busch meeting provided the basis for
the claim that the Council of People's
Commissars had received its authority
from the workers' and soldiers' dele
gates of the Berlin councils. See for
example Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte, p.
28. The Majority Socialists did not
like this interpretation and preferred
the fiction of the "legitimate" transfer.
For an illustration of this point of view
see the following quote from an article
by Friedrich Stampfer:

"It is a legend that the first socialist
government of Germany had been ap
pointed by the congress of workers'
and soldiers' delegates. Ebert had
taken over from Prince Max the Reich
Chancellorship, appointed his Major
ity Socialist ministers, and completed
his cabinet on the basis of negotiations
with the party-leadership of the Inde
pendents. The giant meeting of the
workers' and soldiers' delegates, which
took place during the evening of Nov
ember 10 in the Circus Busch, confined
itself to giving approval to the fail ac
compli. Nobody at that time thought
of this as anything more than a for
mality."
(Friedrich Stampfer, "Nationalver
s a m m I u n g und Sozialdemokratie,"
Deutscher Revolutions Almanach fuer
das Jahr 1919, ed. Ernst Drahn and
E r n s t Friedegg [Hamburg, Berlin:
Hoffmann & Campe Verlag, 1919], p.
76.)
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by Daeumig) in which Germany was referred to as a socialist
republic where all political power was vested in the councils and
the provisional government, elected by the councils, had as its
tasks the realization of peace and the socialization of the means
of production, was hollow under the circumstances. Character
istic of the attitude of the left wing elements was the proclamation
containing greetings to the Russian workers and soldiers who had
shown their German brothers the way of the revolution. 56
The significance of the revolutionary development in Berlin
on November 10 lay in the recognition and formalization of the
two parallel governmental structures, the old state apparatus
headed by the Provisional government and the new council sys
tem. Of equal importance was the creation of a connecting link
between the two systems in the form of the Executive Council
of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Greater Berlin. Theo
retically at least, the revolution in Berlin had brought into exist
ence a revolutionary institution ( the Workers' and Soldiers' Coun
cil of Greater Berlin) which claimed authority and jurisdiction
over all workers' and soldiers' councils in the Reich and thereby
over all Germany as such. An arbitrary claim lacking legal jus
tification, it was an important development because it elected the
. Executive Council and allegedly also the Council of People's
Commissars which did exercise, with certain limitations, au
thority throughout Germany.57
The Executive Council considered itself the legislative and
executive power for the entire Reich and for Prussia during the
first few days of the revolution and thereby gave a clear demon56 Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 78; Her•
mann Mueller, op. cit., p. 72. The text
of this proclamation is quoted in Fer
dinand Runkel, Die deutsche Revolu•
tion (Leipzig: Verlag Grunow, 1919),
pp. 150-52.
57 Wilhelm Roemer, Die Entwick•

lung des Raetegedankens in Deutsch
land (Berlin: V e r l a g E. Ebering,

1921), p. 21. It is interesting to note
that the Executive Council was not

recognized as the superior authority
for weeks by workers' and soldiers'
councils in other parts of Germany or
by the central soldiers' council of the
Supreme Command of the Army. How
ever, this lack of recognition did not
prevent the Executive Council from
acting as a supervisory and controlling
agency for the new Provisional gov
ernment. (Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 23637.)
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stration of its intentions to acquire dictatorial powers. 58 The
Executive Council's relation to the Council of People's Com
missars was temporarily clarified during the later hours of Nov
ember 10. The Executive Council became the controlling au
thority of the Provisional government as originally planned, but
because of the predominance of Majority Socialists, it actually
became a source of support for the SPD members of the Council
of People's Commissars. 50
Thus, the Majority Socialists were successful in reaching their
immediate aims: ( 1) They succeeded in establishing a coalition
cabinet with the Independents who agreed to work on the basis
of a moderate liberal program. (2) They prevented the left
wing radicals from setting up a competitive central revolutionary
government during the most confused and unsettled period of the
revolution. (3) They even succeeded in utilizing the great powers
originally inherent in the workers' and soldiers' councils to
strengthen the authority of the Provisional government through
out the Reich.
4.

The Spartacists and the November Revolution

As has been pointed out before, the numerous but small and
almost autonomous groups of Spartacists and Left Radicals were
5 s Roemer, op. cit., p. 21. See the
first proclamation of the Executive
Council of November 12, 1918, which
d e c l a r e d that all municipal, State,
Reich, and m i 1 i t a r y governmental
agencies will continue their activities,
but will issue their ordinances in the
name of the Executive Council. The
text of this proclamation is quoted in
Runkel, op. cit., pp. 152-53.
59 Runkel, op. cit., pp. 1 5 3 -5 4;
Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre, p. 78.
The claim of the Executive Council
for executive powers also caused con
siderable friction with the Council of
People's Commissars which considered
the exercise of executive functions as
its exclusive prerogative. The juris
dictional fight was not settled until De-

cember 10 when the official Gazette
(Reichsanzeiger) announced that the
Executive Council had the controlling
and supervisory powers and the Coun
cil of People's Commissars the execu
tive powers. This announcement was
a restatement of a previous proclama
tion, dated November 23, which trans
ferred all executive powers for the
Reich and for Prussia to the Provi
sional government which, however,
was supposed to exercise this author
ity under the control of the Executive
Council. (The text of the November
23 agreement is quoted in Hermann
Mueller, op. cit., pp. 130-31.) The
next change in the relation of the Pro
visional government to the revolution
ary institutions came as result of the
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not able to influence substantially the growing revolutionary fer
ment prior to the outbreak of the spontaneous mass uprising of
November 191 8. uo After the beginning of the revolution, these
groups, with a few exceptions, failed to become leading elements
in the local workers' and soldiers' councils. 61 Even when Sparta
cists succeeded in getting elected to the councils, they always were
a small minority and therefore could not exercise any real in
fluence on local events. In most cases, they became quickly dis
couraged and preferred to resign from the councils rather than
serve with Majority Socialists or with representatives of bourgeois
parties who, according to the Spartacists, did everything in their
power to end the revolution before any decisive changes in the
political and social conditions could be achieved." 2
The loose organizational arrangement of the Spartacists prior
to the founding of the KPD and the influx of doubtful elements
into the organization during the November days facilitated the
development of ultra-radical and revolutionary-romantic views
among some members. The differences in the political concepts
of those ultra-left elements and those held by the old core of
first Congress of Workers' and Soldiers'
. Councils in the middle of December,
1918. (See below pp. 136-144; and
Roemer, op. cit., pp. 21-22.)
60 See p. 78.
61 An exception was, for example,
the situation in Hamburg where the
Left Radicals (who had joined the
Spartacists in October) gave the work
ers' and soldiers' council the character
of a genuine revolutionary agency. The
Council took over the Hamburger
Echo and appointed Paul Froelich as
its editor-in-chief. From November 8
on he published the newspaper under
the name: Die Rote Fahne, Official

Organ of the Hamburg Workers' and
Soldiers' Council. (lllustrierte Ge
schichte, pp. 191-92.) In Bremen the

workers' and soldiers' council was also
guided by "class conscious workers."
All militaristically-minded teachers
were dismissed from the schools, all

reactionary officials were discharged
from the police, and a Red Guard was
organized to function as the executive
force for the council. In Brunswick,
the workers' and soldiers' council aso
organized a Red Guard, purged the
courts, and confiscated the landed
property b e l o n g i n g to the Duke.
(Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 78.) A photo
graphic reproduction of a proclamation
of the Bremen Workers' and Soldiers'
Council, dated November 9, 1918, is
presented in lllustrierte Geschichte, p.
200. It is one of the few examples of
official pronouncements of workers'
and soldiers' councils during the Nov
ember Revolution in which the revolu
tionary program of the Spartacists can
readily be discerned.
62 See for example the situation in
Wuerttemberg as described by Wil
helm Keil, op. cit., pp. 84-122.
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Marxist-trained Spartacists became most apparent in questions
which had a direct bearing upon the revolutionary tactics of the
Spartacist League. For example, the members of the lunatic
fringe advocated armed uprisings conducted by minorities and
the use of terror as an instrument of the revolution. They also
declared that a dictatorship of a minority had become unavoid
able because the masses continued to follow the "bureaucrats"
and "traitors of the working class."
Thus, they oscillated continuously between the mystical notion of
an elite, a contempt for 'the reactionary masses,' and an equally ir
rational belief in the genuine revolutionary character of the exploited
and dependent people.'13
While these "syndicalist-putschist elements" failed to gain
the upper hand in the Spartacist League because of the over
whelming influence of such old leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and
Karl Liebknecht, they succeeded at times in causing local "revo
lutionary actions" which did not receive the approval of the
Spartacist leaders.
Thus, most of the activities of the Spartacists during the
November Revolution were the product of the influence of the
Spartacist leaders, based on the latter's contemporaneous political
concepts and evaluation of the revolutionary events. Probably
the best source for a study of Spartacist behavior during this
period is the various short- and long-range programs of action
developed during that time. In fact, most of the available state
ments and proclamations made by Rosa Luxemburg and Lieb
knecht demonstrate the interrelation of their political concepts,
their evaluation of the revolutionary situation, and their recom
mendation for specific actions.
The Spartacists were aware that neither their own strength
nor their influence among the masses constituted real power fac
tors at the outbreak of the uprising. Therefore during the initial
63 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 41.
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phase of the revolution, they attempted to bring about a decision
of the issue between bourgeois democracy and proletarian dic
tatorship in favor of the latter by two surprise moves. 64 After the
failure of the attempts made by the left wing radical groups in
Berlin, Spartacist policies were directed at changing the bourgeois
character of the German Revolution into a proletarian revolution
like the Bolshevik revolt in Russia. The Spartacists believed that
only a proletarian revolution could achieve the political, social,
and economic changes required for realizing their ultimate aim,
the socialist society. Thus, their revolutionary tactics were strong
ly influenced by their determination to push the revolution fur
ther. Rosa Luxemburg regarded the November Revolution as
only the beginning. According to her, all that it had accomplished
was the elimination of the monarchy which in itself was meaning
less as long as the capitalist class, "the imperialist bourgeoisie,"
had not been destroyed.
The abolition of the capitalists' rule, the realization of the socialist
society: this and nothing less is the historical contents of the present
revolution. A tremendous task which cannot be done quickly by means
of a few decrees coming from above, but can only be achieved through
. determined mass action of the working people in town and country.

...

85

Karl Liebknecht believed that the November Revolution was
nothing more than the destruction of the old autocratic state ma
chinery. The German Revolution could not be considered a suc
cessful undertaking as long as the rule of the capitalists and of
64 See above, pp. 87, 93-96.
65 Rosa Luxemburg, "Der Anfang,"
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte
Reden, II, p. 594. Liebknecht sum
marized the ultimate aim of the revolu
tion as follows: "Abrogation of class
rule, of exploitation, and of suppres
sion, and realization of socialism that is, the proletariat's aim." (Karl

Liebknecht, "Was ist zu tun?" quoted
in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden,
p. 490.) "The removal of the capitalist
society, that is the only salvation for
the proletariat...." (Karl Liebknecht,
"Was will der Spartakusbund?" quoted
in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden,
p. 507.)
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the socialists who had "betrayed" the International in August
1914 continued. However, Liebknecht was convinced that the
proletariat would eventually make use of its dormant political
power and would end the economic class rule of the bourgeoisie.
He referred to this part of the revolution as its social phase, and
he confidently announced in an address to the proletarians of all
countries ( co-signed by Rosa Luxemburg, Mehring, and Zetkin)
that "Germany is pregnant with the social revolution... . 66
Under the impact of the events in Russia, the Spartacists ac
cepted the Bolshevik example of a dictatorship of the council
system as the proper organizational form of the proletarian revo
lution. 67 A leaflet disseminated on November 8, 1918, on the
eve of the mass uprising in Berlin, clearly indicated the Spar
tacists' intention of creating a "German Socialist Soviet Republic."
Workers and Soldiers!
Your hour has arrived. Now you are taking matters into your own
hands after long endurance and stagnant days. It is not an exaggera
tion to say that in these days the world is looking at you and you are
holding the fate of the world in your hands.
Workers and soldiers! Since the hour of action has arrived, there
must be no return. The same "socialists," who for four years have
served as souteneurs for the government and who in the past weeks have
promised you every day "government of the people," parliamentari
zation, and other nonsense, are now doing everything to hinder you
in your struggle in order to make the movement fade out.
Workers and soldiers! What your comrades and colleagues in
Kiel, Hamburg, Bremen, Luebeck, Rostock, Flensburg, Hanover,
Magdeburg, Brunswick, Munich, and Stuttgart could do, you also can
do. Because on what you can achieve, on your tenacity and on the
outcome of your fight, the victory of your brothers in those places and
the success of the proletariat of the entire world depend.
Karl Liebknecht, "An die Pro
letarier aller Laender," quoted in Lieb
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 480.
Karl Liebknecht, "Der neue Burgfrie-

den," quoted in Liebknecht, Ausge
waehlte Reden, pp. 468-471.
67 Tormin, op. cit., p. 70; Meinecke,
Die Revolution, p. 113.
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Soldiers! Act like your comrades in the navy, unite with your
brothers in workers' clothes. Do not permit yourselves to become a
tool against your brothers, do not obey the commands of your officers,
do not shoot at the fighters for freedom.
Workers and soldiers! The immediate aims of your struggle must
be
( 1) Liberation of all civilian and military prisoners.
(2) Abolition of all individual states [ of the German Federa
tion] and elimination of all dynasties.
( 3) Elections of workers' and soldiers' councils, elections of
delegates [ to the councils] in all factories and military units.
(4) Immediate establishment of relations with other German
workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 5) Assumption of governmental authority by the commissars of
the workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 6) Immediate [ establishment of] contact with the international
proletariat, especially with the Russian Workers' Republic.
Workers and soldiers! Now prove that you are strong; now
demonstrate tha� you have the sense to use your power.
Long live the socialist Republic!
Long live the International!
The Group International (Spartacist League)
Ernst Meyer68
Karl Liebknecht

Only two days later, on November l 0, 1918, a proclamation
in the second issue of the Berlin Rote Fahne and generally as
cribed to Rosa Luxemburg presented a more comprehensive pro
gram of the Spartacist League.'39 It contained the following im
mediate demands:
(1) Disarmament of all policemen and all officers and soldiers
who do not accept the new order; arming of the people; all
trustworthy soldiers and proletarians who are armed retain
their weapons.
68 Spartakusbund [Karl Liebknecht],
Arbeiter und Soldaten, quoted in Lieb
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 46667.

69 During the afternoon hours of
November 9, 1918, a group of Spar
tacists occupied the printing plant and
the editorial offices of the Berliner Lo-
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( 2) Transfer of all military and civilian offices and headquarters
to representatives of the [Berlin] Workers' and Soldiers'
Council.
( 3) Transfer of all weapons and ammunition reserves as well as
armament factories to the Workers' and Soldiers' Council.
( 4) Control over all means of transportation by the Workers' and
Soldiers' Council.
( 5) Abolition of military justice. Replacement of brute obedi
ence (Kadavergehorsam) by voluntary discipline for soldiers
controlled by the Workers' and Soldiers' Council.
( 6) Abolition of the Reichstag and of all parliaments as well as
of the existing Reich Government; taking over of the gov
ernment by the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council until
a Workers' and Soldiers' Council representing the entire
Reich can be formed.
(7) Nation-wide elections of workers' and soldiers' councils
which are the only agencies vested with legislative and ad
ministrative authority. The entire rural and urban working
population, regardless of sex, is to participate in the elections
of the workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 8) Abolition of all dynasties and individual states [ of the Ger
man Federation] ; our watchword is a unitary socialist Ger
man republic.
( 9) Immediate establishment of relations with all workers' and
soldiers' councils in Germany and with the socialist brother
parties abroad.
kal-A nzeiger and printed there the first
few issues of Die Rote Fahne. Rosa
Luxemburg was opposed to the force
ful occupation of the "bourgeois" paper
and its transformation into the Spar
tacists' organ because she was certain
that her group did not have enough
strength to defend this seizure against
its numerous enemies. As soon as dif
ficulties developed, the Spartacists gave
up the plant. Finally on November 18,
arrangements were completed with an
other printing plant and the new Rote
Fahne was published. Rosa Luxem-

burg and Liebknecht signed as re
sponsible editors. However, Rosa Lu
xemburg was actually managing the
newspaper assisted by Paul Levi, Au
gust Thalheimer, Paul Lange, and oth
ers. (Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
310-11; l/lustrierte Geschichte, pp. 205,
211-12.) Hermann Mueller describes
the difficulties Die Rote Fa/we experi
enced at the Scher! publishing house of
the Berlin Lokal-Anziger as the refusal
of the workers of the printing plant to
print the paper. This resulted in the
week-long interruption in the publish-
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(10) Immediate recall of the Russian embassy to Berlin.'°

At the end, the proclamation categorically announced that any
collaboration with the "socialist traitors" was beyond considera
tion.11
In Rosa Luxemburg's first article in the new Rote F ahne of
November 18, 1918, entitled "The Beginning," she drew up the
main points of the Spartacists' program for transforming the
"limited revolution" into a genuine proletarian revolution:
The aim of the revolution [ i.e., a socialist society] clearly deter
mines its source; the mission [ of the revolution) determines its method.
All power in the hands of the working masses, in the hands of the
workers' and soldiers' councils; protection of the achievements of the
revolution from the lurking enemies: all this provides the general di
rection for all measures the revolutionary government [ is supposed to
undertake].
Every step, eyery action of the government should point in this
direction like · a compass:
(1) Completion and re-election of local workers' and soldiers'
councils ....;
(2) permanent session for those bodies representing the masses
and transfer of the intrinsic political power from the small
committee of the Executive Council to the broader forum
represented by the Workers' and Soldiers' Council;
( 3) calling the Reich parliament of the workers' and soldiers'
councils into session as quickly as possible, in order to make
the proletarians of all Germany into one class and one com
pact political power and to rally them behind the work of the
revolution as its defensive arm and its assault force;
( 4) [ undertaking) immediate organization not of the "farmers"
but of the rural proletarians and small farmers who as a
social class are still outside the revolution;
ing of the Spartacists' organ beginning
with November 12. (Hermann Mueller,
op. cit., p. 122.)

10 See above, pp. 65-66.
71

lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 212.
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( 5) formation of a proletarian Red Guard for the permanent pro
tection of the revolution and conscription of a workers' militia
to prepare the entire proletariat to be on the alert at all times;
( 6) removal of the agencies taken over from the absolutist mili
tary police state, the administration, judiciary, and army;
( 7) immediate confiscation of dynastic property and estates and
landed estates as a temporary first measure to secure the
food supply for the people, because hunger is the most dan
gerous ally of the counter-revolution;
summoning
of the Workers' World Congress to meet im
( 8)
mediately in Germany in order to emphasize distinctly and
clearly the international character of the revolution; only
in the International, in the world revolution of the proletariat
is the future of the German Revolution anchored. 72
In contrast to this program, which Rosa Luxemburg con
sidered only as "the first and most urgent steps" of the revolution,
were the actions and omissions of the "revolutionary government"
of Ebert and Haase. Her attack and criticism of the proposed con
stitutent national assembly was an important revision of her views
as expressed in The Russian Revolution, written as late as the fall
of the same year. The change in her opinion regarding the na
tional assembly was probably the result of the developments of
the first week of the German Revolution. Her criticism ran as
follows: 73
What is the present revolutionary government doing?
It does not disturb the state administrative machinery from top to
bottom, leaving it quietly in the hands of the past supporters of the
Hohenzollern absolutism and of the future instruments of the counter
revolution;
it calls for the constituent national assembly [ and intends] to
create thereby a bourgeois counter-weight to the representative body
of the workers and soldiers; it thereby shifts the revolution onto the
72 Luxemburg, Der Anfang, pp. 59596.

73 See above, p. 57, n. 63; see also
Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 313.
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track of a bourgeois revolution and filches the socialist aims of the
revolution;
it does nothing to destroy the notorious power of the capitalist
class rule;
it does everything to mollify the bourgeoisie, by announcing the
sanctity of private property, by assuring the inviolability of the capi
talist arrangement;
it permits the very active counterrevolution to operate and fails
to bring this to the attention of the masses and fails to warn the
people emphatically.
The result of the first week of the revolution: nothing fundamental
has been changed within the state of the Hohenzollerns, the workers'
and soldiers' government is acting as a substitute for the imperial government which has gone bankrupt. .. .
But revolutions do not stand still ....74

All major aspects of the revolutionary program of the Spar
tacists were related to the strengthening of the council system
which was regarded by the left wing radicals as the only method
of bringing about their aim of a unitary German socialist soviet
republic. Other points of the program which did not directly
refer to the councils - such as the necessity of proletarian con
trol over the means of coercion, precautions to be taken against
reactionary assaults on revolutionary achievements, and emphasis
on the international character of the proletarian revolution were conceived only as instrumental to the perpetuation and
strengthening of the council system, the organizational manifesta
tion of the proletarian revolution.
The Spartacists strongly advocated the council system in pref
erence to the "bourgeois democracy" not because they believed
the former could produce a better representation of public opin
ion; on the contrary, they recognized that it could be used with
great advantage to falsify the popular sentiment, since the fran74 Luxemburg, Der Anfang, pp. 59697.
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chise was limited to the workers and soldiers. The council system
could actually facilitate the perpetuation of a minority rule and
still make it appear as being backed by a sizeable majority. The
Russian manipulation of their soviets had clearly demonstrated
their utility to the Spartacists. 75 This could be achieved only when
the workers' and soldiers' councils were the sole organs of state
power and were not subordinate to any other type of govern
mental agency such as the Provisional government. 76
Tormin uses a different approach to explain the position of
the Spartacists toward the council system. He claims that it was
the result of "their concept concerning the nature and aim of the
revolution." Since the Spartacists could not hope to reach their
aim, "the socialist and extremely democratic state," by demo
cratic means because they were a small minority, they saw in the
council dictatorship the best instrument for its realization. Tor
min concludes that this was the situation which forced the Spar
tacists to change from the concept of social democracy to the
"dictatorship of the councils." 77
The council system, regardless of the role it was to play in the
revolutionary program of the Spartacists, did appeal to the great
masses of German workers and soldiers - as the spontaneous
and rapid creation of thousands of such councils demonstrated.
The masses which for years had been kept from active political
participation saw in the councils a means to exert direct influence,
at least in the formulation of local policies. 78
75 Max Weber, Gesammelte Politi
sche Schriften (Munich: Drei Masken
Verlag, 1921), p. 346; Berlau, op. cit.,
p. 218.
7 6 Roemer, op. cit., p. 19; in addi
tion to the book by Walter Tormin re
ferred to above, Roemer, op. cit., is
also an excellent presentation of the
impact of the council system upon
revolutionary developments in Ger
many.
77 Tormin, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
78 Jbid., p. 56.
Roemer goes one
step further in explaining the psycho-

logical motivation for the mass partic
ipation in the council movement. He
claims that in the past the only polit
ical right the worker had was to join
a party and vote. This ended all his
political activity, because policies were
not determined by him but by the party
leadership. The combination of the
political impotence of the old system
and the desire for power by the in
dividual worker who had been denied
this opportunity in the past might ex
plain his interest in the active, di
rect participation which the councils

107

108

THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF

1919

Rosa Luxemburg defined the functions and the operational
significance of the councils as follows:
The workers' and soldiers' councils were then the organs of the
revolution, pillars of the newly-formed order, executors of the will of
the masses in working clothes and soldiers' uniforms. The workers'
and soldiers' councils had a tremendous amount of work in front of
them. They had the task, first of all, of putting into operation the will
of the revolutionary masses of the people and of building up the entire
social and political state machinery in the proletarian-socialist mean
ing [ of the term]. 79

It was understandable, therefore, that the Spartacists did
their utmost to support the council system against all its op
ponents and also tried to obtain a majority of sympathetic coun
cil delegates in order to utilize the councils "to push the revolu
tion further."80 However, the councils remained primarily under
the influence of the SPD and the trade unions. Even representa
tives of the bourgeois parties found entrance. In the soldiers'
councils, the bourgeois elements often succeeded in obtaining a
dominant influence, simply because leaders among the soldiers
quite frequently came from the middle classes. 81 Thus, only the
seemed to offer. (Roemer, op. cit., pp.
1-2.)
Not only the workers but also the
soldiers and to a lesser degree the
farmers wanted to be active in deter
mining their own fate. (Tormin, op.
cit., p. 61.) Walter Goerlitz reports
that ". .. the millions of German sol
diers [created] their own representa
tion in approximately 10,000 soldiers'
councils. At the end of November, a
central soldiers' council was consti
tuted, a kind of army parliament, such
as the history of the German army
had never before known:• (Walter
Goerlitz, Der Deutsche Genera/stab
[Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag der Frank
furter Hefte, 1950], p. 296.) The farm
ers' councils played a very insignific-

ant part in the German Revolution.
Only in certain parts of the Reich, e.g.,
Bavaria, Silesia, and Hanover, they ap
peared but hardly ever transcended
their initial stage.They never obtained
any real importance although in in
dividual cases they did expropriate
landed estates and distributed the land
among farmers. (Roemer, op. cit., p.
18; Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 71.)
79 Rosa Luxemburg, "Um den Voll
zugsrat," quoted in Luxemburg, Aus
gewaehlte Reden, II, p. 630.
80 Ulbricht, Der Zusammenbruch,
pp. 24-25.
s1 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 174; Flecht
heim, op. cit., pp. 38-39; Grotewohl,
op. cit., p. 72; lllustrierte Geschichte,
pp. 216-18. It is not surprising then
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Spartacists and certain circles among the bourgeoisie were ready
to see in the councils the beginning of the Bolshevizing of Ger
many.6"
On November 12, 1918, when the People's Commissars subtly
announced the meeting of a constituent national assembly, they
thereby made it known that they intended to place the formulation
of the future constitution and governmental structure of Germany
in the hands of representatives of all social classes. 83 This move
was bound to provoke strong opposition from the Spartacists and
other left wing radicals, who, as has been pointed out above,
wished to transfer all political, social, and economic powers to
the workers' and soldiers' councils. One of the most precise for
mulations of the Spartacists' point of view in this matter was ex
pressed by Rosa Luxemburg. Her antagonism to the national
assembly must be seen within the context of the growing contro
versy of national assembly versus council system. Her opposition
to the national assembly, the "bourgeois counter-weight" to the
councils, constituted an important point in her article "The Bethat Max Weber was able to write in
a letter the following remarks about
the councils:
"One can really be happy about the
plain objectivity of the simple people
from the trade unions and also of
many soldiers, for example in the local
workers' and soldiers' council to which
I am attached. They have done their
work really excellently and have done
everything without [a lot of] talk, this
I must admit. The nation as such is
after all a people of discipline. . . ."
(Weber, op. cit., p. 482.)
82 Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 114.
83 See the contents of the govern
mental program of the Provisional
government on pp. 92-93 above. Cf.
also Tormin who considers this an
nouncement by the People's Commis
sars as the end of the first phase of
the German Revolution and possibly
even the end of the entire revolution.
(Tormin, op. cit., p. 65.) Barth, the
left wing member of the Provisional

government, wrote in his book that
he requested the deletion of the sen
tence in the governmental proclama
tion of November 12 which made a
reference to the constituent assembly;
he was out-voted five to one. (Barth,
op. cit., p. 68.) The utility of a na
tional assembly, based on universal and
equal franchise, for establishing a new
constitution for Germany was already
discussed between Prince Max and the
SPD before the outbreak of the Nov
ember uprising. It was agreed that
only a caII for a constituent national
assembly might prevent the outbreak
of a violent revolution. (Prinz Max,
op. cit., p. 598.) Nevertheless, after
the outbreak of the revolution, Prince
Max proposed on November 9 the
summoning of a national assembly to
serve as the representative agency
which should decide on the future Ger
man constiution and also on the ques
tion of a monarchy. (Ibid., p. 616.)
On November 9 during the nego-
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gmning," published on November 18. 84 However, in her attack
in Die Rote Fahne on November 20 against the Independents,
who approved of the national assembly in principle but wanted to
postpone its formulation until the revolutionary gains had been
consolidated, she seemed to regard this issue as the most decisive
one for the future course of the German Revolution. 85 The fol
lowing are substantial excerpts from Rosa Luxemburg's article
"The National Assembly."
From the Deutschen Tageszeitung, the Vossischen, and the Vor
waerts to the Independent [i.e., USPD] Freiheit, from von Reventlow,
Erzberger, Scheidemann to Haase and Kautsky, a unanimous call is
heard for the national assembly with an equally unanimous cry of an
guish because of the plan to place the power into the hands of the
working-class.
The entire "people," the entire "nation" is supposed to be called
on to decide by majority decision the future fate of the revolution.
The solution is a foregone conclusion for the admitted, disguised
spokesmen of the ruling classes. [However] we do not discuss things
with the guardians of the capitalist money safes either in the national
assembly or about the national assembly.
The leaders of the Independents are also joining the ranks of the
· protectors of capitalism in this issue.
As pointed out by Hilferding in Freiheit, they intend thereby [ i.e.,
by means of the national assembly] to make it unnecessary for the

tiations conducted between Prince Max
and Ebert which eventually led to the
appointment of the latter as Reich
chancellor, Prince Max suggested again
a constituent national assembly as the
means of working out the future con
stitution. Ebert's answer was in the
affirmative, "We can declare our agree
ment with the principle of this national
assembly." (Ibid., p. 636.)
;,4 See above, pp. 104-6.
s 0 Tormin correctly pointed out that
the Independents were divided on this
issue. The right wing sided with the

SPD and the left wing with the radi
cals. It is also interesting to note that
officially the Independents avoided
giving reasons of principle for their
proposal for postponing the national
assembly. They justified their request
with such practical considerations as
that prisoners of war had not yet been
returned, political parties did not have
enough time for their campaigns, and
the fate of the occupied territories was
still uncertain. (Tormin, op. cit., p.
71 and p. 71, n. l.) See also Runkel, op.
cit., p. I 55.
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revolution to use force [and to eliminate] the civil war with all its
terror. Petit-bourgeois illusions....
These profound Marxists have forgotten the ABC's of socialism.
They have forgotten that the bourgeoisie is not a parliamentary
party, but a ruling class which is in possession of economic and social
means of coercion.
These Junkers and capitalists will remain peaceful only as long as
the revolutionary government is content with pasting little beauty spots
on top of the capitalist wage arrangement. . . .
The present idyl, where wolves and sheeps, tigers and lamb graze
peacefully side by side as in Noah's Ark, will last only until the very
minute when socialism becomes serious.
...When the bourgeoisie is hit in its heart - and its heart beats
in the cash register - it will put up a life and death struggle to retain
its control and will use thousands of open and concealed means of
resistance against socialist measures.
... The "civil war" which they seek to banish from the revolution
with uneasy anxiety, cannot be banished. Civil war is only another
name for the class struggle, and the idea that socialism can be intro
duced without a class struggle and through parliamentary majority
decisions is a ridiculous petit-bourgeois illusion....
In the Great French Revolution, the first decisive step was taken
in July 1789 when the three separate estates combined in a unified
national assembly. This decision determined the entire future course
of events; it was the symbol of victory of a new bourgeois society over
the medieval feudal estates.
[Thus] the national assembly is superannuated inheritance from
the bourgeois revolutions, ....
The fight over the national assembly is carried out under the battle
cry, democracy or dictatorship! ...
The question today is not democracy or dictatorship. The prob
lem, placed on the agenda by history, is: bourgeois democracy or so
cialist democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat means de
mocracy in the socialist sense. The dictatorship of the proletariat does
not mean bombs, revolts, uproars, and "Anarchy," as the spokesmen
of the capitalist profit system willfully falsify, but it connotes the use
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of all political power to bring about socialism, to expropriate the capi
talist class - and because it is based on the will of the revolutionary
majority of the proletariat, it is within the spirit of socialist democracy.
Without the conscious intent and action of the majority of the
proletariat there can be no socialism. In order to clarify this con
viction, to strengthen this will, to organize this action, a class organ
is necessary: the Reich parliament of the urban and rural proletarians.
The summoning of this kind of workers' representation in place of
the traditional national assembly of the bourgeois revolutions alone
constitutes an act of the class struggle, a break with the historic past
of the bourgeois society, a powerful means to wake up the proletarian
masses of the people, a first frank and blunt declaration of war against
capitalism
. . . Parliamentary cretinism was a weakness yesterday; today it
is an ambiguity; tomorrow it will be treason. sn

This article was significant not only because it contained Rosa
Luxemburg's statements on the left wing radicals' determined op
position to th� national assembly, but also because it clarified the
Spartacists' concepts of "socialist democracy" and "dictatorship
of the proletariat." These terms, as defined by Rosa Luxemburg,
were not interchangeable but applied to the same situation, the
class rule of the proletariat. According to her, the rule of the
proletariat was a socialist democracy because the majority de
cisions of the working class set the over-all policies to be pursued
by the revolutionary government and therefore did not constitute
a rule by a majority. It was a dictatorship of the proletariat be
cause it excluded all social classes, except the working class, from
participating in the political process. The disenfranchised classes
were subject to severe political, social, and economic restrictions.
Important for examining Spartacist actions during the immediate
post-revolutionary period is also the great emphasis placed on the
"majority will" of the proletariat because this could mean - and
actually did for Rosa Luxemburg and other Spartacist leaders 86 Rosa Luxemburg, "Die Nationalversammlung," quoted in Luxemburg,

Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 603-07.
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that the Spartacists could not make their claim for power until
they had succeeded in gaining the support of the majority of the
working class. Thus, the primary objective of their tactics became
their concern for gaining the patronage of the masses. Methods
used for this purpose included various propaganda media and
stressed the revolutionizing effects of mass strikes and street
demonstrations.87
Any success the Spartacists enjoyed in those endeavors was
due not only to their own theories and related or unrelated actions
but was influenced to a considerable degree by the prevailing ten
dencies among the masses. The Spartacists themselves recognized
correctly the spontaneous character of the German Revolution
and also its primary, limited aim of ending the war. Possibly be
cause of their great confidence in the masses, they overestimated
the socialist potentialities of the revolutionary movement. Since
they did not realize how weak was socialist sentiment among the
people, they also failed to recognize the actual and potential in
fluence of the moderate socialists and of the bourgeois parties with
their program of political democracy.88

87 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger
krieg in Deutsch/and (Berlin: Phoebus
Verlag, 1925), p. 13. These aggres
sive activities played an important part
in the consolidation process of the
German Revolution which was at
tempted by the SPD and the right wing
of the USPD. (Cf. Chapter IV.) It
will also be of interest to examine to
what extent these principles, formu
lated by Rosa Luxemburg and later re-

inforced by the program of the Spar
tacist League of December 14, 1918,
and of the program of the KPD, were
followed in practice. (Cf. Chapter V.)
ss Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 35; for a
characterization of the German Revo
lution by Liebknecht, see Liebknecht,
Reden, pp. 322-30; Karl Liebknecht,
"Das, was ist," quoted in Liebknecht,
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 473; Lieb
knecht, Was ist zu tun? p. 485.
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Consolidation Versus
Continuation of the
Revolution

1. The "Limited Revolution" of the SPD
The initial phase of the German Revolution ended when the
SPD leaders succeeded in obtaining a strong position within the
Provisional government and the Executive Council and began
using their power to consolidate the political achievements
brought about by the spontaneous mass uprising. The Majority
Socialists in the government considered themselves only as trustees
of the people until general elections could be held. 1 This point
of view was strongly attacked by the other socialist factions.
1:'he next phase of the German Revolution was characterized
by the impetuous conflict between two hostile camps. One side,
led by the SPD, consisted of the protagonists of the constituent
national assembly. The other was composed of the left wing
radicals who worked for the continuation of the revolution, ex
pecting that through the workers' and soldiers' councils and the
use of propaganda and "revolutionary actions" they would eventu
ally succeed in transforming the "bourgeois" revolution into its
proletarian counterpart. The struggle between these two groups,
each of which rallied around its respective symbol - national as
sembly or council system - was the fight between two funda
mentally different interpretations of the meaning of the revolu
tion and its ultimate aims.2
1 Stam pf er, Nationalversammlung,
p. 76; see also Berlau, op. cit., p. 215.

2 Berlau interpreted this controversy
as follows: "The struggle between the
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During this second phase of the revolution, in spite of the
fundamental controversy raging within the socialist movement,
the Provisional government succeeded in improving considerably
the over-all conditions of the working class. Noske's assertion
that "the satisfaction of all political democratic desires immedi
ately followed the 9th of November" is an exaggerated version
of the situation. 3 However, even Communist appraisals of the
work of the Provisional government admit that some long
overdue and significant changes were accomplished during this
period.4
One of the first steps of the new government was to repeal all
laws and ordinances which the imperial authorities had pro
claimed during the war. The SPD members of the government
seemed to have forgotten, as did some of their colleagues from the
USPD, that they had originally given their approval to these re
strictive war-time laws. 5 These first legislative acts of the revo
lutionary government included not only repeals of laws and de
crees considere<;l especially oppressive by the people, but also such
new and important provisions as the eight-hour work day, the
right to unemployment compensation payable from public funds,
and the expansion of health insurance. All these measures "de, creased considerably the rule of capitalism over the workers and
system of councils and a national con
stitutional assembly elected on the
wildest democratic franchise was there
fore not so much an academic struggle
over the comparative merits of each
system, as it was in the last analysis,
a struggle between two contending in
terpretations of the purposes of the
revolution and the mandate bestowed
on the revolutionary government by
the events of November 9." (Berlau,
op. cit., p. 219.)
3 Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 60.
4 Otto Grotewohl, after listing the
"social and democratic advances" made
during the reign of the Provisional
government, claims that these achieve-

ments should really have been the out
come of the 1848 Revolution, The
November Revolution stopped short
when it did not press for such decisive
reforms as the expropriation of large
estates and the democratization of the
governmental administration, school
system, and military forces. ( Grote
wohl, op. cit., p. 81.) Walter Ulbricht
also states that the social reform pro•
gram of the SPD and USPD did not
go beyond the framework of the bour
geois-capitalist society. (Ulbricht, Zur
Geschichte, p. 26.)
5 See the text of the proclamation of
November 12, 1918, quoted above, pp.
92-93.
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improved greatly the social position of the workers in relation to
[the owners of] property. "6
Many of the workers expected that the Provisional govern
ment would start im�ediately with the socialization of industry. 7
These demands for socialization created a very difficult problem
for the government because they involved a number of factors be
yond its control. On the one hand, it was necessary that something
be done because of public pressure; on the other, realistic consid
erations concerning the post-war economic conditions of Germany
seemed to indicate that it would be wise not to interfere with in
dustry and the national economy. For example, evidence was
available that the industrialists were reluctant to convert their
factories to peace-time production primarily for fear of eventual
expropriation. The Provisional government, furthermore, ques
tioned its own authority to invade private rights as extensively
as would be required for socialization without having the explicit
sanction of the national assembly.
The government tried to work its way out of the socialization
problem at a meeting of the People's Commissars on November
18, 1918. It was decided that only those branches of industry
which were ripe for socialization should be socialized, and a So
cialization Commission was appointed to investigate the situation
and make recommendations before the government took any
action in this matter. 8
6 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 176. For a
full discussion of the legislative work
of the Provisional government see [So
cial Democratic Party of Germany,]

Nichts getan? Die Arbeit seit dem 9.
November 1918 (Berlin: Arbeitsge

meinschaft fuer staatsbuergerliche u.
wirtschaftliche Bildung [1919]. An ap
pendix of this pamphlet contains a list
ing of the most important decrees and
laws for the workers promulgated by
the government after November 9,
1918. (Ibid., pp. 29-32.)
7 This is not an assertion based on
the claims of left wing radicals or of
Communists. For example, Ulbricht

describes this particular issue in his his
tory of the German labor movement.
(Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte, p. 30.) The
demands for socialization, as part of
the price of victory in the revolution
made by the German workers, were
even reported by moderate Social
Democrats. For example, see Hermann
Mueller, op. cit., p. 200.
8 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 178; Hermann
Mueller, op. cit., pp. 196-99. This
commission was comprised of leading
socialist economists and theorists such
as Karl Kautsky, who was elected as
chairman of the commission, Heinrich
Cunow, Rudolf Hilferding, Professors
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The Socialization Commission met tor the first time on De
cember 5, 1918. Five days later, it published the first preliminary
report which constituted the platform for its work. The follow
ing significant statements were made:
The Commission is conscious of the fact that the socialization of
the means of production can only be accomplished during an organic
evolution lasting for some time. The first prerequisite for any eco
nomic re-organization is the revival of production. The economic
situation of Germany demands, first, the re-establishment of export
industry and foreign trade.
The Commission is of the opinion that the present organization of
these branches of the economy must be retained....
However, the Commission believes that those branches of the
national economy in which capitalist-monopolistic arrangements have
developed should be considered first for socialization. . . . 9

The report of the Socialization Commission made it clear that
the government _was not supporting indiscriminate nationalization
of the means of production and did not intend to socialize every
branch of the economy even in the distant future. The program
of the Commission restored confidence among business people
·and thereby contributed to the revival of the national economy. 10
On January 7, 1919, the Socialization Commission reported
its preliminary findings to the government. They added nothing
new to the work program of December 1918. The Commission
warned of the dangers inherent in a doctrinaire transformation of
the economy and advised that the situation of each individual
branch of the economy be studied to determine how much sociali
zation would be advisable. 11
Karl Ballod, E. Franke, E. Lederer,
and several others. (Ibid., p. 197.)
9 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 177.
10 Ibid. The Nationalzeitung wrote
in a stock market report on December
16, 1918: "The greatest concern of the
[stock] exchange, i.e., the danger of

Bolshevism and equally the danger of
a general socialization of industry, can
now be regarded as completely over
come." (Quoted in Ulbricht, Zur Ges
chichte, p. 30.)
1 1 Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre, pp.
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Karl Kautsky in particular tried to convince the workers that
socialization was practically impossible because of the condition
of Germany's post-war economy.
The economic base on which socialism was supposed to be erected
was the immense wealth created by capitalism and which should have
made it possible to create a rule of well-being for everybody. This
wealth has been almost completely destroyed during nearly five years
of war and war-time conditions; thus the economic base of socialism
has become extremely reduced. 12

While socialization was being considered, studied, and post
poned, the trade unions and the employers' associations arrived
at a general agreement on November 15, 1918, which for the
first time made the unions the official and recognized representa
tive agencies of the workers. The employers' associations ac
cepted another agreement which provided that henceforth col
lective bargaining was the sole means for settling wage questions
and for determining working conditions. This so-called November
Agreement was celebrated by union and SPD leaders as a great
labor victory while the left wing radicals bitterly denounced it as
a violation of the principle of the class struggle. 13
In its effort to establish law and order and to solve urgent
and foreign problems the Provisional government be
domestic
_
lieved that it must rely on the cooperation of the well-trained and
77-78, Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
207-08.
12 Karl Kautsky, "Aussichten der
Revolution," ed. by E. Drahn and E.
Friedegg, Deutscher Revolutions-Al
manach fuer das Jahr 1919 (Hamburg
Berlin: Hoffmann & Campe Verlag,
1919), p. 28. Otto Grotewohl refers to
a publication by Kautsky, Sozialdemo
kratische Bemerkungen zur Ueber
gangswirtschaft, Le i p z i g , 1918, in
which Kautsky declares that during
the change from war-time to peace
time economy, the prevailing system

or organization of production should
not be disturbed. Only after the change
has been accomplished is it possible
to begin transforming capitalism to so
cialism. (Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 6162.) Also see the discussion concern
ing the problems of socialization in Au
gust Mueller, op. cit.
13 Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre, p.
75; Flechtheim, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
Flechtheim places the date of the
November Agreement at November
11, while Stampfer dates it at Novem
ber 15.
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smoothly-functioning official bureaucracy. Hence the proclama
tions of November 9 and 12, 1918, in which Ebert called upon
all civil servants to support the new "legitimate" government and
assured government officials that their previously acquired rights
would be fully protected. 14 Most government employees continued
in their positions, although in spirit they remained the same old
imperial bureaucrats and never became converted, democratically
inclined civil servants. The decision to rely on these officials, who
by origin and tradition were reactionary and monarchist-minded,
was one of the most significant taken by the Provisional govern
ment. It perpetuated the autocratic spirit among the German civil
service including the judiciary which at a later date decisively sup
ported elements hostile to the democratic German Republic. 15
An even more significant step was the conclusion of a working
agreement with the Supreme Command of the German Army. It
was - and still is - generally believed that the Ebert-Groener
Pact, as this arrangement later became known, was one of the most
decisive influences in the period immediately following the Nov
ember uprising. To a large extent, it directed the course of sub
sequent revolutionary developments and also made it possible for
the professional officer corps, symbolized by the representatives
of the General Staff, to weather the revolutionary storm and to
regain afterwards its influential position in German political life.
Ebert and the Majority Socialists have been severely attac�ed
by the political left as well as by liberal democratic circles for
having reached an agreement with the leaders of the former im
perial army and for having collaborated with the German General
Staff. Communists, as a matter of course, charged that Ebert de
liberately made common cause with the reactionary officers in
order to destroy the revolutionary workers - in particular the
Spartacists - and thereby to prevent developments from exceed
ing the dimensions of a bourgeois revolution. 16 This agreement
14 See above, p. 89, n. 43; Grzesin
ski, op. cit., p. 80.
15 Ibid., p. 79.

16 Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
Paul Froelich claims that the Ebert
Groener Pact was concluded with the
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was also called a "natural" alliance because both Ebert and the
Supreme Command were opposed to real changes in Germany.11
Neither of those assertions can be supported by factual evidence.
The real difficulties in which Ebert, as People's Commissar in
charge of internal and military affairs, found himself as the result
of the Allies' demands for a speedy evacuation and demobilization
of German military forces and of his sincere intention to re
establish law and order, were far weightier than all the sinister
motives ascribed to him. 18 Ebert could have chosen either the
Supreme Command, which was still in control of the field armies,
or the soldiers' councils as the instrument for carrying out the
evacuation. However, the time limit of 30 days hardly permitted
him any other choice than the Supreme Command.19
Ebert also needed a reliable armed force to make law and
order of the chaotic conditions which followed the breakdown of
the old authority during the revolution. There were many armed
workers and soldiers in Berlin, but the Provisional government
could not depend on them. Many of these armed men were or
ganized in quasi-military "revolutionary" units which fought
against each other for supremacy; the regular army units were
still far from the capitol. Each political faction aspired to have
its own military formation. The Spartacists organized the Na
tional Association of Deserters (Reichsbund der Deserteure).
The Independent Chief of Police, Emil Eichhorn, with the saneimmediate aim of suppressing the
workers in Berlin. (Froelich, Rosa
Luxemburg, p. 318.)
17 William Ebenstein, The German
Record (New York-Toronto: Rine
hart & Co., 1945), pp. 195-96.
18 This writer agrees with Waite's
interpretation of Ebert's actions. Waite
claims that Ebert was prompted by the
pressure of events when he turned to
the Supreme Command for help.
"Ebert's real mistake was not made
on the night of November 9. At that
time, he made the only decision pos
sible. His mistake
and it proved to

be a fatal one was in continuing to
rely on the Army even after it had
proved faithless and in failing to try
to build an army sympathetic to the
Republic until it was much too late."
(Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of
Nazism (Cambridge: Harvard Univer
sity Press, 1952], p. 6.)
19 Ibid., pp. 3-4. Arthur Rosenberg
calls this the first great mistake of the
Republic. Military experts tend to be
lieve that the former generals were es
sential for this complicated undertak
ing. (Ibid.; see also Goerlitz, op. cit.,
p. 296.)
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tion of the Executive Council, formed from the ranks of socialist
workers and soldiers a Security Force (Sicherheitswehr), which
was considered the military force of the USPD. In addition there
was the People's Naval Division (Volksmarine-Division), con
sisting of approximately 3,200 sailors primarily from Cuxhaven
and Kiel, which occupied and settled down in the Imperial Palace
and the Stables (Marstall). On November 17 the City Com
mandant of Berlin, Otto Wels, began to organize a volunteer
army, the Republican Soldiers' Army (Republikanische Soldaten
wehr) which eventually reached a total of 15,000 men. Ebert
expected the Supreme Command with its regular units to assist
him in making order of this highly explosive situation in Berlin.20
The situation in which the Provisional government found itself
was summarized by Otto Braun, a leading Majority Socialist and
later Prussian Premier:
... Many who condemn the position taken by the Reich Govern
ment during that time overlook completely the serious situation in
which it found itself. Without having a dependable instrument of
power, it was supposed to control the frantic outbreaks of violence of
the misled masses. [Military) formations which were organized to
protect the government soon made impossible demands and threat
ened to use force if they were not met; they even arrested the govern
ment for a time.... Nothing else could be done but to make use of
the remaining organized parts of the regular army which, to be sure,
were commanded chiefly by reactionary officers. . .. 21
20 Waite, op. cit., pp. 2-3; lllustrierte
Geschichte, pp. 234-36; Erich Otto
Volkmann, Revolution ueber Deutsch
land (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling,

1930), p. 119. For details on the Re
publican Soldiers' Army, see also Oert
zen, op. cit., p. 248; Noske, Erlebtes,
p. 80; Anton Fischer, Die Revolutions
K o m m a n d a n t u r Berlin ([Berlin,
1922]), pp. 8-11. Revealing is the ad
mission of Lt. Anton Fischer, who later
succeeded Otto Weis as City Comman
dant and who assisted in the organiza-

tion of the Republikanische Soldaten
wehr, that the so-called volunteers
were quite interested in the monetary
aspect of their services. Since the funds
available at the Kommandantur were
not sufficient, large amounts of money
came from bourgeois circles which
were interested in supporting a mili
tary force serving the moderate Ma•
jority Socialists against the dangers
from the radical left. (1bid.)
21 Braun, op. cit., p. 84.
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The motives behind the willingness of the military to col
laborate with Ebert and the Majority Socialists during this period
of flux were primarily to safeguard the unity and integrity of the
Reich against a possible Bolshevik assault and to preserve the au
thority, prestige, and reputation of the professional German officer
corps.22 The specific demands which the military made in return
for their assistance to the Provisional government were: ( 1) sum
moning of the national assembly, (2) disarming of the civilian
population, and ( 3) abolition of all workers' and soldiers' coun
cils. 23
The "Ebert-Groener Deal" did not work out satisfactorily for
Ebert. The Supreme Command recognized that while it was still
in control of the field army it had strong bargaining power, but
that as soon as the troops were in Germany for any length of time
they would inevitably disperse. Therefore, Groener and Hinden
burg soon pressed Ebert to fulfill their demands, in particular the
disarmament of the workers, the abolition of the workers' and
soldiers' councils, and the ousting of the Independents from the
22 Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 22;
Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 297. For detailed
information on the establishment of
contact between Ebert and Groener
over a secret telephone line running
from the Reich Chancellery to Army
headquarters at Spa and on their con
versation and agreement, see Waite,
op. cit., pp. 4-9; Volkmann, Revolu
tion, pp. 67-68. Also see lllustrierte
Geschichte, p. 233 for an extract of
Groener's statement in the Munich
Dolchstossprozess in 1925.
General von Luettwitz explained the
background of the collaboration of the
military leaders with the Provisional
government as follows: "The old offi
cer corps gave its support to the
People's Commissars not because of
its admiration or its political convic
tion, but because of the pressure of
time which categorically demanded
the prevention of [duplicating] Russian
conditions [in Germany]. The situ
ation during the early part of Decem-

ber, 1918 was such that this could be
done only in collaboration with the
Ebert government. The time had defi
nitely passed when the troops, inde
pendently and on their own, could pos
sibly have nipped the revolt in the bud
and could have suppressed it." (Frei
herr Walter von Luettwitz, lm Kampf
gegen die November-Revolution [Ber
lin: Vorhut Verlag, 1934], p. 17.)
23 Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 298; Wheeler
Bennett, op. cit., pp. 28-29. Wheeler
Bennett describes the intimate contact
between Ebert and Groener as fol
lows: "Each night between eleven and
one, the two men in whose hands the
destiny of Germany rested talked to
gether without fear of being overheard
and, in Groener's words, 'reviewed the
situation from day to day according
to developments.' Indeed this secret
wire became a kind of umbilical cord
which bound the infant German Re
public to its progenitor and protector,
the German Army.'' ([bid., p. 28.)
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Provisional government - if necessary with the use of armed
force which they were ready to supply. Ebert believed that this
action might bring about a civil war which he wished to avoid
under all circumstances.24
When the long-promised front divisions finally arrived in Ber
lin - the troops which were to empower the Provisional govern
ment to deal forcefully with the difficult situation in the capital they dispersed rapidly, partly because of the effective leftist prop
aganda and partly because the soldiers wanted to be home for
Christmas. Shortly after the first troops arrived on December 11,
roughly only 1,400 men of the original nine or ten divisions re
mained. 25 As early as December 16, the military leaders as well
as Ebert realized that the plans based on the returning field army
had failed. 20
In order to provide the government with reliable troops, Major
von Schleicher's suggestion was accepted. He had recommended
the organization of volunteer corps recruited from among veteran
army men and _non-commissioned officers and commanded by
imperial officers.21
24 Jbid., pp. 28-29. According to
Walter Goerlitz, Ebert"...was afraid
-of a civil war with all its horrible con
sequences, the same civil war which
the General Staff regarded as indis
pensable to the clarification of power
relations and to the re-establishment
of order." (Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 300.)
20 illustrierte Geschichte, p. 234.
See also Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, Ge
schichte der Freikorps I 9 I 8 -192 4

(Stuttgart: Robert Lutz Nachfolger
Otto Schramm, 1936), pp. 178-79;
Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 125-35;
Noske, Erlebtes, p. 81; Wheeler-Ben
nett, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
2o Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 13536.
21 This proposal by Schleicher was
made December 20, 1918, during a
meeting of the General Staff officers
in Berlin. It followed the example set
by volunteer corps organized for the

defense of the eastern border of the
Reich and authorized by Hindenburg
as early as November 24. (Goerlitz,
op. cit., pp. 300-01; Konrad Heiden,
Der Fuehrer [Boston: Houghton Miff
lin Co., 1944], p. 243.) There appears
to be some willful distortion of the
beginning date of the formation of the
notorious Free Corps. Many of their
units were organized during the later
part of December, 1918. Ebert and
Noske, for example, visited the "Free
Corps Maercker" on January 4, 1919.
( V o I k m a n n, Revolution, p. 171.)
Therefore, Hermann Mueller is ab
solutely incorrect when he asserts that
the Free Corps were organized after
the outbreak on January 4, 1919, of
the s o-c a l l e d "January Uprising."
Mueller claims that these voluntary
formations were supposed to provide
the government with the necessary
freedom of action in order to carry
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Simultaneously with the build-up of a military force by former
imperial officers with the sanction of the Majority Socialists,
several propaganda organizations financed by reactionary circles
operated a vicious campaign against the radical left. For example,
the Anti-Bolshevik Liga disseminated hate literature against the
Spartacists and in particular against Rosa Luxemberg and Lieb
knecht. These activities, organized primarily by extremists of the
right, were designed to get mob action against the revolutionary
workers. The propaganda was also very strongly anti-Semitic. 28
The attitude of the Western Allies toward Bolshevik Russia
and toward the workers' and soldiers' councils in Germany became
an issue in the political struggle within Germany for and against
the consolidation of the revolution. The pro-consolidation forces
asserted that the Western Allies would never permit Germany
to follow the Russian example because this would bring Bolshev
ism too close to their own home territories. 29 Concrete examples of
hostile actions by the Allied occupation authorities, especially the
French, against the councils were cited. Indigenous opponents of
the council system emphasized that the Allies openly refused to
deal with representatives of the councils and did not hesitate to
show preference for officials of the old bureaucracy. 30
No information is available on the effectiveness of this anti
council propaganda. However, the Executive Council in Berlin
out preparations for the election of
t h e constituent national assembly.
(Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 192.)
The basis for Mueller's statement ·is
the fact that the first official announce
ment by the Provisional government
concerning the formation of Free
Corps is dated January 9, 1919, when
the January uprising was well under
way. However, numerous units of this
type were definitely in existence prior
to that date. (Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 301;
Stuemke, op. cit., p. 163.) For a very
thorough study of the entire Free
Corps Movement, see Waite, op. cit.
28 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
108-10, 122; lllustrierte Geschichte,

pp. 236-38; Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg,
p. 320.
29 Ebenstein, op. cit., p. 196.
30 Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupa
tion and the Rule of Law (London:
Oxford University Press, 1944), pp.
25-36. In a speech delivered on Nov
ember 28, 1918, Liebknecht confirmed
the alleged practice of the Allies of
dissolving the workers' and soldiers'
councils in the territory occupied by
their troops. Liebknecht interpreted
this as symptomatic of Allied fear that
their own troops might become "in
fected" by the revolutionary spirit.
(Liebknecht, Was ist zu tun?, p. 493.)
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found it necessary to take steps to counteract its influence. The
Executive Council distributed leaflets in which the bourgeois news
papers were accused of printing false allegations concerning the
Allied attitude towards the councils. These leaflets asserted that
the Allies did not demand the abolition of the workers' and
soldiers' councils, and to prove this point, the city of Trier was
given as an example: here the American commandant had official
ly recognized the local council. 31

2.

The Left Wing Radicals' Opposition to Consolidation
The Spartacists and the left wing radicals within the USPD
fought with determination against the consolidation efforts of the
combined powers of the Majority Socialists, bourgeois politicians,
and military leaders. The opposition of the revolutionary radicals
to the summoning of a constituent national assembly remained
unchanged. They continued to view the assembly as nothing but
an instrument for continuing the suppression of the working class.
The radicals also did not share the optimism of the SPD which
expected a socialist majority in the assembly; on the contrary,
they anticipated a victory of the bourgeois political parties. 32
Rosa Luxemburg's opposition to the national assembly in
.creased steadily after it became known that all political forces of
the right, including the Supreme Command, had become sup
porters of the "new democracy" to be founded by the constituent
assembly. In December she identified the national assembly as
"a counterrevolutionary fortification against the revolutionary
proletariat." In an article in Die Rote Fahne, she described the
two alternatives faced by the German people:
33

31 Vollzugsrat des Arbeiter-u. Sol
datenrates, Die buergerliche Presse ar
beitet gegen die Revolution ( [Berlin,
leaflet], December 17, 1918).
32 "The capitalists and Junkers will
utilize the war-weariness of the shop
keepers and the speculative spirit of
the farmers, they will incite the small
property owners against the workers,
and it is quite probable that the ma-

jority in the national assembly will not
favor the class-conscious workers, but
will be on the side of the bourgeoisie."
(Karl Radek, Die deutsche Revolution
[Moscow, November, 1918], p. 17.)
Karl Liebknecht also shared this opin
ion. (Liebknecht, Was will der Spar
takusbund?, p. 508.)

33 Rosa Luxemburg, "Die Wahlen
zur Nationalversammlung," quoted in
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Either national assembly or complete power to the workers' and
soldiers' councils, either renunciation of socialism or most violent class
struggle of the armed proletariat against the bourgeoisie: that is the
dilemma. 34

In spite of the Spartacists' violent opposition to any action di
rected toward a consolidation of the unfinished revolution, they
did not plan, prepare, or organize an armed uprising with the in
tention of overthrowing the government - regardless of the many
allegations of their numerous contemporary enemies. Neither
their political utterances and written statements nor their actions
can be used to support these claims which were widely dissemi
nated not only by "bourgeois" and military circles but also by the
Majority Socialists. In fact, both the political concepts and the
actions of the Spartacists at that time followed a very simple and
open pattern which does not resemble the deceptive tactics of
contemporary Communist parties.
Their short-range revolutionary tactics were based on the fol
lowing assumptions: ( 1) the revolution was being betrayed by the
Majority Socialists who were supported in their endeavors by the
traditional enemies of political, social, and economic progress;
(2) most of the workers were unaware of the course which de
velopments took after the mass uprising of November and, there
fore, could not understand the "treacherous" actions of the SPD
and of the moderate wing of the USPD. 35
The Spartacists' conviction of the political immaturity of the
workers and soldiers did not affect their confidence in the masses.
It was merely a statement of fact which called for specific remedies.
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II,
pp. 651-52.
34 Rosa Luxemburg, "Nationalver
s am m l u n g o d e r Raeteregierung,"
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte
Reden, II, p. 640.
35 Liebknecht blamed the policies of
the Majority Socialists for the confused
state of mind of the masses and for a

lack of political and social conscious
ness. (Karl Liebknecht, "Was ist zu
tun?," quoted in Liebknecht, Ausge
waehlte Reden, p. 486.) The soldiers
were especially ignorant about social
ism. (Karl Liebknecht, "Der neue
Burgfrieden," quoted in Liebknecht,
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 469.)
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Revolutionary propaganda and "revolutionary actions" were the
means by which the Spartacists intended to educate the masses
and gradually win over the majority of the working class. The
revolutionary actions referred to were nothing more than street
demonstrations and strikes, primarily of a political nature. Be
cause of their political content, leading inevitably to clashes with
the "reactionary" forces of the government, they would attract
more and more workers and revolutionize growing segments of
the masses. It was nothing but an extension of the old "revolu
tionary gymnastics," as the opponents of the Spartacists called
Liebknecht's tactics before and during the November uprising.
While Liebknecht tended more toward action, Rosa Luxem
burg believed that the principal mission of the Spartacist League
was "to arouse a socialist spirit and consciousness in the work
ers."36 However, both apparently agreed that the proletarian revo
lution was only the beginning of a long and tedious road, and
both-but particularly Rosa Luxemburg-warned their fol
lowers against rash actions. 37 As late as December 23, 1918, after
numerous armed clashes between left wing radicals and various
other groups, including military formations -. struggles which
often were used to illustrate the allegation that the Spartacists
wanted to overthrow the government by a putsch - Liebknecht
declared in a speech in Berlin:
At present the Spartacists are attacked from all sides. The news
papers of the bourgeoisie and the social patriots, from the Vorwaerts
36 Ruth Fischer, op. cit., p. 74. Ruth
Fischer believes that the difference in
emphasis in these two tactical ap
proaches between Luxemburg a n d
Liebknecht reached the nature of a
conflict during the months of Novem
ber and December, 1918. (Ibid.)
ar When Karl Radek returned to
Germany from Russia at the end of
December, 1918, Liebknecht allegedly
told him without disappointment: "We
are only at the beginning; the road will
be a long one." Radek further reported

that Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and
he agreed that the only way to shorten
the distance to the ultimate aim was
relentless agitation, propaganda, and
action. (Liebknecht, Reden, p. 3 66.)
The Communists attach two differ
ent meanings to the terms "agitation"
and "propaganda." Lenin adopted the
definition originally stated by Ple
khanov, who is quoted by him as hav
ing made the following distinction:
"A propagandist presents many ideas
to one or a few persons; an agitator
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to the Kreuzzeitung, abound with the most fantastic lies, with the most
insolent misrepresentations, with distortions, and defamations. There
is nothing we are not accused of. We are supposed to advocate terror;
we are presumed to intend to start the bloodiest civil war; we are pre
sumed to have equipped ourselves with weapons and ammunition in
preparation for the armed revolt.38

The Spartacists remained confident throughout the consolida
tion phase that, as long as the workers could prevent the counter
revolutionary forces from suppressing the revolutionary move
ment, the masses eventually would follow the political program
of the Spartacist League. 39 Their confidence in the masses re
ceived new impetus when the huge strike movement was started
presents only one or a few ideas, but
he presents them to a mass of people."
(Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet
Russia [Cambridge: Harvard Univers
ity Press, 1950], p. 39.)
38 Karl Liebknecht, "Was will der
Spartakusbund?" quoted in Liebknecht,
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 518. A typic
al example of a bloody clash occurred
in Berlin on December 6, 1918. The
tension among the various political
factions, especially between the Spar
tacists and the Majority Socialists, was
further aggravated by a number of
events which transpired on that day;
an attempted arrest of the Executive
Council by troops, an occupation of
the building of Die Rote Fa/me, and
the appointment of Ebert as the new
Reich President by a group of soldiers.
On that day also three mass meetings
of the Spartacists were held which
were followed by the usual demonstra
tion m a re h e s . The demonstrators
marched toward the heart of the city
as rumors were being spread that a
counterrevolution had been launched.
Troops attached to the office of the
SPD City Commandant, Otto Weis, at
tempted to intercept the demonstrators.
The ensuing street fighting resulted in
approximately 18 demonstrators killed
and 30 wounded. For further details
on these events, see lllustrierte Ge-

schichte, pp. 242-44; Stampfer, Die er
sten 14 Jahre, pp. 80-81; Oertzen, op.
cit., pp. 249-50; Volkmann, Revolu
tion, pp. 122-24.

39 See Liebknecht's warnings about
the counterrevolution in D i e R o t e
Falzne, November 21, 1918:
"

.................

"Let us not deceive ourselves. The
political power of the proletariat which
was seized on the ninth [of November],
is almost gone by now and continues to
disappear hour by hour.
"Parallel with this process of the
weakening of the proletariat goes a
most intensive rallying process of all
the deadly enemies of the proletariat.
In the country as well as in the cities,
the counterrevolution organizes [its
forces] w i t h increasing cynicism."
(Liebknecht, Das, was ist, pp. 474-75.)
In the December 2, 1918, issue, he
clearly pointed at the dangers coming
from the military commanders of the
returning front-line units. The Social
ists in particular were threatened by
them. Liebknecht reported cases where
workers' and soldiers' councils were
abolished by military commands. He
also described other excesses com
mitted by the military against socialist
workers. (Karl Liebknecht. "Ruestung
der Revolution," quoted in Liebknecht
Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 499-502.)
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at the end of November 1918 by the metal workers in Berlin and
the miners in Upper Silesia and the Ruhr area. The strikes spread
rapidly to other industries throughout Germany and involved
great numbers of workers. The workers originally struck for
purely economic reasons but soon political demands came into
play. Clashes with counterrevolutionary troops resulted in the
death of many workers. 40 The Spartacists interpreted the spon
taneous mass strikes as an indication that the workers again were
beginning to take matters into their own hands in spite of the
efforts of the consolidation forces. Rosa Luxemburg believed
that these strikes would grow in size and importance and would
become the focal points of the revolution. She also predicted that
the revolution would assume an economic character and would
become a truly socialist revolution. 41
In an article in Die Rote Fahne she greeted these strikes as the
beginning of the most powerful phase of direct mass action:
Instead of waiting for the blessed decrees of the government or
for the decisions of the famous national assembly, the masses in
stinctively reach for the only real means which leads· to socialism: the
fight against capital. Up to now, the government has exerted every
. effort to castrate the revolution and to establish harmony among
classes....
The proletarian masses upset ... the revolutionary class harmony
and wave the dreaded banner of the class struggle.
The growing strike movement is proof that the political revolution
invaded the social foundation of society. The revolution recalls its
own original cause; it puts aside the paper wing of personnel changes
and decrees which did not in the slightest effect changes in the social
relation between capital and labor, and places itself upon the stage of
events.
The strikes which have just broken out are within [ the framework]
of the present revolution, and are not controversies of a "trade-union
40 Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 247.

41 Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser
reich, II, p. 676.
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type" pertaining to trifles, to wage problems. They are the masses'
natural answer to the powerful shock which capitalism has experienced as the result of the breakdown of German imperialism and the
short political revolution of the workers and soldiers. They are the
first beginning of a complete settlement between capital and labor in
Germany; they introduce the start of a powerful, direct [form of]
class struggle in which the outcome can be nothing other than the removal of the capitalist wage system and the introduction of the socialist
economy. They release the active social power of the present revolution: the revolutionary class energy of the proletarian masses. They
open up the period of direct activity on the part of the great masses.
42

This interpretation of the strike movement by Rosa Luxem
burg was later strongly criticized by the representatives of the
official Communist creed because, according to them, it revealed
once more her two greatest weaknesses: over-confidence in the
spontaneity of the masses, and a lack of appreciation of the role
of a revolutionary class party. By the middle of December 1918,
however, there were already specific signs that the need for a
proletarian party which could supply leadership to the revolution
ary masses was increasingly recognized by many of the Spartacists
and other left wing radicals. 43
It is possible to see in Rosa Luxemburg's program for the
Spartacist League - published on December 14, 1918, in Die
Rote Fahne - a conscious step toward uniting the left wing
radicals by providing them with a common platform. 44 Consider
ing that it preceded the founding of the KPD by only two weeks
and the so-called "Spartacist Uprising" by about three weeks, this
comprehensive statement of the Spartacists' political concepts and
42 Rosa Luxemburg, "Der Acheron
in Bewegung," quoted in Luxemburg,

Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 618, 620.
43 See, for example, Oelssner, op. cit.,
pp. 133-34. Oelssner also referred to
another "misconception" of Rosa Lu
xemburg: "The weakness of the Ger
man Revolution," according to him,

was not that the revolution had not in
cluded in its earlier phase issues re
lated to "the social foundation of so
ciety," but that the political revolution
was never concluded and that no real
decision had settled the question of
political power. (Ibid., p. 133.)
44 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 259-63.
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policies was important for several reasons. First of all, the pro
gram re-emphasized the ideological independence of the Sparta
cists from major Leninist concepts by specifically rejecting the
use of terror as a tactical method and the precept of dictatorship
by a minority. Secondly, it clarified the position of the Spartacists
vis-a-vis the Ebert government and any other "bourgeois" gov
ernment, as a policy of non-participation and non-interference in
governmental affairs until the Spartacist League had the support
of the majority of the proletariat. Thirdly, it formulated tactics
for the long period of class struggle aimed at securing the con
fidence and support of the masses. Fourthly, it provided the basis
for searching discussions among the left wing radicals during the
two weeks which intervened between the announcement of the
program and the founding of the KPD. 45
Rosa Luxemburg's clear formulation of these political con
cepts left no room for misinterpretations, especially of those issues
related to the Spartacists' position toward a coup d'etat. Her
statement concerning the rejection of terror reads as follows:
The proletarian revolution requires no terror methods [ to realize]
its objectives; it hates and despises violence and murder. It does not
, require this means of combat because it does not fight against in
dividuals but against institutions.... It is not a desperate attempt of
a minority to shape the world by force according to its ideals, but the
45 Ruth Fischer's interpretation of
the main points of the program are:
(1) ".•. the Spartakusbund would
not participate in any kind of workers'
or democratic party alliance. If the
present government reached an im
passe, the Spartakusbund would nei
ther attempt to support it nor attempt
to overthrow it; it would neither share
in a caretaker successor government,
nor take power alone. In effect, the
Spartacist program was equivalent to
a critical toleration of the Ebert gov
ernment, combined with militant pro
paganda against army and for social
ist aims."

(2) "... the rejection of revolution
ary terror, again a conscious and strong
rejection of Bolshevik practice. The
Spartakusbund emphatically d e n i e d
punitive measures against their enemies; ..."
(3) "... a program of non-interference in the policy of the new Re
public - of absentionism concerning
the formation of the new state; that is,
participation in elections to the nation
al assembly but as a mere propaganda
instrument." (Ruth Fischer, op. cit.,
p. 75.)

.
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action of great masses of millions of people who are called up to fulfill
a historic mission and to transform historic necessity into reality.46

In the conclusions to the program, Rosa Luxemburg sum
marized the position of the Spartacist League as follows:
The Spartacist League is not a party desirous of obtaining political
power over the working masses or through the working masses.
The Spartacist League is only the most conscious part of the pro
letariat [in terms of] objectives, pointing incessantly to the historic
task for the entire broad masses of the working class, representing
throughout the individual phases of the revolution the ultimate so
cialist objective and representing in all national issues the interests of
the proletarian world revolution.
The Spartacist League rejects the idea of sharing power with
Scheidemann and Ebert, tools of the bourgeoisie, because in this type
of collaboration, it sees treason to the fundamentals of socialism,
strengthening of the counterrevolution, and paralysis of the revolution.
The Spartacist League will never assume governmental power un
less it is supported by the clear, decisive will of the great majority of the
proletariat in Germany, and in no other way except with their con
scious acceptance of the ideas, objectives, and fighting methods of the
Spartacist League.
The victory of the Spartacist League stands not at the beginning
but at the end of the revolution: it is identical with the victory of the
millions of masses of the socialist proletariat.47

Not all of the opposition to the consolidation policy came
from the Spartacists. The left wing of the USPD, on many issues
holding views close to these of the Spartacists, formed a powerful
opposition force. The moderate USPD leaders, although on an
entirely different level of operation (i.e., in the Provisional gov
ernment), also frequently disagreed with the policies of the Ma46 Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 261.

47 Ibid., p. 263.
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jority Socialists and eventually, at the end of December, 1918,
officially joined the opposition to the Ebert government. 48
The USPD's position toward the problem of consolidation
versus continuation of the revolution was made more complex by
the fact that the USPD had accepted governmental responsibilities
within the "legitimate" and council governments of the Reich. In
addition, the USPD supported two distinct positions since they
were divided among themselves.
The left wing of the Independents occupied the seven seats
which the USPD originally had in the Executive Council. The
Revolutionary Shop Stewards looked upon the Executive Council
as their own domain, especially since one of their leaders, Richard
Mueller, was its chairman.49
The left wing radicals of the USPD, with their strongholds in
the Executive Council and among the Revolutionary Shop Stew
ards, very vigorously opposed the principle of national assembly
and favored, as did the Spartacists, the council system. They in
tended to make it a permanent feature of the governmental struc
ture. 50 On November 13, 1918, Ernst Daeumig, an exponent
of the left wing faction of the USPD and a memb(;!r of the Execu
tive Council, proposed a resolution against the holding of the
national assembly. Three days later the Council discussed the
matter. Daeumig announced his preference for a "proletarian
democracy," the class rule of the proletariat. His proposal was
defeated by a vote of twelve to ten and the Executive Council
thereby endorsed the national assembly. 51 It was agreed, how
ever, to call a general meeting of all the delegates of the workers'
and soldiers' councils for November 19, 1918, at the Circus Busch
to discuss the extremely important issue of consolidation versus
continuation of the revolution and to give the Executive Council
48 See below, pp. 147-49.
49 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 100;
Tormin, op. cit., p. 74. Gradually, the
Executive Council increased in mem
bership to 45. See also a very interest
ing description of the continuously ex-

panding work of the Executive Coun
cil, Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 107,
lllff.
50 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 247.
51 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 128.
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an opportunity to report on its activities. At the meeting Richard
Mueller vigorously opposed the national assembly and, like the
Spartacists, referred to it as an instrument of the counterrevolu
tion. It was at this meeting that he earned his nickname "Leichen
mueller" (Corpse-Mueller) because of the f ollowing statement
in his speech:
We, the workers' and soldiers' councils must defend our power,
even by force if it cannot be done otherwise. Whoever advocates the
national assembly forces us to fight. I announce openly to you: I
have risked my life for the revolution and I shall do it again. The
national assembly is the road to political dominance by the bourgeoisie;
it is the road which leads to fighting; the road to the national assembly
proceeds over my corpse . . . 52

Haase attempted to pacify the assembled delegates by de
claring that it was impossible to lose the revolutionary achieve
ments because the proletariat had the majority. He asserted fur
thermore that in Germany democracy and socialism belong to
gether. The meeting achieved no positive results although it con
tributed to increased tension between the Executive Council and
the People's Commissars. 53
The moderates among the USPD were represented in the Pro
visional government by Haase and Dittmann. (Barth, another
Independent People's Commissar, opposed from the beginning
anything the Ebert government did, but lacked the influence to
do something about it.) They were opposed to the extreme forms
of collaboration which the Majority Socialists undertook with the
bourgeois and military representatives. However, they also op
posed the revolutionary tactics of the Spartacists which were in
terpreted by some moderate USPD followers as preparations for
a coup d'etat. 54
52 Ibid., p. 129.
ss Ibid., pp. 129-30.
54 Haase (who was the People's
Commissar in charge of foreign affairs
and "colonial affairs") was apparent-

ly quite dissatisfied with the collabora
tion between the USPD and the Ma
jority Socialists in the Provisional gov
ernment. On November 26, 1918, he
wrote the following in a letter to his
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The moderates among the Independents were in complete dis
agreement with their leftist faction on the issue of the national
assembly. Under pressure from the left, a general meeting of the
Berlin USPD organization was held on December 15, 1918, at
which Haase was able to achieve an important victory over the
left wing radicals. He succeeded in obtaining support for his
moderate policies: participation and preparation for the elections
for the national assembly. The meeting endorsed the position
ofthe moderates, 485 to 195 votes. 55

3.

The Struggle for Consolidation
During the month of December 1918, the Majority Socialists
attained two major political achievements in their fight for the
consolidation of the German Revolution. The first was the crush
ing defeat suffered by the council system at the First Reich Con
gress of Councils. The second was the establishment of an all
Majority Socialist government, an outgrowth of the fighting be
tween regular troops and revolutionary military units during the
Christmas period and the subsequent resignation of the USPD
members from the Provisional government.
The workers' and soldiers' councils in Germany did not chal
·1enge the Executive Council of the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers'
Council, which claimed jurisdiction over the entire country, until
son Ernst: "...The Scheidemaenner
[people like the SPD leader Scheide
mann], also kept bourgeois representa
tives in important political [govern
mental] positions. We still have not
been able to accomplish the discharge
of Solf [who had been foreign minister]
from the Foreign Office, who without
consulting me, publishes decrees in the
same old manner....The revolution
ary process is still in its beginning
phase. How it will continue depends
on the work which the government
will perform ..." (Hugo Haase, Hugo
Haase sein Leben und Wirken [Berlin:
E. La u b s ch e Verlagsbuchhandlung,
1929], p.173.)

55 Stuemke, op. cit., pp.172-73; Her
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 234-35.
Characteristic of the position of the
moderates was the answer Haase gave
during a meeting of the People's Com
missars on December 28, 1918, in re
gard to his willingness to support any
actions against a possible putsch by
the Spartacists. Haase declared that he
would oppose any v i o I e n t threat
against the government regardless of
the quarters from which it came, but
he added that he did not believe the
Spartacists intended to stage a coup
d'etat. (Ibid., pp. 235-36.)
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the controversy over the future governmental structure - demo
cratic, parliamentary republic through a constituent national as
sembly, or a council republic based exclusively on the council
system - became the most urgent issue of the day. Pressure
exerted by the councils to summon a Reich Congress of Councils
became increasingly strong, because it appeared to the councils
that the Executive Council was in favor of a class dictatorship.
Thus, on November 23, 1918, after some delaying tactics, the
Executive Council called the First Reich Congress of Councils
for December 16, 1918, in Berlin. 56
The Majority Socialists as well as the left wing radicals placed
great expectations in the Reich Congress, each side hoping to get
the support of the delegates for their respective concepts of the
future Reich constitution. Rosa Luxemburg called upon the
Congress to elect a Central Council which would make up for
the omissions of the past and would take action against the coun
terrevolutionary forces which were poised to destroy the revolu
tionary institutions, the workers' and soldiers' councils. In order
to save the revolution, Rosa Luxemburg proposed that the future
Central Council undertake immediately after its inception the
following four measures:
( 1) It must eliminate the center of the counterrevolution, the
point where all nerves of the counterrevolutionary conspiracy
come together; it must remove the cabinet of Ebert, Scheide
mann, and Haase.
( 2) It must demand the disarming of all front units which do not
unconditionally recognize the political authority of the work
ers' and soldiers' council and are being converted into a body
guard for the cabinet of Ebert and Haase.
sn Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser
reich, II, p. 98; Tormin, op. cit., p. 94.
Mueller claims that the People's Com
missars demanded the Reich Congress
because they hoped they would be able
to work better with a central council
elected by council representatives from

all of Germany than with the Executive
Council elected by the Workers' and
Soldiers' Council of Berlin. (Hermann
Mueller, op. cit., p. 211.) Grzesinski
presents the erroneous version that the
Provisional Government convoked the
Congress. (Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 57.)
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( 3) It must demand the disarming of all officers [ of the military
forces] and of the White Guards organized by the government
of Ebert and Haase and it must create a Red Guard.
( 4) It must reject the national assembly as an attack against the
revolution and the workers' and soldiers' councils.51

The Russian Bolsheviks also saw the great influence a Reich
Congress could exert on the further course of the German Revo
lution. They wished to assist the left wing radicals with, at the
very least, advice and the prestige which the presence of a number
of Bolshevik leaders at the Congress would give. On December
5, Lenin appointed a five-man delegation consisting of the ex
pelled Joffe, Radek, Bukharin, Rakovsky, and Ignatov to par
ticipate in the Reich Congress at Berlin. But the Provisional
government refused to grant permission for this delegation to
enter Germany. 58
In their evaluation of the general political situation, the Spar
tacists greatly overrated the revolutionary spirit among the masses.
As a result, the outcome of the Reich Congress - the rejection
of the council system - came as a great disappointment to them.
The left wing radicals found in what they called the "outdated"
composition of the Congress the explanation for the decisions
made by the delegates; thus they did not have to admit the ob
vious fact that the majority of the German workers remained
faithful to traditional Social Democratic concepts and were plainly
opposed to a class dictatorship. The left wing radicals stressed the
fact that the delegates were not chosen directly by the workers
and soldiers but were actually representatives of the local councils
which in most cases still had the same composition as when they
were organized in the wake of the revolution. Therefore, the
radicals claimed, they did not represent the true attitude of the
57 Rosa Luxemburg, "Auf die Schan
zen," quoted in Luxemburg, Ausge
waehlte Reden, II, pp. 635-39.
58 Lionel Kochan, Russia and the
Weimar Republic (Cambridge, Eng-

land: Bowes Publishers, 1954), p. 13.
Only Radek, as already mentioned
above, managed to reach Berlin dis
guised as an Austrian prisoner of war.
He came too late for the Reich Con-
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masses. 59 This assertion of substantial changes in the disposition
of the masses toward the objectives of the radicals must be serious
ly questioned in view of the results of the January elections, in
which the Majority Socialists obtained a large majority of the
socialist votes. 60 Because of their superior organization through
out Germany, the SPD had a decided advantage during the se
lection of delegates for the Reich Congress. Nevertheless, the
percentage-wise majority of the Majority Socialists among the
delegates was not as "outdated" as claimed by the left radicals. 61
The generally unfriendly attitude of the Congress toward the po
litical left was also reflected in its refusal to admit Rosa Luxem
burg and Karl Liebknecht to the Congress even in an advisory
capacity. 62
The outcome of the main issue of the Congress - national
assembly versus council system - was a foregone conclusion con
sidering the overwhelming number of SPD delegates and soldiers
who were under the influence of the Majority Socialists unless the
radicals through outside pressure could change substantially the
opinions of many of these delegates. The Spartacists wasted no
gress but was there for the founding
congress of the Communist Party of
Germany. (Ibid., p. 14.)
59 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
323-24; lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 249.
60 The SPD obtained 11,400,000
votes and the USPD 2,300,000 votes.
The KPD did not participate in the
elections. (Ibid., p. 307.)
61 In order to prove the "inherent
conservative" character of the Con
gress, the left wing radicals assembled
some interesting statistical information.
A total of 489 delegates had voting
privileges: 405 were workers' councils
and 84 soldiers' representatives. The
political affiliation of the delegates was
reported as follows: 288 Majority So
cialists, 80 Independents, IO Sparta
cists, 25 Democrats, 11 independent
radicals, 25 members of a special sol
diers' faction, 50 without party affili
ation. (Ibid., pp. 249-50.) Otto Grote-

wohl gave a somewhat different break
down, but essentially he presents the
same picture. (Grotewohl, op. cit., p.
73.)
The professional composition of the
Congress was given for most delegates:
195 paid party officials [such as party
and union officials, editors, etc.], 164
from the SPD, 31 from the USPD, 179
workers and employees, 71 intellec
tuals [it is not clear if these 71 are a
separate group or if they belong to
other categories], 13 active army offi
cers, 3 representatives of agricultural
organizations, 1 tenant of a large land
ed estate. (Illustrierte Geschichte, p.
250.) Robert Leinert (SPD), Fritz Se
ger (USPD), and Gomolka (front
soldiers) were appointed as chairmen
of the Congress. (Hermann Mueller,
op. cit., pp. 215-16.)
62 Had Liebknecht really wanted to
attend the meetings as a delegate, he

139

140

THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF

1919

time. On the first day of the meeting, a workers' delegation pre
sented to the Congress in the name of 250,000 Berlin revolu
tionaries a resolution which contained the following:
(1) Germany is a unitary socialist republic.
(2) All powers are vested in the workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 3) The Executive Council elected by the Congress of Councils
is the supreme legislative and executive authority and has
the power to appoint and discharge People's Commissars and
all Reich officials.
(4) Abolition of Ebert's Council of People's Commissars.
( 5) Immediate, energetic execution, through the Central Coun
cil, of all measures necessary for the protection of the revo
lution, primarily the disarmament of the counterrevolution,
arming of the proletariat, and organization of the Red Guard.
( 6) An immediate proclamation by the Central Council ad
dressed to the proletarians of all nations requesting them to
form workers' and soldiers' councils for the purpose of ful
filling the common tasks of the socialist world revolution.63

The delegates failed to be impressed by the "workers' delegation"
even after the effort was repeated two days later. A motion by
'Max Cohen-Reuss to hold elections for the national assembly as
early as January 19, 1919, was accepted by a vote of 400 to 50.
Daeumig's proposal to call for a new Congress of Councils which
should decide on the future constitution for Germany and to vest
the supreme legislative and executive powers in the council system
was defeated, 344 to 98. 64
could have been sent by his "National
Association of Deserters" as a rep
resentative of the soldiers. It is quite
possible that the interpretation by von
Oertzen is correct; namely, that Lieb
knecht could only have made speeches
as a delegate. He preferred to make
use of the Congress by exerting pres
sure from the outside. (Oertzen, op.
cit., p. 254.)
G3 Quoted in Illustrierte Geschichte,

p. 251. The terms "Executive Council"
and "Central Council" are apparently
used here interchangeably. Usually,
"Executive Council" is the name used
for the executive committee of the Ber
lin Workers' and Soldiers' Council, and
"Central Council" is applied to the
executive committee elected by the
Reich Congress of Councils.
64 For a detailed discussion of the
events of the Congress of Councils in
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Thus the Congress of Councils had, in the words of Daeumig,
committed suicide by voting against the council system and for
the early election of a national assembly.
With a second major issue - the elimination of the influence
of the old imperial army - the left wing radicals had more suc
cess with the delegates of the Congress because "...though di
vided on many points of Socialist doctrine and dogma, the Con
gress was unanimous and vociferous in its determination to put
an end once and for all to the Officer Corps."65 On this issue the
Spartacists also employed pressure from the outside. On the
second day of the meeting, December 17, 1918, a delegation of
soldiers representing the entire Berlin garrison, including the
People's Naval Division, Eichhorn's Security Force, and even
Otto Wels' Republican Soldiers' Army, insisted that:
( 1) The Supreme Soldiers' Council composed of elected dele
gates from all soldiers' councils, assumes command of all
army troops and of the navy.
(2) All insignia of rank are prohibited. All officers are to be
discharged. . .
(3) The soldiers' councils will be responsible for the reliability
and discipline of the troops.66
These demands became the basis for the so-called Seven Ham
burg Points which the Congress adopted. The adoption of this
anti-militaristic proposal placed Ebert in a very difficult position.
He defended his military allies as best he could. Hindenburg let
his fury be known, declaring that he would not follow the pro
visions set forth. 67
relation to the issue of national as
sembly versus council system, see Bern
stein, op. cit., pp. 82-84, 91-95; Her
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 216-19;
Tormin, op. cit., pp. 97-100; Stampfer,
Die ersten 14 Jahre, pp. 81-83. A mo
tion to postpone the national assembly
until March 16, 1919 was also de
feated; only 50 votes were cast in its
favor. (Ibid., p. 82.)

65 Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 32.
66 Quoted in lllustrierte Geschichte,
p. 252; see also Hermann Mueller, op.
cit., pp. 217-18.
67 For the text of the Seven Ham
burg Points see lllustrierte Geschichte,
p. 253. The name derives from the
fact that it was proposed by the Ham
burg delegation. Wheeler-Bennett, op.
cit., p. 32; Volkmann, Revolution, pp.
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On December 20, 1918, the Congress was to elect the new
Central Council which was to assume the functions of the Execu
tive Council as the control organ of the People's Commissars until
the meeting of the national assembly.68 Having lost their fight for
the perpetuation of the council system, the left wing radicals de
manded that the powers of the Central Council be enlarged at the
expense of the Council of the People's Commissars. There was a
heated discussion on the interpretation of the term "supervision"
in the adopted proposal of Luedemann-Kahmann-Severing which,
against the votes of the left radicals, had transferred all legis
lative and executive powers to the Council of People's Com
missars for the period before the meeting of the national assembly.
The motion defined the functions of the Central Council as "su
pervision of the German and Prussian cabinet" and "the right to
appoint and discharge People's Commissars, and until the final
settlement of the governmental structure, also the People's Com
missars of Prussia."69 Haase viewed this arrangement as requir
ing the People's. Commissars to present legislative drafts to the
Central Council and to seek its advice in important cases. How
ever, if the Central Council should disagree with the People's
Commissars, the latter had the right to make a decision indepen137-45; Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 255-56;
Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 182-86;
Waite, op. cit., pp. 8-9. The Seven
Hamburg Points became law because
they were adopted by the Congress of
Councils. However, they were never
implemented. On December 20, 1918,
a joint meeting of the People's Com
missars with the newly-elected Central
Council took place. General Groener
and Major von Schleicher were invited
to attend. The members of the Central
Council agreed that they had gone too
far in accepting the Hamburg Points.
It was decided that this law had no
validity for the units of the field army,
border troops, and navy. As far as the
home army was concerned, i.e., the
army administrative units and the units
slated for demobilization, special or-

ders implementing the Hamburg Points
were to be worked out. (Oertzen, op.
cit., pp. 256-57; Volkmann, Revolu
tion, pp. 149-51.)
For another version of this meet
ing, see Barth, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
68 The official announcement made
on December 21, 1918, read as fol
lows: "The Central Council of the Ger
man Socialist R e p u b 1 i c has been
formed and has taken over the gov
ernmental business for the Reich and
Prussia. The Executive Council of the
Workers' and Soldiers' Council of
Greater Berlin continues its activities
for the Greater Berlin area." (Quoted
in Roemer, op. cit., pp. 22-23.) Cf.
above, pp. 96-97.
69 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
218-19.
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dently. 10 The left wing radicals insisted that the entire legislative
powers remain with the Central Council. A vote of 290 to 115
decided to retain Haase's interpretation of the division of juris
diction between the two Councils. 71 Against the advice of Haase,
Dittmann, and Hilferding, the USPD factions decided not to par
ticipate in the election for the Central Council. The USPD left
wingers like Ledebour and Richard Mueller, who forced their
party to leave the supreme council organ to the Majority Social
ists, justified their decision by insisting that they did not wish to
participate in the strangulation of the council system. 72
The twenty-seven persons on the list of the SPD were elected
to the Central Council. Among them were Max Cohen-Reuss
(who became chairman), Hermann Mueller, Albert Grzesinski,
and Robert Leinert.73
The First Congress of Councils was a complete victory for
the SPD with the one exception of the military issue. (But the
Majority Socialists were able to straighten out quickly the tensions
which the adoption of the Hamburg Points had created between
the Supreme Command and the Provisional government. As has
been pointed out above, in practice nothing was done about these
Points.) In the first place, the proponents of the councils were
turned down by the council delegates themselves; secondly, the
10 For the text of Haase's statement,
see Bernstein, op. cit., p. 93.
11 Ibid., p. 95.
72 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p.
223; Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre,
p. 83.
73 For a listing of the members of
the Central Council see Bernstein, op.
cit., p. 95. Hermann Mueller reports
interesting details of the work of the
Central Council and its organizational
structure. (Hermann Mueller, op. cit.,
pp. 239-40.) When the national as
sembly met, the Central Council relin
quished the political power it had ob
tained from the Reich Congress. (Roe
mer, op. cit., p. 24.) However, it did
continue with some functions and only
ended its activities in the middle of

July 1920. (Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 64.)
A second Congress of Councils met in
Berlin on April 15, 1919, and changed
the Central Council into a kind of
workers' interest representation. The
notion of political councils had been
eliminated by the Majority Socialists in
all bodies over which they held con
trol. (Roemer, op. cit., pp. 30-32.)
The last item on the agenda of the
Reich Congress was the problem of
socialization. The Congress directed
the People's Commissars to start soon
with the socialization of "ripe" indus
tries as recommended by Hilferding in
his report to the delegates. {Bernstein,
op. cit., pp. 95-99; lllustrierte Ge
schichte, p. 254.)
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Congress reaffirmed the SPD aims of the revolution - the demo
cratic, parliamentary republic; and thirdly, the delegates added
to the general optimism and confidence with which the public
looked upon the coming national assembly. 74 Of paramount im
portance was the fact that the Central Council was composed ex
clusively of SPD members, a situation which considerably weak
ened the position of the Independent People's Commissars.75
Shortly after the Majority Socialists had won this major
battle in the Reich Congress of Councils, difficulties with the
People's Naval Division in Berlin gave them a pretext to impress
the left wing radicals with the military strength they thought they
could muster against any attempt to seize power. Whether this
display of force was a deliberate act on the part of Ebert and the
Supreme Command or was the result of a situation thrust upon
them is most difficult to determine; the available accounts relating
to the People's Naval Division are contradictory. Nationalists
and Majority Socialists usually described the sailors as a group of
mercenaries and looters; the left wing radicals made them out to
be revolutionary idealists. 76 Even more important, the information
relating to the incidents which brought out the bloody fighting
on December 24, 1918, is also contradictory. The sailors al. legedly had agreed to vacate the Imperial Castle and to reduce the
strength of their division as of January 1, 1919, to 600 men in
return for 80,000 marks. 11 For reasons which are not quite clear
Ebert and the City Commandant refused to pay the money in spite
of the agreement made with the sailors. The left wing radicals
74 Tormin, op. cit., p. 101. Hermann
Mueller believed that great credit is
due to the Congress because its de
cisions opened the road to the national
assembly. (Hermann Mueller, op. cit.,
p. 224.)
75 Rosa Luxemburg wrote on De
cember 20, 1918, in Die Rote Fahne
about the new Central Council. She
claimed that this development finally
achieved "the Ebert-'control' over the
Ebert-government. Control of the
devil by his mother-in-law." (Rosa

Luxemburg, "E b e r t s Mamelucken,"
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaeh/te
Reden, II, p. 648.)
76 Compare, fo r example, Volk
mann, Revolution, p. 133 with the ac
count in I//ustrierte Geschichte, pp.
254-55.
77 The agreement, signed by all six
People's Commissars, is quoted in
Bernstein, op. cit., p. 104. (The Im
perial Castle and Stables were used by
the sailors as headquarters.)
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charged that the violation of the agreement was a willful provo
cation intended to incite the sailors to rash actions. The sailors
reacted to Ebert's decision with the arrest of the People's Com
missars, the cutting of all telephone lines from the Reich Chan
cellery, and the seizure of Weis and two other Majority Socialists
as hostages. Ebert used the direct telephone line to the Supreme
Command ( the sailors did not know of its existence) to ask for
immediate help. On the same day, units of the First Guard
Cavalry Rifle Division under the command of General von Lequis
were sent from Babelsberg, located a few miles from the center
of Berlin, with the mission "to finish once and for all the People's
Naval Division." 78 There is no doubt that Ebert, without notify
ing the USPD People's Commissars, gave orders to General von
Lequis to liberate Weis and to force the People's Naval Division
into unconditional surrender. 79
The military action of the regular troops of the Supreme Com
mand was a complete fiasco. After initial successes against the
outnumbered sailors, fortune changed. Armed workers and units
of Eichhorn's Security Force and the Republican Soldiers' Army
came to the assistance of the sailors. On the same day, December
24, 1918, Major von Harbou, Chief of Staff of Army Corps Le
quis, phoned the Supreme Command and declared that it was
impossible to rely on the existing regular troops. The Supreme
Command then decided to step up the organization of the Free
Corps units in order to have the military force needed to handle
the "internal chaos. "80
The military outcome of the conflict gave the People's Naval
Division a victory over the Provisional government. However,
negotiations conducted after the cessation of fighting effectively
78 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 258; Stampfer,
Die ersten 14 Jahre, p. 85.
79 Schmidt-Pauli, op. cit., p. 181; ll
lust ri e r t e Geschichte, pp. 257-58;
Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p.
9.

80 Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 259-60;
Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg,

pp. 11-12; Illustrierte Geschichte, pp.
256-57; Schmidt-Pauli, op. cit., p. 181.
For very detailed accounts of the
Christmas fighting and its background,
�ee Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 100-21;
Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 152-64;
Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 224-33.
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neutralized the unit. The sailors were attacned to the Republican
Soldiers' Army and thereby came under the jurisdiction of the
City Commandant. (Otto Wels was replaced on December 28,
1918, by Lieutenant Anton Fischer.) The division of General
Lequis was withdrawn immediately. On the other hand, the sail
ors obligated themselves to vacate the Castle and in the future
never to support an action directed against the government.81
The Christmas incident had far-reaching political repercus
sions which overshadowed the military setback suffered by the
SPD and which eventually led to the second major political gain
of the Majority Socialists in December. The Independent People's
Commissars objected to the decision of Ebert, Scheidemann, and
Landsberg giving unlimited authority to the Minister of War to
deal with the People's Naval Division. They were even more
alarmed since it had been done without consulting the USPD
members of the Provisional government. Therefore, on Decem
ber 27, Haase, Dittmann, and Barth directed eight questions to
the Central Coup_cil, the alleged supervisory agency of the Council
of People's Commissars. They made it clear that their continued
support of the government depended upon the Council's answer.
The questions were: Does the Central Council approve the action
of the Majority Socialist cabinet members during the night of De
cember 23-24, when unlimited authority was conferred on the
Minister of War? Does the Council approve the methods em
ployed by the troops of General von Lequis (i.e., a ten-minute
ultimatum and artillery fire against the Castle and Stables) ? What
is the Council prepared to do about the Hamburg Points adopted
at the Reich Congress? Does the Council endorse the Supreme
s1 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 118. Richard
Mueller stresses the fact that no at
tempts were made by the left wing
radicals to seize power on the evening
of December 24, even though it was
generally known that the government
was without protection. The Spartacists
called for mass demonstrations for the
following day, December 25, to pro
test the actions of the Majority Social-

ist People's Commissars. (Ri c h a r d
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 15-17.)
In the course of these demonstrations,
the Vorwaerts building was occupied
by a group of about 500 men. How
ever, this action was neither planned
nor ordered by the Spartacists or by
the Revolutionary Shop Stewards. On
the following day, the plant was again
freed. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 82.)
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Command's defiance of the decisions of the workers' and soldiers'
councils? Does the Council approve the transfer of the seat of
government from Berlin as recommended by Ebert, Scheidemann,
and Landsberg? Does the Council approve the limited demobilization of the army to peace-time strength instead of complete de
mobilization? How does the Council feel about the socialist republic's reliance for protection on the old imperial generals and
units or on a newly-formed democratic people's army? Does the
Council endorse immediate socialization of the industries ripe
for it? 82
After three hours of deliberation, the Central Council gave
its reply. Because of its complete SPD composition, its answer was
hardly a surprise. It was a complete endorsement of the actions
of Ebert, Scheidemann, and Landsberg. The Independents there
upon withdraw from the Council of People's Commissars, from
almost all other governmental offices of the Reich, and from the
Prussian government. 83
The Central Council, upon recommendation of the remaining
People's Commissars, appointed three additional Majority So
cialists, Gustav Noske, Rudolf Wissel, and Paul Loebe, as re
placements. Loebe, however, declined, and since no substitute
was elected to take his place, the Council of People's Commissars
from then on was restricted to five members. Noske was assigned
to handle military affairs for the Provisional government. 84
s:2 Text of this series of questions is
quoted in Bernstein, op. cit., p. 123.
83 The text of the reply of the Cen
tral Council to Haase, Dittmann, and
Barth is quoted in ibid., pp. 123-24.
The statement delivered by Haase jus•
tifying the resignation of the Inde•
pendents from the government is quo
ted in ibid., p. 124. Bernstein claimed
the withdrawal of the Independents
was "an inglorious and unfortunate
capitulation" to the principles of the
Spartacists.
The withdrawal of the three USPD
members from the Council of the
People's Commissars was followed by

the resignation of almost all Indepen
dents from leading positions in the
Re i c h and Prussian governments.
Bernstein, Kautsky, and Wurm were
the exceptions and they remained in
their offices because no immediate re
placements were available. (Ibid., pp.
127, 130.)
84 Starnpfer, Die ersten 14 lahre, pp.
86-87. General Groener allegedly de
manded from Ebert the appointment
of a strong man to replace a USPD
member. Ebert suggested Noske. This
choice was quickly endorsed by Groe
ner since he and the other military
leaders had great confidence in Noske's
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The appointment of Majority Socialists as replacements for
the Independents in the cabinet was advantageous to internal
agreement. The Central Council and the Council of People's Com
missars were composed exclusively of Majority Socialists. Both
agencies could work harmoniously for law and order and for the
preparation of the national assembly. The SPD enjoyed a monop
oly of political authority. 85
The new government announced its general policies to the
people:
It is our intention to protect the Reich from upheavals until the
national assembly meets, and then the elections will determine if the
majority of the people wishes another government or if it stands be
hind us. We are convinced that only a government which does not
have to overcome internal frictions - that is, a government made of
one piece of wood - can accomplish this, and we believe that we are
that government.86

Although it was a great advantage for the Majority Socialists
to have been freed from the troublesome Independents in both
the Central Council and the Cabinet, this development had for
the over-all socialist movement in Germany some very unfortu. nate and lasting effects. The resignation of the USPD members
from the Provisional government, for example, probably re
moved the last chance of a reunification of the two socialist par
ties. The resignation also pushed the Independents into the camp
of the revolutionary opposition, and many of their adherents
eventually joined the ranks of the Communists. 87
abilities and attitude. (Waite, op. cit.,
pp. 13-14; Noske, Erlebtes, p. 82.)
ss Starting on December 29, 1918,
the SPD government referred to itself
as Reich government or Cabinet in
stead of the Council of People's Com
missars. This change in name was one
of the many indications of the efforts
made by the Majority Socialists to
overcome the "period of the councils."
(Tormin, op. cit., p. 101, n. 2.) Ebert
was appointed as chairman of the

Cabinet. All laws and decrees were
henceforth signed in the name of the
Reich government. (Hermann Muel
ler, op. cit., pp. 241-42.)
86 Quoted in Stampfer, Die ersten
14 Jahre, p. 87. For other govern
mental proclamations pertaining to the
policies of the new all SPD govern
ment, see Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 1293 I.
s7 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 238;
Volkmann, Revolution, p. 168; Ri-
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The great demonstrations which took place in Berlin on
December 29, 1918, gave evidence of the deepened cleavage
within the German socialist movement. That day was almost
like a general mobilization of forces prior to the commencement
of open warfare. The USPD, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards,
and the Spartacists had called upon the workers to attend the
funerals of the victims who perished in the fighting on December
24, and to demonstrate against the "blood-stained government
of Ebert" and against the entire counterrevolution. The SPD
had also called for a demonstration on the same day under the
slogan "against the bloody dictatorship of the Spartacist League"
and the fight against "the terror of a minority." Both sides drew
large crowds, and the demonstrating masses moved through the
streets of Berlin until the late evening hours. 88
4.

The Founding of the Communist Party of Germany

During the month of December 1918, a growing number of
Spartacists came to believe that any organizational connection
with the USPD was out of the question, because of the policies
and actions of the party's leadership and especially of the In
dependent People's Commissars. The moderate USPD leaders
had endorsed the principle of the constitutional national assembly
and, according to the Spartacists, had thereby placed themselves
solidly on the side of the "counterrevolution." Karl Liebknecht
explained the position of the Spartacists as follows:
The reactionary decisions of the [Reich J Congress of Councils
were achieved with the cooperation of the USP-cabinet members. The
large majority of the USP leaders made propaganda for the national
assembly and fought against the council system. This act of treason
committed against the revolution was completed at the Congress of
Councils. The demand for a party congress, to make it possible for
the masses of party comrades to make the decisions, was refused ....
The leaders of the USP have helped to create the prerequisites for the
chard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 13.
ss Stuemke, op. cit., p. 186; Richard

Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 20-24;
lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 269-70.
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rapid development of the counterrevolutionary forces, which are at
the base of the events of December 6 and 24 ....89
The Spartacists, in forcefully demanding the summoning of
a party conference, also wanted to take advantage of the increas
ing opposition within the USPD toward its right wing leaders.
We wanted to provoke the condemnation, by the USP members,
of the compromised leaders. The request of the Revolutionary
Shop Stewards as well as our ultimatum of December 22 demanding
a party congress were refused. 90
Simultaneous with their challenge of the right-wing leaders
of the USPD, the Spartacist League called the delegates of its
groups to Berlin for a national conference to begin on December
30. The urgency on the part of the Spartacists to found their own
party was not primarily the result of their realization of the
USPD's policies. It was due to at least two other major develop
ments. One was the growing conviction, as the result of the huge
strike movement which spread throughout Germany, that only a
proletarian class party could provide the essentia.l unified leader
ship for the "spontaneous revolutionary masses. "91 The other was
the pressure being exerted by the Bremen Left Radicals for the
founding of an independent party. 92
89 Karl Liebknecht, "Die Krise in
der USP," quoted in Liebknecht, Aus
gewaehlte Reden, p. 523.
110 Ibid. Richard Mueller interpreted
the short-term ultimatum, requesting
that the USPD congress be held before
the end of December, and the type of
arguments used in the demand as proof
that the Spartacist leaders intended to
found their own political party. (Ri
chard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p.

88.)

91 For the Spartacists' interpreta
tion of the strike movement, see above,
pp. 129-31.
112 On December 24, the Bremen
Left Radicals held a conference in Ber
lin with representatives of their groups

from Northern Germany, Saxony, Ba
varia, and the Rhineland. The main
issue was to decide whether to remain
independent and form their own party
or to join the Spartacist League. Karl
Radek, the only member of the ill-fated
Soviet delegation to the Reich Con
gress of Councils who managed to get
through to Berlin, attended this con
ference and convinced the Left Radic
als and the representatives of the Spar
tacists, Leo Jogiches, that they should
join forces in order to "strengthen the
revolution." The Reich Conference of
the Left Radicals decided to unite with
the Spartacists, provided that the lat
ter would leave the USPD. On the
issue of participation in the election of
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The Reich Conference of the Spartacist League actually
started on December 29, 1918, with a closed meeting in which
the decision was made to separate from the USPD and to form
a new party. Only three votes were cast against this motion. 93
From December 30, 1918, to January 1, 1919, the Spartacists
and the Left Radicals held the Founding Congress of the new
party in the Banquet Hall of the Prussian House of Representa
tives. On the first day of the congress, Karl Liebknecht declared
the following in his speech about "the crisis in the USPD":
Solidarity with Haase, Barth, and Dittmann is no longer possible.
. . . Today, it has become necessary publicly to draw the dividing line
and to constitute ourselves as a new independent party . ... Our pro
gram and our fundamental principles have been in use for some time;
all we have to do is to make them official. It is not necessary to make
something new of ourselves. The masses already know what we are
and what we represent. . . . 94
A motion made by Fritz Heckert (Chemnitz) to call the new
party Communist Party of Germany (Spartacist League) was ac
cepted by an overwhelming majority. 95
the national assembly, about half the
delegates were for it and half against.
In order not to decide this important
question on the basis of a close vote,
the conference adjourned until the
delegates could consult with the mem
bers in their respective localities. When
the conference reconvened on Decem
ber 30, only one delegate still advo
cated participating in the elections.
(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 264.)
The leaders of the Spartacists had
also been preoccupied with the found
ing of a party during December. They
met on several occasions with the lead
ers of the Revolution Shop Stewards
to find ways and means to improve the
collaboration of the two revolutionary
factions and to establish a stronger or
ganizational union. Richard Mueller
reported that during these meetings
the question of a possible withdrawal

from the USPD and the founding of
a new political party had been dis
cussed. The Revolutionary Shop Stew
ards expressed their preference for re
maining within the USPD in order to
enable them to enlarge their influence
among the masses of the members who
still followed the right-wing leaders.
The Spartacists were strongly in favor
of founding a new party. (Richard
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 86.)
93 Kommunistische Partei Deutsch
lands (Spartakusbund), Bericht ueber
den Gruendungsparteitag der Kommu
nistischen Partei Deutsch/ands (Spar
takusbund) (Berlin, 1919), p. 3 (here
after cited as KPD, Gruendungspartei
tag).
94 Liebknecht, Die Krise in der USP,
p. 524.
95 KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, p. 6.
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The 8 7 delegates and 16 guests at the congress represented
46 different localities. It was a highly heterogeneous group. Very
few of the delegates were genuine revolutionary Marxists. Most
of them were fanatical and radical utopians who seriously be
lieved that their immediate aim, the rule of the councils, would
be realized very soon. They refused to see or to understand the
various tactical problems which the actual situation entailed. The·
influence of these vague political notions, held by a majority of
the delegates, was much in evidence during the discussions and
found reflection in some of the decisions taken at the congress. 9"
The question of participation in the elections for the national
assembly was the first major issue faced by the congress. (The
opposition to the national assembly as "an instrument of the coun
terrevolution" was unanimous and, therefore, did not require
discussion.) It was an important problem because it involved the
position which the Communists were to take toward "bourgeois
parliamentarianism." Paul Levi spoke for the Spartacist leaders,
who demanded participation in the elections in order to work
against the national assembly from within. He emphasized that
the elections would take place regardless of how vigorously the
revolutionary forces opposed it. Even the use of violence against
· the assembly would have no lasting effect because the real power
of the bourgeoisie would not suffer seriously from a minority at
tack. The use of force was opportune only when it could be com
bined with assumption of political power, and this could be done
only with the support of the majority of the working class. Levi
also reminded the delegates that the national assembly would un
doubtedly control the political life of Germany for months to
96 Tormin, op. cit., p. 111. At a
later date, the KPD determined that
the majority of the participants at the
founding congress of the party were
people who were not Communists and
had never even read the Spartacists'
program. (Ibid., p. 111, n. 3.) Richard
Mueller states that the majority of the
delegates were anarchists, syndicalists,
and putschist elements. (Richard Muel-

ler, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 88.) The
"very insufficient political experience
and lack of theoretical knowledge" of
many of the delegates was also ex
plained by the fact that many new
elements had joined the League; they
distinguished themselves primarily by
their "revolutionary enthusiasm and
readiness for action." (Illustrierte Ge
schichte, p. 265.)
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come, and it was important, therefore, for the revolutionary forces
to be represented in the assembly in order to utilize it as a propa
ganda forum. Most of the speakers in the discussion which fol
lowed Levi's presentation were opposed to participation in the
elections. Otto Ruehle declared that it would be equivalent to
an endorsement of the national assembly. Rosi Wolfstein ad
vocated political mass strikes against the assembly. The majority
of the delegates were opposed to participation and neither Rosa
Luxemburg nor Liebknecht were able to change their determina
tion to boycott the elections. A vote of 62 to 23 ruled against par
ticipation. 97
The contents of Levi's speech was significant not only because
it revealed what most of the Communist leaders understood as
participation in the elections and in the national assembly, but
also because it was a strong re-statement of a fundamental Spar
tacist principle - here related to an actual political situation that an overthrow of the government can be achieved only with
the support of the majority of the working class. The original
internal democracy of the party was convincingly illustrated
when the leadership was out-voted by the rank and file. The
newly-founded KPD had not yet learned the meaning of Lenin's
"democratic centralism. "98
The Founding Congress also revealed the widespread con
fusion which prevailed among the delegates concerning the po
sition the Communists should take in regard to the trade unions.
Paul Lange in his report on economic conflicts asserted that the
unions were against the socialization of the economy, and that
they were doomed as a result. The economic agencies which
97 KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, pp.
9-13; Oelssner, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
138-39; Ruth Fischer, op. cit., pp. 7778.
9 8 The lack of understanding and
failure to apply Lenin's concept of
"democratic centralism" is one of the
points which Otto Grotewohl criticizes
about the first congress. (Grotewohl,
op. cit., p. 57.) Leo Jogiches was great-

ly disappointed with what he called the
"lack of enlightment among the mem
bers of the Spartacist League." He ar
rived at the conclusion that the found
ing congress was held too soon. (ll
lustrierte Geschichte, p. 266.) Ruth
Fischer reports a conversation she had
with a "Mr. G. F.," who attended the
congress. He had told her "that dur
ing the session Jogiches asked him
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should handle the interests of the workers were the factory coun
cils:
The organizations necessary to bring about socialism are the fac
tory councils, which in collaboration with the workers' councils direct
the internal affairs of the individual factories, regulate the working
conditions, control the production, and eventually will have to take
over the entire direction of the factory. . . .99

In the discussion following Lange's report, demands were made

for immediate withdrawal from the trade unions. Rosa Luxem
burg's intervention prevented this matter from being given a
"premature vote. "100

The delegates adopted the Spartacist program of December
14, 1918, as the party platform. This event indicated that the
organizational change from the Spartacist League to the KPD
involved no basic changes in political thought or in fundamental
tactical concepts. In her speech, "Our Program and the Political
Situation," Rosa Luxemburg gave a detailed account of the de
velopments of the German Revolution and of the lessons learned
from them by the revolutionary Marxists. Possibly for the benefit
of the new, impatient elements among the ranks, she discussed
the revolutionary tactics which the Spartacists would have to pur
sue in order to support the proletarian revolution:
. . . what is the general tactical guiding principle applicable for
the situation which shall confront us in the immediate future? The next
thing you may be hoping for is the fall of the Ebert-Scheidemann gov
ernment and its replacement by a pronounced socialist-proletarian
revolutionary government. However, I would like to draw your at
tention to what is happening at the lowest political level. We must not
have [ the same] illusion we held during the first phase of the revolu
tion on the ninth of November, that all that is necessary for a socialist
revolution is to overthrow a capitalist government and replace it by
whether or not he should blow up the
whole affair." (Ruth Fischer, op. cit.,
p. 79, n. 31.)

KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, p. 15.
Tormin, op. cit., p. 111; lllustri
erte Geschichte, p. 266.
99

10°
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another one. The victory of the proletarian revolution can be achieved
only when one goes about it in the opposite way; the Ebert-Scheidemann government must be undermined through social and revolutionary mass actions of the proletariat step by step....
. . . history does not make it as simple for us as it was in the case
of the bourgeois revolutions when it was sufficient to overthrow the
central authority and replace it by a few or a few dozen men. We must
work from the bottom up; this is necessary because of the mass
character of our revolution which is pointed at the very core of
society; it is one of the requirements of the present proletarian revo
lution that we must seize political power not from the top but from
the bottom....On the bottom where the individual employer faces
his wage slaves, down there, where all executive organs of political
class rule are standing face to face with the objects of this rule - the
masses - there we must little by little tear away from the oppressors
their powers and seize them for our purposes. . . .101
Rosa Luxemburg knew well that many of the revolutionaries
were greatly concerned about the length of time it would take be
fore the revolution could be built from the bottom up. Therefore,
she made the following statement:
. . . The revolution is capable of accomplishing its achievements
with tremendous speed. I cannot predict how much time this process
requires. Who among us counts and who cares, if our lives last long
enough to see it happen! 102
The future organization of the party was another concern of
the congress. Hugo Eberlein proposed that the revolutionary
program and tactics of the KPD should be the decisive factors in
forming the organization.
We are faced with the question of whether we should establish an
election club or a political combat organization. The organizations of
the old Social Democrat Party were, except during election times, dull
and empty....We must build our organization along entirely dif1o1 Rosa Luxemburg, Rede zum Programm, quoted in Luxemburg, Ausge-

waehlte Reden, II, pp. 683-84, 687-88.
1 02 Ibid., p. 688.
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ferent lines if we wish to maintain our readiness for action ... . We
demand that all political power be taken over by the workers' and
soldiers' councils. The factory councils are at the base of the power
[ of the workers' and soldiers' councils J. We must adapt our organiza
tion to this situation. Therefore, it probably will be best to set up
Communist groups in the factories. The shop stewards of the factories
will form the conference of the functionaries of the community which
in turn appoints the party office for the community ( Ortsleitung). In
addition, meetings with the unemployed, etc. must be arranged. In
the rural and industrially poor areas other solutions must be found.
This type of organization has the advantage of increasing readiness
for combat. This organizational form, however, must not be made
schematic but must be adapted to local conditions. Individual locali
ties must retain complete freedom in the selection of their own or
ganization. It is not permissible to dictate from above. Individual or
ganizations must have complete autonomy. They must not wait for
direction from the top of the organization, but must work on their
own initiative. The task of the central office is primarily to sum up
external developments and assume political and ideological leader
ship....1oa
No discussion took place, and the proposals were turned over
to the program and organization commission for further study.
However, the significance of the proposals was the strong em
phasis placed on local autonomy and on the factory groups as the
basic units for party organization. The general conviction was
that here was the source of all political and economic powers.
The congress elected a Central Committee composed of Her
mann Duncker, Kaete Duncker, Hugo Eberlein, Paul Froelich ( as
representative of the Bremen Group), Paul Lange, Leo Jogiches,
Paul Levi, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernst Meyer, Wil
helm Pieck and August Thalheimer.104
On the last day of the congress, Liebknecht and Pieck re
ported the failure of the negotiations conducted with the Revo
lutionary Shop Stewards who had been invited to join the new
103 KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, pp.

43-44.

104 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 267.
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party. The Revolutionary Shop Stewards made their acceptance
of the offer contingent upon the adoption of five points by the
party congress: ( 1) repeal of the anti-parliamentary decision con
cerning non-participation in the elections for the national as
sembly; (2) complete parity of the KPD and Revolutionary Shop
Stewards in party leadership and in party committees; ( 3) precise
definition of street demonstration tactics and agreement that no
actions were to be taken without prior approval by the Revolu
tionary Shop Stewards; ( 4) joint editing of the party newspaper
and of all propaganda literature; ( 5) deletion of the designation
"Spartacist League" from the party's new name. Liebknecht found
these demands unacceptable; he was especially incensed about
point three which was directed against the alleged putsch tactics
of the Spartacists. 105
The failure of these unification efforts deprived the new party
of a substantial number of members and also of the opportunity
to win over, through the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, the radical
elements among the workers. The KPD had only a few thousand
members throughout Germany. In Berlin there were barely fifty
members. It was an elite party or the framework for a mass party
which remained isolated from the socialist masses for a consider
able time. 10"
The events at the Founding Congress demonstrated that the
Russian Bolshevik had nothing directly to do with the creation of
the KPD or with its program and tactics. Karl Radek attended
the congress as the official representative of the Bolsheviks. How
ever, he could do no more than underline the formal solidarity
which existed between German and Russian revolutionaries.
105 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger
krieg, pp. 88-89; Illustrierte Geschich
te, p. 267. Tormin states that the de
mands of the Revolutionary Shop
Stewards were primarily intended to
keep utopian radicalism under control.
(Tormin, op. cit., p. 112.) Richard
Mueller, who attended the negotiations
between the two revolutionary groups,

gave this intention as the real reason
for the actions of his organization.
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg,
p. 88.)
106 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 47; Illus
trierte Geschichte, p. 267. R i c h a r d
Mueller speaks of scarcely one thou
sand Spartacists. (Richard Mueller,
Der Buerkerkrieg, p. 85.)
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The congress also gave evidence that the left wing radical
leadership had insufficient authority over the rank and file and
that it was unable to control effectively its members. The lack of
control was partly caused by the internal party democracy. Thus
it was possible that in spite of Rosa Luxemburg's violent oppo
sition to adventurous and putschist policies, so-called "revolu
tionary actions" could get out of hand. Possibly Leo Jogiches was
correct when he noted that the Spartacist members were not yet
ready to form a political party. 101

101 Richard Mueller expressed the
same opinion. He called the founding
of the party a serious mistake. He be
lieved that the Spartacists should have

remained within the USPD where they
could have exerted beneficial influence
on that party's policies. (R i c h a r d
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 90.)

The Spartacists
and the January Uprising

"The Spartacist Uprising"
Civil War in Berlin

1.

The Test of Strength

The hostile encounters between the Majority Socialists and
the left opposition during December 1918 had deepened the cleav
age within the German socialist movement. Mutual animosity
had grown in intensity. The rival demonstrations on December
29, 1918, at the occasion of the funeral for the victims of the
Christmas incident, had illustrated the great antagonism existing
between the "government" socialists and their opposition on the
left. The attitude of the SPD leadership toward the left wing
radicals was expressed in a candid article in Vonvaerts:
The despicable actions of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg soil
the revolution and endanger all of its achievements. The masses must
not sit by quietly for one minute longer while these brutal beasts and
their followers paralyze the activities of the republican governmental
offices, incite the people more and more to a civil war, and strangle
with their dirty fists the right of free expression.
They want to demolish and destroy with lies, slander, and violence
everything which dares oppose them. They pose with boundless inso
lence as the masters of Berlin, in spite of the fact that at least nine-tenths
of the population hate and despise their actions from the bottom of
their souls .... 1
1 Extracts of this Vorwaerts article
are quoted in lllustrierte Geschichte, p.
269. The accusation that the radical

left "strangles free expression" is a
reference to the occupation of the
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Middle class circles joined the Majority Socialists in their
attacks against the left wing radicals. At the end of December
1918, the so-called "Berlin Citizens' Council" distributed a leaflet
which, in the manner of the SPD, blamed primarily the Spartacists
for the unrest and violence.
Workers, Soldiers! The Christmas blows of the Spartacist group
lead directly into the abyss. None of us wishes to spill blood. How
ever, it is easier to cure a mad dog with biblical phrases than [ to
change] the Spartacists with gentle persuasion. The brutal force of
these criminals can be countered only with force. If they intend to
strike us down, we shall defend our skins. The hypocritical outcry of
the Spartacists about the "blood bath" does not divert us from their
intention to pit workers against workers and soldiers against soldiers.
Do you want peace? Then every man must see to it that the
Spartacists' rule of violence comes to an end!
Do you want bread? Then see to it that all wheels are turning!
Do you want freedom? Then eliminate Liebknecht's armed sluggards!
When you are united, then the entire pack will run away.
Do you want to be hungry? Then listen to Liebknecht!
Do you want to become slaves of the Entente? Liebknecht can
arrange this.
Long live law and order!
Down with the dictatorship of the anarchists! 2
In their propaganda warfare against the left wing radicals, the
Majority Socialists and their allied forces blamed Spartakus for
all violence and unrest. This practice appears to have been a
deliberate attempt by those who favored the consolidation of the
revolution or opposed the revolution altogether. Therefore Spar
takus was used as the catch-all term even though the Spartacists
were very few in number. 3
Vorwaerts building immediately following the Christmas fighting.
2 Quoted in Illustrierte Geschichte,
pp. 269-70.

3 For a discussion of the Spartacists'
strength, see above, p. 157, 157n.
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There are several reasons for this practice of making the
Spartacists the focal point of public hatred: ( l) It is conceivable
that the SPD and other opponents of the left radicals acted ac
cording to their convictions, actually believing that the Spartacists
were the most dangerous elements among the revolutionaries and
were retarding the process of consolidation. The fate of the Rus
sian Kerensky government, liquidated by a determined Bolshevik
minority, could have served as a warning. (2) The public censure
may have been an intentional over-simplification of a complicated
situation - a device frequently used in political propaganda war
fare. The selection of the weakest among a multitude of op
ponents and the use of it as a symbol of the entire opposition is
convenient because it helps raise the morale of the censuring side.
In addition, a defeat of the weakest component of the opposition
can be developed, propaganda-wise, into a major and decisive
event. ( 3) This practice could have been an attempt to drive a
wedge between the various radical groups on the left. Making the
Spartacists the root of all political evil could have been interpreted
by the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the left wing of the
USPD as evidence of a more conciliatory SPD attitude toward
them. ( 4) It also could have been a means of discrediting all the
oppositional forces by identifying them with the "blood-thirsty"
Spartacists. This would have been an especially desirable ob
jective for the period preceding the elections to the national as
sembly and could have been designed to reduce the influence of
the USPD upon the masses.
Whatever the reason, or combination of reasons, using the
Spartacists as a symbol of political evil indicated that the Majority
Socialists were concerned almost exclusively with the danger from
the left. They apparently were not afraid that their military de
pendence on the imperial officers would eventually lead them into
a political subjugation by the alleged reactionary forces. This
attitude can possibly be explained by the blind confidence of the
SPD leaders in the security provided by democratic elections.
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At the end of December, 1918, in spite of their improved po
litical position, Ebert and his government felt insecure because of
the lack of military forces to defend themselves against the coup
d'etat, presumably being prepared by the radical left.4 The Ma
jority Socialists regarded the armed workers, the various "revo
lutionary" military units which had failed to come to the support
of the government during the Christmas incident, and the un
reliable troops of the Berlin garrison as the forces which the left
wing radicals would try to bring under their control in order to
overthrow the government and to create a council dictatorship,
following the Bolshevik example. On the other hand, the Spar
tacists, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, and large parts of the
Berlin organization of the USPD suspected that the SPD govern
ment, in alliance with the volunteer units commanded by the for
mer imperial officers and the reactionary political forces, were
planning to suppress the revolutionary workers by force.
In the opinion of this writer, neither side intended to start a
civil war at the ·beginning of January. Even if the Ebert govern
ment had wanted to suppress the revolutionary danger of the left
and disarm the civilian population in order to · assure peaceful
elections for the national assembly, the troops needed for this
operation were not then available. On the opposite side, the newly
formed KPD had adopted as one of its planks the principle of
obtaining mass support before attempting to seize political power.5
4 Many bourgeois circles and SPD
leaders seriously believed in the coming
coup. For example, Meinecke wrote
". . . the most dangerous zero point
was around the end of the old and be
ginning of the new year 1918/19 when
one was physically defenseless against
the Bolsheviks, ... " (Meinecke, op.
cit., p. 118.)
There is also the report of a tele
phone call from Ebert to General
Groener at the end of December, ask
ing impatiently when he could count
on the promised volunteer units, the
Free Corps. He pleaded urgently that

the insurrection was imminent and
that he had no military forces at his
disposal to s u p p r e s s the uprising.
(Volkmann, Revolution, p. 170; lllus
trierte Geschichte, pp. 272-73.)
5 The unruly and noisy elements of
the KPD who urged an immediate
"proletarian revolution" lacked influ
ence within the party and among the
workers. It should be noted, however,
that this situation was not generally
known outside the party; this fact may
have contributed to the fears of a coup,
then widespread in government circles.
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The Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the left wing of the USPD
were also against a coup d'etat. The negotiations conducted by
the Spartacists with the Shop Stewards during the Founding Con
gress of the KPD had given evidence of the latter's strong anti
putsch views.
Mutual suspicion caused the period at the end of December
and the beginning of January to be marked by high tension. Any
move in either camp which could be interpreted as an attempt to
challenge or change the precarious power balance was almost
certain to set off a test of strength, a civil war. The so-called
"Eichhorn Incident" was the fuse that ignited the week of fighting
which entered history under the misnomer of "Spartacist Up
rising." Rudolf Hilferding, one of the USPD leaders, called it
appropriately "the revolution's battle of the Marne."6
The Eichhorn Incident - The Immediate Cause of the
Uprising
Emil Eichhorn, a left wing USPD Reichstag deputy, became
the Berlin Chief of Police in the wake of the November Revolu
tion. His imperial predecessor, von Oppen, sent a message to
USPD party headquarters on November 9 requesting that a rep
resentative be designated to negotiate the surrender of the police.
Eichhorn was appointed by the USPD to head the police force
for the time being. On the next day, the Berlin Workers' and
Soldiers' Council formally approved Eichhorn for this position. 7
The sequence of the Eichhorn incident was as follows: Eich
horn's dismissal from office as Chief of Police by the Prussian

2.

Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 246.
7 For a detailed account of Eich
horn's appointment and early activities
as chief of the Berlin police, see Emil
Eichhorn, Eichhorn ueber die Januar
Ereignisse (Berlin: Verlagsgenossen
s c h a f t Freiheit, 1919), pp. 7-28.
Noske's version that Eichhorn took
over the office on his own responsibility
and made an unidentified workers' and
soldiers' council appoint him to this
0

position prior to the time when any
government was formed and then pro
ceeded to create a so-called new police,
is an example of the highly distorted
reports on the January events. (Noske,
Erlebtes, p. 80.) Most of the accounts
examined in the preparation of this
study were found to be influenced
markedly by the political views of the
respective authors.
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government; his refusal to comply with this order; immediate sup
port from the left wing radical organizations in Berlin in his at
tempt to defy the Prussian government.
The Majority Socialists had a simple explanation for the dis
charge of Eichhorn by the Prussian Minister of Interior, Paul
Hirsch. They claimed they were justified in dismissing the USPD
Chief of Police, who refused to withdraw from the key position in
Berlin, in spite of the fact that the Independent members of the
Prussian government had resigned, following the example set
by Haase, Dittmann, and Barth. The SPD had become increasing
ly alarmed by Eichhorn's activities. His open favoritism toward
the left wing radicals was a thorn in their side. He was accused
of giving agents of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards leading po
sitions in his Security Force, of having indirectly helped the mu
tinous sailors during the Christmas incident by keeping his police
neutral, of having armed 1,500 workers who then assisted the
rebellious People's Naval Division, and finally of having publicly
declared his opposition to the coming constituent national as
sembly. The SPD newspapers opened a concerted campaign
against Eichhorn, demanding his immediate dismissal from office.
On January 3, 1919, Eichhorn appeared before the Prussian Min
ister of Interior as requested, even though he had earlier an
nounced that he recognized only the Executive Council as his
superior authority. Confronted with the charges, Eichhorn prom
ised to answer them in writing. The Prussian SPD government
claimed to be convinced more than ever that it could no longer
tolerate the situation created by a hostile Chief of Police, and on
the following day it officially dismissed Eichhorn. Eugen Ernst,
the Prussian Minister of Police, was appointed as his successor.
Majority Socialists' accounts of the incident stress that the left
wing opposition used this completely legal and justifiable dismis
sal as a welcome pretext for beginning their long-planned fight
against the government.8
8 Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 131-34. The
text of Hirsch's letter of dismissal to

Eichhorn is quoted in ibid., p. 133. See
also Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
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Quite naturally, the left wing radicals viewed the discharge of
Eichhorn in an entirely different light. They believed it was a
premeditated action by the SPD, intended not so much as a seizure
of an important executive office but primarily as a provocation to
the revolutionary workers of Berlin. The leftist opposition in
sisted that the SPD leaders knew the workers could not afford
to give up the position of the Chief of Police without a struggle.9
In order to prove their accusations against the Majority Socialists,
the left wing radicals charged that the attack by the Social Demo
cratic and bourgeois newspapers against Eichhorn was intended
to prepare public opinion for his discharge. This censure had
started before January 3, the withdrawal date of the Independents
from the Prussian government. Furthermore, the preparatory at
tack was not accidental, but allegedly was a well-coordinated af
fair managed by the Political-Parliamentary-News-Service, a
semi-official mouthpiece of the Ebert government. 10 The left wing
opposition also circulated a statement ascribed to the successor
to Eichhorn
Eugen Ernst - who, on the day after the sup
pression of the January Uprising, supposedly revealed to a cor
respondent of the Manchester Guardian that
a success of the Spartacists was a priori impossible; we (the Ma
jority Socialists) forced them to resort to force prematurely because
246-50; Grzesinski, op. cit., pp. 61-62;
Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 48; and
Volkmann, Revolution, p. 173. Volk
mann's report of the incident is similar
to other SPD accounts. According to
Hermann Mueller, who is obviously
mistaken, Eichhorn refused to appear
before the Prussian Minister of In
terior.
9 Richard
Mueller, Der Buerger
krieg, p. 28. Walter Ulbricht asserts
that the attack was also d i r ec t e d
against the Executive Council which
originally appointed Eichhorn. This
assertion is hardly justified since the
Executive Council was by then com
pletely under the dominance of the
SPD, a situation which was clearly
demonstrated when the council readily

endorsed Eichhorn's dismissal order
on January 6, 1919. (Ulbricht, Zur
Geschichte, p. 37; Hermann Mueller,
op. cit., p. 248.)
10 Eichhorn, op. cit., p. 58. Richard
Mueller reported that on January 1
this news service circulated the fol
lowing item: "Each day Mr. Eichhorn
remains in his office as Chief of Police
means added danger for the public
safety." According to Mueller, this
newspaper release carried the addi
tional assertions that Eichhorn was in
the pay of the Russian government and
that he was preparing a civil war.
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg,
p. 26.) See also lllustrierte Geschich te,
p. 270.
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of our preparations. They had to fight before they were ready and
therefore we were in a position to challenge them successfully. 11
The interpretation by the left wing radicals of the over-all
situation was as follows:
The government people who decreed the dismissal of Eichhorn
knew that they thereby most severely provoked the Berlin workers.
The government wanted this controversy; they wanted it in order to
fight, defeat, and disarm the working class. If this provocation had
failed and Eichhorn had submitted to the order, then they would at
least have gained the chance to change completely the police system
in Berlin, to drive away the organized workers with whom Eichhorn
had built up the Security Force and replace them with mercenaries.
12

When Eichhorn received his dismissal order, he reported to
the party offices of the Berlin organization of the USPD. On the
evening of the �ame day - January 4, 1919 - a joint meeting
of the Central Committee of the Berlin organization of the USPD
and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards had been scheduled to deal
with routine matters. After learning about Eichhorn's discharge,
. the discussion switched to the steps that should be taken to pre
vent the government from carrying out its intention. Against the
vote of a few Independents, it was decided to call the workers and
soldiers to a protest demonstration the next day, Sunday, January
5. No further details were worked out except the text of a joint
proclamation. The Central Committee of the KPD was notified
of the action which the USPD and the Revolutionary Shop Stew
ards had agreed upon. The Communists decided to join the other
two organizations and to insist that the counter-measures to the
11 l/lustrierte Geschichte, p. 271.
Richard Mueller be I i e v e d that the
charges against Eichhorn were nothing
but falsehoods and were made public
only to influence public opinion for the
planned attack against Eichhorn and

the revolutionary workers of Berlin.
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg,
pp. 26-29.) For Eichhorn's own de
fense against the charges, see Eichhorn,
op. cit., pp. 50-51, 60-61.
12 lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 270-71.
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government's provocation be kept within the framework of power
ful protest demonstrations. The Central Committee then felt that a
violent overthrow of the government would lead nowhere, since
a proletarian government could not remain in power in isolated
Berlin for longer than a few days. 13
The text of the joint proclamation was immediately dissemi
nated in leaflet form and was published the next morning in Die
Rote Fahne and Freiheit. It read as follows:
Attention! Workers! Party Comrades!
The Ebert-Scheidemann government has heightened its counter
revolutionary activities with a new contemptible conspiracy directed
against the revolutionary workers of Greater Berlin: it tried malici
ously to oust Chief of Police Eichhorn from his office. It wished to
replace Eichhorn with its willing tool, the present Prussian minister of
Police, Ernst.
By this action, the Ebert-Scheidemann government wishes not only
to remove the last trusted man of the revolutionary Berlin workers, but
primarily it intends to establish in Berlin a despotic rule antagonistic
to the revolutionary workers.
13 Ibid., p. 273. Eichhorn, op. cit.,
pp. 67-69. Richard Mueller, Der Buer
gerkrieg, p. 30. R i c h a r d Mueller
quotes from a Communist leaflet dis
tributed shortly before the January
fighting which reflected the lack of in
tention on the part of the KPD to
seize political power at that time: "If
the Berlin workers would forcefully
disperse the national assembly today
and would throw the Scheidemann and
Ebert people into jail, while the work
ers in the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia, and
the agricultural laborers of the area
east of the Elbe remain inactive, the
capitalists would be able to subjugate
Berlin tomorrow by starving it out."
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg,
p. 30.)
According to a Communist report,
published at a later date, the Central
Committee of the KPD took the fol
lowing position toward the Eichhorn

incident: "The members of the Cen
tral Committee agreed that all de
mands which would necessarily result
in the fall of the Ebert government
must be avoided. Our demands were
specified as follows: rescinding the dis
missal of Eichhorn, disarming the
counterrevolutionary troops ( S u p p e
unit, etc.), and arming the proletariat.
None of these demands involved in any
form the fall of the government, not
even the demand for arming the pro
letariat, because at that time, the gov
ernment still had a large following
among the proletariat. We also agreed
then, that this constituted a minimum
program which must be carried out
with a maximum of energy. It was
supposed to be the impressive result
of a powerful revolutionary action.
... It was in this sense that we issued
the slogans for the demonstrations."
(Quoted in ibid.)
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Workers! Party Comrades! The person of Eichhorn is not the
main issue; you yourselves will lose the last remnants of your revolu
tionary achievements through this major blow.
The Ebert government with its accomplices in the Prussan Minis
try intends to support its power through bayonettes and to secure for
itself the grace of the capitalist bourgeoisie, whose disguised repre
sentative it was from the very beginning.
By this blow directed against the Berlin police headquarters, the
entire German proletariat, the entire German Revolution is to be
struck.
Workers! Party Comrades! This you cannot and must not permit!
Therefore, tum out for powerful mass demonstrations. Prove your
power to the autocrats of today; prove that the revolutionary spirit of
the November days has not been extinguished.
Come today, Sunday, at 2 p.m. to the impressive mass demon
strations in the Siegesallee!
Come in masses! Your freedom, your future, the fate of the Revo
lution is at stake! Down with the despotism of Ebert, Scheidemann,
Hirsch, and Ernst! Long live revolutionary, international socialism!
Berlin, January 5, 1919.
The Revolutionary Shop Stewards and Confidence Men of the
large factories of Greater Berlin.
The Central Committee of Greater Berlin Social Democratic
Election Association of the Independent Social Democratic
Party.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany
( Spartacist League) . 14
The Majority Socialists as well as the leftist opposition had
interpreted the events related to Eichhorn's dismissal from a
purely political point of view. Both sides of the conflict failed to
recognize that a strong personal element was also involved: the
intrigues of Lieutenant Anton Fischer, the city commandant and
successor to Otto Weis. Because of jurisdictional disputes and
their political alignments, an intense enmity had developed dur14 Quoted in Bernstein, op. cit., p.

134.
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ing November and December of 1918 between Eichhorn's Se
curity Force and Wels' Republican Soldiers' Army. 15 Fischer
anticipated an ultimate clash between the two militant organiza
tions. In order to strengthen his position, he succeeded as early
as December in bribing a number of Security Force leaders to
make common cause with him against their Chief of Police. When
the concerted campaign of the Majority Socialists against Eich
horn began, Fischer thought the time had come for him to take a
more prominent part in the final assault against his personal and
political antagonist. 16 On January 4, 1919, supported by two
members of the Executive Council, Molkenbuhr and Frank,
Fischer convinced the Prussian Minister of Interior that he could
unseat Eichhorn once a dismissal order was issued. 11 It is prob
able that Fischer's intervention aggravated considerably the pre
vailing tense situation and thereby directly contributed to the
events which followed the Eichhorn incident.

The Major Events of "Spartakus Week"
On Sunday, January 5, 1919, in response to the joint procla
mation of the leftist opposition, huge throngs of workers surged
into the streets and marched through the main arteries of Berlin
shouting defiance at the "counterrevolutionary" Ebert govern
ment. The number of participants in the demonstrations sur
passed even the most optimistic expectations of the left wing
radicals. 18 Great masses of people formed into marching columns,
their revolutionary spirit further kindled by fiery speeches from
3.

15 For details on the tensions, juris
dictional disputes, and mutual accusa
tions of the two forces, see Eichhorn,
op. cit., pp. 28-35, 42-46; Anton Fi
scher, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
16 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 269. Volk
mann, Revolution, pp. 173-74. Fischer
admitted that he had "bought" mem
bers of the Security Force. (Anton
Fischer, op. cit., pp. 55f.)
17 Anton Fischer, op. cit., p. 54; see
also Richard Mueller, Der Buerger-

krieg, p. 41; Oertzen, op. cit., p. 269.
18 Bernstein believed that the over
whelming mass response of the people
was due to the cleverly written pro
clamation which succeeded in con
vincing the masses that the govern
ment was committing a counterrevo
lutionary, despotic act by dismissing
the "proletarian and revolutionary
Chief of Police." (Bernstein, op. cit.,
p. 133.)
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Liebknecht and other leaders, and moved to police headquarters
at Alexanderplatz to bring their ovations to Eichhorn and to those
who supported him in his struggle against the government. It
was indeed a most inopportune time for Anton Fischer and Eugen
Ernst to appear in the police building and demand Eichhorn's
ouster. Caught in the spirit of the demonstrating masses, even
those of the Security Force leaders who had accepted bribes from
Fischer declared their loyalty to the Chief of Police and asked
him to remain in office. Fischer, greatly disappointed by the be
trayal of "his" men among the Security Force, recognized that
neither threats nor pleading would change Eichhorn's mind. It
would require force. 19
A number of functionaries of the Revolutionary Shop Stew
ards and a few members of the Central Committee of the Berlin
USPD and of the KPD had come to police headquarters to confer
on the next move, in view of the successful response to their joint
summons for mass demonstrations. They were not able to arrive
at any decision. and therefore postponed the conference for the
evening of the same day. In the meantime Eichhorn, Ledebour,
Daeumig, Liebknecht, and others addressed the huge crowds from
the balcony of the police building. All of them severely attacked
· the Ebert government for its alleged counterrevolutionary activities, although none of the speakers called for violent actions.
The demonstrators waited patiently until the evening hours for
further instructions; when nothing developed, the mob gradually
dispersed. 20
Later in the evening, about seventy Revolutionary Shop Stew
ards, the Central Committee of the Berlin USPD, and Liebknecht
and Pieck from the Central Committee of the KPD gathered in
police headquarters to resume their discussion on further action.
It was at this meeting that the decision was taken to overthrow
the government.
10 Anton Fischer, op. cit., pp. 55-59;
Eichhorn, op. cit., pp. 69-70; Richard
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 3 I; and
Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 269-70.

20 Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 32; Eichhorn, op. cit., p. 70.
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The impact of the huge mass demonstrations upon the as
sembled functionaries was so great that they believed sincerely
that the masses were ready to overthrow the Ebert cabinet and
support a new revolutionary government of the left wing radicals.
Reports of spontaneous mass actions, the occupation of the Vor
waerts and of other bourgeois newspapers and press services in
the area of the Belle-Alliance-Platz convinced the oppositional
leaders that the revolutionary workers of Berlin were again taking
matters into their own hands. Dorrenbach, the leader of the
People's Naval Division, described the high revolutionary spirit
of his own unit and of the other troops of the Berlin garrison.
According to him, all these units, including troops in Spandau
and in other parts of the Reich, were ready to overthrow force
fully the Ebert government. Against the votes of six persons,
among whom were Ernst Daeumig and Richard Mueller, the con
ferees decided to take up the fight against the government with
the aim of replacing it with a revolutionary government. It was
also decided to maintain the occupation of the newspaper plants
and to proclaim a general strike for Berlin. A provisional Revo
lutionary Committee, comprised of fifty-three persons with three
co-chairmen, Ledebour, Liebknecht, and Paul Scholze, was
elected. This Committee was charged with the preparation, di
rection, and coordination of the struggle for power. After the
fall of the Ebert government it was temporarily to take over gov
ernmental affairs. 21
The so-called "spontaneous occupation" of the newspaper
plants on January 5, followed by the seizure of several public
21 See Richard Mueller, Der Buer
gerkrieg, pp. 32-35 for a detailed de
scription of this revolutionary evening
meeting on January 5. Mueller re
lates the position taken by most of
the prominent leaders among the or
ganizations represented at the meet
ing. He also describes the arguments
of the six functionaries, including his
own, who were opposed to the de
cision of overthrowing the govern-

ment by violence. The other four who
shared his and Daeumig's views were
Paul Eckert, Heinrich Mahlzahn, Neu
endorf, and Oskar Rusch.
See also lllustrierte Geschichte, pp.
274-75. A long quote of Ledebour's
statement at his trial for treason on
the occurrences at this meeting is given
in ibid. Another account of a par
ticipant is Eichhorn, op. cit., pp. 7072. See also Bernstein, op. cit., pp.
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buildings, became one of the most controversial and significant
issues of the January incidents. The left wing radicals as well as
the Majority Socialists used their respective interpretations of
these seizures as proof that the other side had planned this action
as a fight to the finish. The opposition of the left insisted that
it had neither planned nor ordered the seizure of the buildings;
it regarded the occupation of the Vorwaerts and of the other news
paper buildings as a spontaneous mass protest action against the
continued dissemination of vicious propaganda by these papers
against Eichhorn and the revolutionary workers of Berlin. After
the conclusion of the January fighting, the leftist forces changed
their story into a declaration that they had been deceived by the
SPD. They asserted that absolute proof had been obtained that
the seizures were the work of agents provocateurs who were mem
bers of an intelligence organization built up by Anton Fischer
during his days as Berlin City Commandant. The left claimed
that the occupation of these buildings was designed to lure them
into the fight, to tie down their forces in unimportant and isolated
locations, and to give the SPD an excuse to use its newly-organized
military units for the destruction of the left wing opposition.22
On their part the Majority Socialists pointed to the same events
as proof that the left wing extremists had been waiting for an
opportune moment to start their long-prepared insurrections.28
135-36, and Herman Mueller, op. cit.,
pp. 252-54. Different figures have
been given for the number of persons
o n t h e Revolutionary Committee.
Richard Mueller, Hermann Mueller,
and Stampfer set the number at fifty
three. Bernstein claims it had only
thirty-three, while Eichhorn speaks of
some thirty men.
22 For details of the personalities
and actions of these agents provoca
teurs, see Richard Mueller, Der Buer
gerkrieg, pp. 41-46, 74-75; lllustrierte
Geschichte, pp. 280-81. R i c h a r d
Mueller also describes the wild seiz
ures of the days after January 5, for
example, the occupation of the Gov-

ernment Printing Office on January 6
and of the Railroad stations and Main
Railroad office building during the
night of January 7-8 as actions of
small groups of bona fide revolution
aries incited by agents provocateurs.
While Anton Fischer does not verify
this accusation from the left, he con
firmed the existence of a "small and
unimportant intelligence unit" under
the direction of a certain Suckow and
Lichtenstein. The unit had about forty
men. (Anton Fischer, op. cit., pp. 6668.)
23 Hermann Mueller declares that
"with the occupation of the newspaper
section [of the city], the German Revo-
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During its short life the Revolutionary Committee distin
guished itself by incredible incompetence and lack of initiative.
The only accomplishments of the committee were the creation
of a number of commissions which never became operative, the
issuance of a few proclamations, and the ordering of an unsuccess
ful attempt to seize the War Ministry. 24
The following is the first proclamation which summoned the
workers and soldiers to leave their factories and barracks and to
demonstrate again in the Siegesallee. Once more thousands of
people marched through the streets in protest against the Ebert
government and again waited in vain for further instructions from
the Revolutionary Committee.
Workers! Soldiers! Comrades!
On Sunday you demonstrated with overwhelming force your in
tention to destroy the latest malicious assault by the blood-stained
Ebert-government.
Now there are more important things in the offing! It is necessary
to stop all counterrevolutionary intrigues!
lution entered the decisive week which
was to determine everything. In the
event of a Spartakus victory, the world
would have become enriched only by
the new Soviet Republic Berlin. The
rest of the Reich would not have fol
lowed the capital. This time the
People's Commissars were determined
not to avoid the fight." (Hermann
Mueller, op. cit., p. 251.) Bernstein,
who in the early part of 1919 returned
to the fold of the SPD, did not be
lieve the assertion of Ledebour, Eich
horn, and others that the seizure of
the newspapers was the product of
revolutionary mass action without di
rection from the revolutionary leader
ship. Bernstein stated that the occu
pations of the v a r i o u s buildings
showed too much coordination in time
for spontaneous mass actions. He also
maintained that the seizure of news
papers was not as a c c i d e n t a 1 as
claimed, but was intended to silence
"inconvenient criticism." (Bernstein,

op. cit., pp. 139-40.) Oertzen blames
the occupation on groups of armed
Spartacists who acted without orders
from the leadership. (Oertzen, op.
cit., pp. 270-71.) The Vorwaerts ap
peared on January 6, 1919, as the
"organ of the revolutionary workers
of Greater Berlin." A long proclama
tion of the first morning edition is
quoted in Runkel, op. cit., pp. 205-07.
24 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 276.
Eichhorn emphasizes that there was
absolutely no central leadership for
any military action. Operations of a
military type which did occur during
the January fighting were carried out
by individual groups without coordi
nation with each other. The reason
for this situation was that "the organi
zations participating [in the uprising]
really had no intention of undertak
ing any military operations" against
the government. (Eichhorn, op. cit.,
p. 52.)
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Therefore, come out of your factories! Appear in masses this
morning at 11 a.m. in the Siegesallee!
Our task is to strengthen the revolution and bring it to fulfillment!
Forward to the fight for socialism. Forward to the fight for the power
of the revolutionary proletariat!
Down with the Ebert-Scheidemann government!
Berlin, January 6, 1919.
The Revolutionary Shop Stewards and Confidence Men of the
large factories of Greater Berlin.
The Central Committee of the Greater Berlin Social Democratic
Election Association of the Independent Social Democratic
Party.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany
( Spartacist League).25
The second proclamation was prepared for release after the
seizure of power:
Comrades! Workers!
The Ebert-Scheidemann government has compromised itself. It
is herewith declared deposed by the undersigned Revolutionary Com
mittee, the representatives of the revolutionary socialist workers and
soldiers (Independent Social Democratic Party and Communist Party).
The undersigned Revolutionary Committee has temporarily taken
over governmental affairs.
Comrades! Workers!
Join the actions of the Revolutionary Committee.
Berlin, January 6, 1919.
The Revolutionary Committee.
Liebknecht
Ledebour
Scholze26
[Liebknecht signed for the absent Ledebour]
25 Quoted in Bernstein, op. cit., p.
138.
26 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 272.
The Revolutionary Committee moved
during the night of January 5-6 from
the police headquarters to the Im
perial Stables, where it was not wel
comed by the sailors who intended' to
remain neutral in the forthcoming

fight. So on January 6, it returned to
its original location in the police build
ing. (Bernstein, op. cit., p. 150; Anton
Fischer, op. cit., p. 63.) The attempted
seizure of the War Ministry, ordered
by the Revolutionary Committee, was
a tragic-comical incident which illus
trated the total incompetence of that
committee. A sailor was placed in
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One of the best descriptions of the situation during these fate
ful days in January is a sarcastic article printed one year later in
Die Rote Fahne in reply to Ledebour's claim that he had started
the January revolution.
What happened on Monday in Berlin was perhaps the greatest
proletarian mass action in history. We do believe that not even in
Russia were there mass demonstrations of this size. From Roland to
Viktoria, proletarians were standing shoulder to shoulder. Deep into
the Tiergarten they were standing. They had brought along their
weapons, they had their red flags. They were ready to do anything, to
give everything, even their lives. There was an army of 200,000 such
as no Ludendorff had ever seen.
Then the inconceivable happened. The masses were standing from
9 in the morning in the cold and fog. Somewhere their leaders were
sitting and conferring. The fog lifted and the masses were still standing.
Their leaders conferred. Noon came and in addition to the cold, hun
ger came. And the leaders conferred. The masses were feverish with
excitement: they wanted one deed, even one word to calm their ex
citement. But nobody knew what to say. Because the leaders were
conferring. The fog came again and with it the dusk. The masses
went home sad. They wanted great things, but they had done nothing.
Because their leaders conferred. They conferred in the Imperial
Stables, then they went to the police headquarters and continued to
confer. Outside the proletarians were standing in the empty [sic]
Alexanderplatz, rifles in hand, with light and heavy machine guns.
And inside the leaders conferred. In the police headquarters guns were
ready for action; sailors were posted at every corner in the corridors;
in the anti-chamber was a milling throng of soldiers, sailors, and pro
letarians. Inside the leaders sat and conferred. They sat the entire
evening and the entire night and conferred; they sat during the next
morning. When dawn came, they either were still conferring or were
conferring again. And again the grey masses marched into the Sieges
allee, and still their leaders sat and conferred. They conferred, con
ferred, conferred.
No! These masses were not ready to take over political power,
otherwise they would have acted on their own and placed men at the
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head whose first revolutionary deed would have been to make the
leaders in the police headquarters stop conferring.27
The end of the Revolutionary Committee was as undistin
guished as its brief life. On January 8, after it had become certain
that the government was ready to take aggressive military action
against the insurgents, the Committee issued as its last deed a
leaflet ending with the empty injunctions: "Show those scoundrels
your power! Take up arms! Use these weapons against your
deadly enemies, Ebert and Scheidemann. Forward to the fight!"
On January 9, the Committee is reported to have held its last of
a series of useless meetings. 28
The "declaration of war" by the left wing radicals put the gov
ernment in a very difficult position. With the announcement of
an all-out campaign dedicated to its forceful overthrow, the SPD
government found itself with practically no military protection. 29
It turned for help to its followers among the workers. During the
night of January 5-6, a leaflet was printed calling on the workers
to come to Wilhelmstrasse, the seat of the Reich government, and
protect the Republic against the assaults from the "armed bandits
of the Spartacist League."
charge of three hundred men and or. dered to occupy the War Ministry.
Upon their arrival at the Ministry, the
sailor handed an official the written
order from the Revolutionary Com
mittee demanding the surrender of
the building. The official replied that
he was willing to comply, provided
that the sailor present him a legal
document signed by the representatives
of the new revolutionary government
who had failed to sign the paper before
the sailor went on his mission. There
upon, the sailor left his three hundred
men waiting in front of the Ministry
while he went back to the Imperial
Stables, then the seat of the Revolu
tionary Committee, to obtain the sig
natures. Liebknecht and S c h o 1 z e
signed the document for him. On the
way out of the Imperial Stables, he
overheard members of the People's

Naval Division asking revolutionary
workers to leave the building. He also
learned that the sailors had decided
not to participate in the conflict. Mak
ing the policy of the People's Naval
Division his own, he put the freshly
signed document in his pocket, forgot
about his three hundred men, and
went home; he stayed away from his
unit for eight days, reporting sick.
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg,
pp. 37-38; lllustrierte Geschichte, p.
276.)
27 Quoted in Noske, Von Kiel bis
Kapp, pp. 69-70. ("Roland" is a monu
ment standing in front of the Berlin
city hall; "Viktoria" is another desig
nation for the Siegessaeule or Victory
Column.)
28 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 275; Richard
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 75.
29 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 142; Ri-
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Workers! Citizens! Soldiers! Comrades!
The armed bandits of the Spartacist League have forcefully oc
cupied the Vorwaerts for the second time. The leaders of these bands
publicly announced again today their intention to overthrow the gov
ernment. Murder and bloody civil war and the establishment of the
Spartakus dictatorship [ are their aims]. Mortal dangers are threaten
ing the German people, especially the workers. Anarchy and hunger
will be the sequel to the Spartacist rule.
Our patience is now at an end!
We do not intend any longer to be terrorized by lunatics and
crimmals. Order must finally be established in Berlin, and the peace
ful reconstruction of the new revolutionary Germany must be secured.
We are asking you, as a sign of protest to the outrage of the Spartacist
bands, to stop working and to come immediately with your [political]
leaders to the building of the Reich government, Wilhelmstrasse 77.
Workers! Citizens! Comrades! Soldiers!
Appear in masses! Show that you are strong enough to protect
your freedom, your rights, and your party property. 30
Tens of thousands of workers followed the appeal of the Ma
jority Socialists and assembled in front of the Reich Chancellery
ready to protect their government. Scheidemann addressed the
crowd and promised them arms. 31
During the morning of January 6, the cabinet met with im
portant members of the Central Council and the Minister of War,
Colonel Reinhardt. Ebert declared that his patience with the
leftist opposition had come to an end and that the events of
January 5 must be countered by the most stringent military meas
ures if the government wished to retain any authority. Additional
troops would be needed for the suppression of the uprising.
Colonel Reinhardt proposed the employment of the Guard
Cavalry-Rifle-Division stationed in the vicinity of Berlin under
the command of General Hofmann. The government believed
chard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp.
46-57.
30 Quoted in Hermann Mueller, op.
cit., pp. 254-55.

31 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 138; Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 254-55;
Oertzen, op. cit., p. 271.
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it would be a tactical error to assign to a general the task of sup
pressing the uprising, because the workers would resent this.
Someone else had to be found. Noske was easily persuaded to ac
cept the assignment.32 He immediately set out to organize the gov
ernment's military counteraction against the left wing insurgents. 33
When the government recognized the Revolutionary Commit
tee's failure to take decisive action, it gained courage and began
vigorously to improve its over-all position which had looked so
hopeless on the morning of January 6. On the afternoon of that
day, the Berlin Executive Council- the agency which Eichhorn
recognized as his superior office- approved, twelve votes to
two, the dismissal of Eichhorn by the Prussian government, thus
adding insult to injury. (Daeuming and Richard Mueller were
the only Independent Executive Council members present. They
cast the two dissenting votes.) 3•
s2 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 256;
Bernstein, op. cit., p. 143. The famous
discussion leading to Noske's appoint
ment was reported _by him as follows:
"We were standing around in Ebert's
Office quite excited because time was
pressing and our followers in the street
clamored for arms. I demanded that
a decision be made. Somebody sug
. gested: 'Then you take over this job!'
I responded to this without hesitation:
'It's all right with me! Someone has
to become the blood hound ["hired
ruffian" or "Myrmidon"]. I will not
s h r i n k from this responsibility.' "
(Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 68.)
33 Noske was convinced that the
only reliable new troops were the sin
cere patriots, professional soldiers,
non-commissioned officers, officers,
and reservists who had not yet found
suitable civilian occupations. The so
called revolutionary military forces
such as the Republican Soldiers' Army
w e r e useless. (Noske, Erlebtes, p.
114.) On January 6, Noske left Ber
lin to assemble enough troops to
guarantee successful military opera
tions against the insurgents. He moved
into the Luisenstift at Dahlem which

for the next few days became the cen
ter for the activation of volunteer
units. Noske reported that Dahlem
looked like a "war camp" within three
days. (Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, pp.
71-72; Noske, Erlebtes, p. 84.) Noske
worked closely with General Luett
witz who had been appointed on De
cember 25, 1918, as successor to Gen
eral Lequis as Supreme Commander
of all troops stationed in and near
Berlin. For detailed information con
cerning the variety of troops assembled
under the command of "Abteilung
Luettwitz," l a t e r renamed "Army
Corps Luettwitz" ( Generalkomman
do), see Luettwitz, op. cit., pp. 22-25;
Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 272-73, 290; and
Waite, op. cit., pp. 33-39.
(The German Military term, Ab
teilung, usually refers to a military unit
of battalion strength. This was ob
viously not the case here; the unit in
question was far larger than a bat
talion. It was the designation used for
the over-all command of the new
troops, and its purpose was to conceal
its actual strength.)
34 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger
krieg, pp. 52-53. The text of the
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The military situation of the government improved with every
hour. A Social Democratic Auxiliary Service (Sozialdemokra
tischer Helferdienst) was organized and took over the protection
of the Reichstag building and the area around the Brandenburger
Tor. 35 A few troop leaders of the Berlin garrison arrived at the
seat of government and offered the services of their units. One
of them, the leader of the Potsdam troops, Klawunde, was ap
pointed as the new City Commandant, replacing Anton Fischer.
The others formed a newly-established garrison council (Kom
mandanturrat). Anton Fischer became Noske's deputy for Ber
lin. 36 As early as January 6, 1919, the mold was cast for the sub
sequent events of Spartakus Week which ended in the complete
defeat of the scattered, leaderless groups of left wing radicals.
Moderate USPD leaders of the Reich organization and some
ad hoc workers' committees offered their good offices to the gov
ernment and to the left wing USPD and Revolutionary Shop
Stewards in an attempt to settle the conflict through negotiation.
Their efforts were in vain; the preliminary discussions broke down
because neither side was willing to make significant concessions.
The radicals of the left accused the government of accepting the
offer of negotiations only to gain time for its military preparations.
The very fact that the left wing opposition would agree to nego
tiate with the government it intended to overthrow by force was
an indication of its weakness or even utter helplessness. 37
On January 8, the government began its offensive. A pro
clamation announced its determination to fight force with force.
The insurgents were warned that "the hour of reckoning" was
near.
Executive Council's approval is quoted
in ibid.
35 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 273; Richard
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 54, 7374. On January 19, 1919, the Social
Democratic Auxiliary Service became
a bona fide Free Corps which bore the
name "Regiment Reichstag" because
of the location of its headquarters.
(Luettwitz, op. cit., pp. 25-26.)

36 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger
krieg, p. 54; Anton Fischer, op. cit.,
p. 65.
37 For details on the negotiation ef
forts as seen from the SPD point of
view, consult Bernstein. op. cit., op.
140, 145-53. The position of the left
opposition is presented in Richard
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 48-60
and Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 284-85.
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Fellow-Citizens!
Spartakus is now fighting for complete power. The government,
which within ten days wants to permit the people to decide freely about
their own fate, is to be overthrown by force. The people are not per
mitted to speak; their voices are to be suppressed. You have seen the
result! Where Spartakus rules, all personal freedom and security is
suspended. The newspapers are suppressed; traffic is paralyzed. Sec
tions of Berlin are scenes of bloody fighting. Others are already with
out water and light. Food depots are stormed. The food supply for
the soldiers and civilian population is interrupted.
The government is taking all measures necessary to destroy tWs
rule of terror and to prevent its recurrence once and for all. Decisive
action will be forthcoming soon. However, it is necessary to do the
work thoroughly and tWs requires preparation. Have patience for a
little while longer. Be confident, as we are, and resolutely take your
place with those who will bring you freedom and order! Force can
be fought only with force. The organized power of the people will
end oppression and anarchy. Individual successes of the enemies of
freedom, which are magnified by them in a ridicnlous fasWon, are of
only temporary· significance.
The hour of reckoning is near!
Berlin, January 8, 1919.
The Reich Government!
Ebert, Scheidemann, Landsberg, Noske, Wissel. 38

On the same day, units of the Berlin garrison stormed a num
ber of occupied buildings and succeeded in re-capturing the Gov
ernment Printing Office, the Main Railroad Office and a railroad
station, and most of the newspaper printing plants.39
The Vorwaerts building was attacked by the Potsdam Regi
ment during the night of January 10-11. Approximately three
hundred defenders surrendered after artillery fire had caused a
Noske was greatly opposed to negoti
ations and to a compromise solution
with the insurgents because he was
convinced that an ultimate fight was
inevitable. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 84;
Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 73.)

as A photostat of the above pro
clamation is contained in lllustrierte
Geschichte, p. 277.
31:l Anton Fischer, op. cit., pp. 75-76;
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 151-54; Illus
trierte Geschichte, p. 285.
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number of casualties. The police headquarters, the last of the
strongholds of the insurgents, fell during the night of January
11-12. Most of Eichhorn's Security Force had gone over to the
government side, and less than two hundred men defended the
building against the attack by the Maikaefer Regiment.40
When Noske, leading approximately 3,000 men, marched
demonstratively into Berlin on January 11, 1919, the uprising
was all but suppressed. There still was fighting at police head
quarters and other isolated places. With the few reliable troops
of the Berlin garrison and some of their own units, such as the
Social Democratic Auxiliary Service, the government had suc
ceeded in overwhelming most of the leftist strongholds before
Noske's Free Corps arrived.41
A few days after the first volunteer units, which Noske per
sonally led into the city, had duly impressed the people of Berlin,
the final occupation of the capital was completed by the units of
Army Corps Luettwitz according to a detailed and carefully pre
pared plan.42
On January 13, Spartakus Week ended in a great fiasco for
the left wing opposition. Any further resistance was useless. The
40 Descriptions of the military events
are contained in Schmidt-Pauli, op.
cit., pp. 185-87; Runkel, op. cit., p.
213; Oertzen, op. cit., p. 277; Bern
stein, op. cit., pp. 157-64. Details of
the fightings described from the left
wing radicals' point of view are con
tained in Illustrierte Geschichte, pp.
285-92. The latter report emphasizes
the brutal treatment accorded the sur
rendered defenders and the shooting
of parliamentarians by the troops. Ma
jor Stephani, the commander of the
troops which attacked the Vorwaerts,
claimed that he had orders from the
City Commandant to shoot any cap
tives carrying arms. Stephani asserted
that this order was confirmed over the
phone from the Reich Chancellery.
(Ibid., p. 290.)
41 "The soldier decides [sic] the
game. Not General Luettwitz's Free

Corps, but the bands of undisciplined
soldiers of the Berlin and Potsdam
barracks and a few republican fighting
units assembled hastily during the last
few days [suppressed the left wing
radicals]." (Volkmann, Revolution, p.
185. See also Richard Mueller, Der
Buergerkrieg, p. 92.)
42 Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, pp.
74-75; Noske, Erlebtes, p. 84. The de
ployment order for Army Corps Luett
witz was Noske's Secret Order I A No.
10 of January 13, 1919. It is quoted
in full in Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 278-80.
Anton Fischer soon became disgusted
with Noske's troops because of their
hostility toward the Republican Sol
diers' Army. (Anton Fischer, op. cit.,
;pp. 77-78.) A good illustration of
Noske's attitude is given in a leaflet
which he had distributed the day he
entered Berlin, January 11. A photo-
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Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Berlin organization of the
USPD asked their followers to return to work. 43 The government
had succeeded in establishing its superiority - at least for the
period immediately following the bloody January events. Since
the fighting potential of the opposition of the left was crushed,
the elections to the national assembly could take place without
major disturbances and interference.
A factual evaluation of the January events supports the as
sertion that the "Spartacist Uprising" was not a premeditated
undertaking but was an outgrowth of the policy meeting of Janu
ary 5 held by the left wing factions because of the overwhelming
mass response to the Eichhorn incident. The estimate of the revo
lutionary situation arrived at by the over-optimistic radical leaders
- especially concerning the attitude of the soldiers -- was in
correct and misleading. However, there is general agreement
among contemporaneous observers that a determined leadership
could have seized political power in Berlin either on January 5
or 6. How long the revolutionaries could have retained power is
another question; it appears that, since the rest of Germany would
not have followed the example set in the capital, it would have
been only a short "council dictatorship." Because the Revolution
ary Committee was divided internally concerning its own ob
jectives, it was incapable of giving directives to the masses which
waited patiently for two days. The Revolutionary Committee de
cided to maintain the occupation of strategically and tactically
unimportant buildings instead of seizing the traditional seats of
political power, such as the Chancellery and the Ministry of War.
In this context it really did not matter if those buildings were
originally occupied by spontaneous mass actions or through the
agitation of agents provocateurs. 44
An examination of the events leading to the January fighting
does not support the assertion that the SPD government provoked
graphic copy is in Illustrierte Ges
chichte, p. 276.
43 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 270.
44 For various views concerning the

short-range possibilities of the revo
lutionary forces, see Cyril L. R. James,
World Revolutions 1917-1936 (Lon
don: Secker&Warburg, 1937),p. 101;
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the action of the left wing radicals in order to create a situation
in which the government would be justified in suppressing by
force. It was not the beginning of a contemplated all-out offensive
by the government against the opposition forces. However, once
the position of power began to change in favor of the government,
the determination to settle the basic issue with the revolutionary
trouble-makers won the upper hand. 45
The number of persons killed during the January uprising re
mains unknown. Even reliable estimates are not available.46
4. The Spartacists and the January Uprising
The attitude of the Communists toward the uprising was not
uniform. Their views toward an expansion of the mass protest
demonstration on behalf of Eichhorn into a full-scale fight for
the seizure of political power were divided as follows: ( 1 ) Karl
Liebknecht and Wilhelm Pieck, the two Central Committee mem
bers who participated in the January 5 meeting of the function
aries of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and of the Berlin USPD,
strongly endorsed the uprising. (2) Rosa Luxemburg, Leo Jo
giches, and the rest of the Central Committee of the KPD were
opposed but believed that, regardless of their views, the new KPD
had the moral obligation to support the revolutionary workers in
their life and death struggle. ( 3) Karl Radek was strictly opposed
Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 184-85;
Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 117;
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 137, 142; Noske,
Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 69; Ulbricht,
Zur Geschichte, pp. 38-39. Richard
Mueller blames the lack of initiative
displayed by the Revolutionary Com
mittee on the fact that it did not rec
ognize the weakness of the govern
ment. (Richard Mueller, Der Buerger
krieg, p. 40.)
45 It is possible that Noske for one
was pleased with the opportunity
created by the January events. They
accelerated the creation of the mili
tary instrument which he thought was
necessary to establish law and order
first in Berlin and then in the rest of

the Reich. See his statement in Noske,

Erlebtes, p. 83.

46 Bernstein claims that the exact
figure was never determined. (Bern
stein, op. cit., pp. 156-57.) Halperin
claims over one thousand casualties
for "Spartakus Week" in Berlin, but
fails to indicate on what sources he
bases his figure. (Halperin, op. cit.,
p. 122.) Stampfer stated that one hun
dred fifty-six persons were killed in
addition to Rosa Luxemburg and Lieb
knecht. (Stampfer, Die e r s t e n 14
Jahre, p. 92.) Official reports assert
that approximately two h u n d r e d
people were killed. (lllustrierte Ges
chichte, p. 292.)
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to the uprising and urgently advocated discontinuing the hopeless
fight before the revolutionary organizations suffered severe de
feats which would affect their work for a long time to come.
Liebknecht and Pieck, in siding with the advocates of the up
rising, had acted without the knowledge and approval of the
Central Committee of the KPD. Liebknecht was severely criti
cized by Rosa Luxemburg for his unilateral action. How many
of the rank and file members of the Spartacists concurred with
Liebknecht's endorsement of the all-out struggle for power is not
known. During the days of the uprising, Liebknecht spent his
time either in conferences with the Revolutionary Committee or
with the dispersed groups of entrenched insurgents. He main
tained little contact with the party leadership. On January 10,
the Central Committee finally ordered Liebknecht and Pieck not
to continue their participation in the Revolutionary Committee.
This directive was meaningless by then since the committee had
already suspended its meetings and had scattered in all di
rections.47
The attitude of most of the KPD leaders, including Rosa
Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches, toward the uprisin� was determined
by their conviction that political developments in Germany had
not reached the point where an attempt to assume power should
· be made. 48 The decision of the January 5 meeting in favor of the
all-out fight created a difficult problem for the Communist leaders.
Should the KPD support the fight of the revolutionary workers in
spite of the fact that the Central Committee did not endorse the
uprising and was certain from the beginning that the insurrection
had no real chance of realizing its objectives? Rosa Luxemburg's
views ( which doubtlessly reflected the Party's position on this
controversial issue) were related by Clara Zetkin on the basis
47 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
339, 342; Illustrierte Geschichte, p.
283; Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
253, 270. Liebknecht's actions were
certainly no indication of the policies
of the KPD during the January Up-

rising. Runkel, for example, fails to
recognize this. (Runkel, op. cit., p.
207.)
48 Oelssner, op. cit., p. 148. Cf.
above, p. 169.
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of a letter she had received from Leo Jogiches, who probably
was Rosa Luxemburg's closest collaborator during the January
days.
Rosa Luxemburg saw the events - as significant and as hopeful
as they were not from the viewpoint of the assault against the Ber
lin City Hall. She related these events to the prevailing situation and
especially to the degree of political maturity of the broad population of
all Germany. On that basis, the overthrow of the Ebert government
could be, for the time-being, only a propagandistic over-all slogan of
the revolutionary proletarians, and not the immediate objective of
revolutionary struggles. Under the prevailing circumstances related
primarily to Berlin, in the most favorable case they [ the revolutionary
fighters] could have led to a Berlin "Commune," ... The aim of the
fight could only be a strong defense against the attack of the counter
revolution. Thus the reinstatement of Eichhorn, the withdrawal of the
troops which were to subjugate the revolutionary proletariat of Berlin
in a violent manner, the arming of the workers, and the transfer of the
military command power to the revolutionary political representatives
of the proletarians - these were the demands which required action,
not negotiations.
Because of this situation, the young Communist Party led by Rosa
Luxemburg had a difficult mission, full of conflicts. It could not accept
the objective of the mass action the overthrow of the government;
it had to reject this aim, but at the same time it was not permitted to
detach itself from the masses which had taken up the fight. In spite
of this contradiction, the Party had to remain with the masses; it had
to remain among the masses to strengthen the fighters in their struggle
against the counter-revolution aad to expedite the process of their revo
lutionary maturation during the operations by making them aware of
the purpose of their struggle. Toward this end, the Communist Party
had to reveal its own aims and make known its precise estimate of
the situation without injuring the revolutionary solidarity it owed
to the fighters. . . .49
49 Quoted in Froelich, Rosa Lu
xemburg, pp. 340-41. There is very
little information available about the
formulation of KPD policies during

the uprising and none about the actual
participation of the Party or its lea
ders in the operational phase, except
a vague notion of Liebknecht's and
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Thus the Communists joined the insurgents not because they
believed that the uprising was a politically and tactically well
founded operation, but because of the obligation the Party thought
it owed to the revolutionary fighters. "Under the circumstances
there was only one decision possible for the Communist Party:
to remain with the fighters, to strengthen their power of resistance
and their courage, to be ready not only to share in their victories
but also in their defeats."50 The KPD also intended to aid the
revolutionary mass action by clarifying and limiting objectives.
The aims set by the Communists for the uprising were disarma
ment of the counterrevolution, arming of the proletariat, merger
of all revolutionary troops into a Red Guard, and new elections
for the workers' and soldiers' councils in order to bring their com
position into harmony with the changes which had occurred since
November, 1918. The overthrow of the Ebert government, the
main purpose of the uprising as determined by the Revolutionary
Committee, became the slogan and general directive for the entire
coming phase (?f the revolution. 51
The articles of Rosa Luxemburg, "What Are the Leaders
Doing?" and "Neglected Duties," in Die Rote Fahne present a
candid view of the KPD about the revolutionary implications of
. the January Uprising. They also furnish an insight into Com
munist attempts to formulate limited and reasonable objectives
and to compel the revolutionary leaders of the insurrection to
fulfill their obligations.
Those who saw yesterday's [January 6, 1919] mass demonstra
tions in the Siegesallee, who felt this adamant revolutionary conviction,
this magnificent attitude, this energy flowing from the masses, must
have reached the lfollowing] conclusions: the proletarians have grown
enormously in a political sense through the experience of the last weeks.
Pieck's activities. Froelich asserts that
a direct party influence and participa•
tion in the fighting existed, although
he admits the lack of specific informa
tion on the subject. (Ibid., p. 342.)
The sources of information for the

Party's policy formulation are re
stricted to the letter of Jogiches men
tioned above and a few articles in
Die Rote Fahne.
so lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 283.
s1 Ibid.
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They have realized their strength and lack nothing but to use their
power.
However, have their leaders, the executive organs of their will,
progressed with them? Have the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and
Confidence Men of the large factories, have the radical elements of the
USP acquired more energy and more determination in the meantime?
Has their capacity for action kept abreast of the growing energy of
the masses?
... The masses followed the call of their leaders with impetuosity.
...They are waiting for further directives and actions from their leaders.
What have the leaders done in the meantime, what have they de
cided? What measures have they taken to secure the victory of the
revolution in this tense situation during which the fate of the revolu
tion will be decided at least for the next phase? We see and hear
nothing! It may be true that the representatives of the working class
are thoroughly and abundantly conferring. However, now is the time
to act.
No time must be wasted. Thorough measures must be taken im
mediately. Clear and urgent directives must be given to the masses
and to the soldiers who remained faithful to the cause of the revolu
tion; . ..
Act! Act! Courageously, decisively, and constantly - that is the
... duty and obligation of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and of
the honest socialist party leaders. Disarm the counterrevolution, arm
the masses, and occupy all positions of power. Act quickly! ...52
...the weakness and immaturity of the revolution manifest them
selves in the questions: How does one conduct the fight to remove the
Ebert government? How does one convert this increased internal ma
turity into practical use? Nothing like the last three days have shown
so strongly these weaknesses and deficiencies.
The elimination of the Ebert-Scheidemann government does not
mean storming into the palace of the Reich Chancellery and chasing
away or arresting a few people: it means first of all to seize all real
power positions and hold on to them and make use of them.
52 Rosa Luxemburg, "Was machen
die Fuehrer?" quoted in Luxemburg,

Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 689-92.
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The experience of the last three days speaks eloquently to the
leaders of the working class: Do not talk! Do not confer forever!
Do not negotiate! Act.53

Karl Radek's opposition to the January uprising and to the
participation of the KPD in the futile attempt to seize political
power cannot be accepted as an indication of the official Soviet
attitude toward the events. It is highly doubtful that Radek had
any contact with his party during this period. His views are of
great interest because they can be cited as proof that the Bol
sheviks did not incite the German revolutionary leaders to the
uprising contrary to the assertions of Edward Bernstein.54 On
the basis of the information available to this writer, at the be
ginning of January, Radek was the only official representative of
the Bolsheviks in Berlin. As has been said, he shared the belief
of Rosa Luxemburg and her associates that the time for the all
out struggle for power had not yet come. He added authority to
this conviction because of his reputation among the Communists
as an experien�ed revolutionary tactician. On January 6, he de
clared his opposition to the decision of the January 5 meeting.
On the 9th, he addressed a letter to the Central Committee of the
KPD in which he requested that the Party use its influence upon
. the Revolutionary Committee and the proletarian masses to cease
the insurrection immediately. fie offered the following reasons
for his request:
In your program pamphlet, "What Does the Spartacist League
Want?", you explain that you intend to take over the government only
when you have the majority of the working class behind you. This
absolutely correct stand finds its justification in the simple fact that a
government of the workers is unthinkable without an existing prole
tarian mass organization. At present, the only mass organizations to
be considered, the workers' and soldiers' councils, are of only nominal
strength....In this situation, one cannot even consider the proletariat's
53 Rosa Luxemburg, "Versaeumte
Pflichten," quoted in Luxemburg, Aus
gewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 693-97.

54 Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 139-40.
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taking over political power. If the government should fall into your
hands as the result of a coup d'etat, within a few days it would be cut
off from the rest of the country and would be strangled.
In this situation, the action taken by the Revolutionary Shop
Stewards in response to the attack of the social-patriotic government
against the police headquarters, should have been only a protest action.
The advance guard of the proletariat - provoked by government
policy and misled by the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, who as the
result of their political inexperience are not capable of understanding
the power relation throughout the entire Reich - has in its enthusiasm
transformed the protest demonstration into a struggle for political
power. This enables Ebert and Scheidemann to strike a blow against
the Berlin movement which can weaken the entire movement for
months. The only force which can prevent this disaster is you, the
Communist Party. You have sufficient insight to know that the fight
is hopeless; ... Nothing can prevent a weaker [power J from retreating
before a superior force. 55

Shortly after the last skirmishes ended, Rosa Luxemburg
evaluated the events of Spartakus Week. In her article "Order
Rules in Berlin" (Die Ordnung herrscht in Berlin), she explained
that a victory of the proletarians - the overthrow of the Ebert
government and the establishment of a socialist dictatorship could not be expected because of the political immaturity of the
German Revolution. The fact that the soldiers, most of whom
were from rural areas which were hardly affected by the revolu
tion, could be used for suppressing the revolutionary workers was
for Rosa Luxemburg one of the significant symptoms of the
general political immaturity of Germany. Under these circum
stances a victory of the working class was impossible.
55 Quoted in lllustrierte Geschichte,
p. 282. See also Radek's letter writ
ten from prison after the January up
rising to Alfons Paquet, the well
known German writer and newspaper
correspondent of the Frt1nkfurter Zei
tung who was stationed in Moscow
during 1918. Radek strongly empha-

sized in this letter his opposition to
the uprising. He also explained that
the KPD was not an effective party
and had no control over the masses a situation different from that of the
Bolsheviks in Russia. Therefore, the
KPD could neither prevent nor stop
the bloody fighting as, for example,
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... A final and lasting victory in this moment could not be ex
pected. Was, therefore, the fight of the last week a "mistake"? Yes,
if it had been an intentional "assault," a so-called "putsch." However,
what was the cause of the fighting of the past week? As in all previous
instances ... it was a brutal provocation of the government! ... The
revolutionary working class was forced to take up arms. It was a
matter of revolutionary honor to repel immediately the assault [ of the
counterrevolution] .... 56

Rosa Luxemburg emphasized that the suppression of the
January Uprising was only a defeat in one single engagement,
and she predicted that the next day the revolution would proclaim:
"I was, I am, I shall be!" 5'
Liebknecht was of the same mind. The uprising was defeated
because "the time was not ripe" for it. This could not be helped
because the workers had not chosen to start the fight. "The fight
was forced on the proletariat by the Ebert-gang." 58
Indeed, it was a strange twist of history which gave the Janu
ary Uprising the name of that left wing opposition group within
the German socialist movement which officially had nothing to
do with starting the insurrection and which became connected
with it only to maintain "proletarian solidarity." If the January
Uprising must be identified at all with a left-wing faction, then the
Revolutionary Shop Stewards, whose functionaries voted unani
mously for it, should be first in line for this "honor."59

5.

The Aftermath
The uprising in Berlin did not remain a completely isolated
event. Radical groups of the left in several German cities followed
the example set in the capital. Newspaper plants were occupied
by "revolutionary workers" in Brunswick, Dortmund, Duesselthe Bolsheviks were able to do during
a hopeless uprising in Petrograd in
July of 1917. (Alfons Paquet, Der
Geist der russischen Revolution [Leip
zig: Wolf Verlag, 1919], pp. viii-ix.)
56 Rosa Luxemburg, "Die Ordnung
herrscht in Berlin," quoted in Luxem-

burg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp.
709-1 I.
51 Ibid., pp. 712-14.
58 Karl Liebknecht, "Trotz alle
dem!" quoted in Liebknecht, Ausge
waehlte Reden, pp. 526-30.
59 Professor Bergstraesser regards
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dorf, Nuremberg, Hamburg, and Wolfenbuettel (Lower Sa
xony). In Duesseldorf, the workers' and soldiers' council seized
power. A Soviet republic was proclaimed in Bremen. Armed
revolutionaries seized the city hall and the banks in Delmenhorst
(Lower Saxony). A general strike broke out in the Ruhr. Vio
lent skirmishes occurred in many other places throughout the
Reich. But none of these proved to be serious challenges for the
authorities. Local security forces, such as police detachments or
small military units, suppressed the individual revolts before they
were able to advance very far. 00
After the arrival of Noske's Free Corps in Berlin, a clean-up
operation began. Its objectives were to crush the organizations
of the left wing radicals and to disarm the civilian population by
confiscating all unauthorized weapons. The brutal methods used
by the volunteer units during the days following the January Up
rising gave Germany a preview of the coming Noske campaign
of re-establishing "law and order" throughout the country. 61
The violent Anti-Spartakus offensive did not decrease in in
tensity even after the end of hostilities. The revolutionary leaders,
especially Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Karl Radek,
became major targets.62 Georg Ledebour and Ernst Meyer had
the January Uprising as a putsch in
stigated by the Revolutionary Shop
Stewards of the large Berlin factories
and joined by the Communists in spite
of their better judgment. (Bergstraes
ser, op. cit., p. 207.)
60 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 28182. See, for example, the description
by Keil of the planned revolt in Stutt
gart and its suppression by the security
forces of the local provisional govern
ment. (Keil, op. cit., pp. 136-37.)
61 Hugo Haase, the leader of the
USPD. described the general situation
in Berlin in a letter as follows: " ...
You cannot imagine the conditions in
Berlin. White terror rages exactly as
it did under the tzarist regime. Even
under the Anti-Socialist Law, at lea�t
an attempt was made to make it ap
pear that the law was followed. At

present, however, brutal force rules
in the open. Disregarding any legal
restrictions, soldiers - government
troops - with loaded rifles break into
apartments at night, make arrests
without warrants, and search the
apartments without court orders. In
the apartment of Oskar Cohn [a lead
ing member of the USPD] a house
search was made the day before yes
terday. He escaped being arrested
only because he was out of town. His
property was confiscated. Landsberg,
Ebert, and Scheidemann, who try to
pose as the guardians of the law, let
the hordes of brutal soldiers (Solda
teska) do as they like.... " (Haase, op.
cit., pp. 173-74; letter dated January
16. 1919, addressed to "Else.")
G2 On January 13, 1919, the Vor
waerts printed the following poem
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been arrested as early as January 9 in the latter's apartment. Leo
Jogiches and Hugo Eberlein were apprehended when troops, fol
lowing the re-capture of the Vorwaerts building, sacked the
offices of the KPD in Friedrichsstrasse. Emil Eichhorn was in
hiding for several days and then managed to escape by car into
Brunswick.63
On January 15, 1919, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht,
and Wilhelm Pieck were captured in the apartment of friends
living in Wilmersdorf, a residential section of Berlin, by members
of the local "Citizen Guard." They were turned over to the
Guard-Cavalry-Rifle-Division which had its headquarters at the
Hotel Eden. On that same day, Liebknecht and Rosa Luxem
burg were brutally murdered by the members of this division.
Both were clubbed and shot to death and Rosa Luxemburg's body
was thrown into a canal running through Berlin. Her body was
written by Artur Zickler:
Many hundred dead are lying in
a row
Proletarians!
Iron, powder, and lead do not ask
if a person belong to the right, to
the left, or to Spartakus,
Proletarians!
Who has brought violence into
the streets,
Proletarians?
Who first took up arms
and relied on their results?
Spartakus!
Many hundred dead are lying in
a row
Proletarians!
Karl, Radek, Rosa and
companions none of them is there, none of
them is there!
Proletarians!
(Quoted in Illustrierte Geschichte,
p. 293.)
A reward of 10,000 Marks was
offered by the "Association for Com
batting Bolshevism" for information
leading to the arrest of Radek. A pho•
tograph of a wall poster announcing
this reward is contained in ibid., p.

-

265. The Volkswehr, organ of the Ber
lin Volunteer Corps, printed the fol
lowing announcement on January 14,
1919:
"Berlin, January 13. The fear has
been expressed that the government
would relax its persecution of the Spar•
tacists. We have been assured by in
fluential circles that the achievements
made so far are not considered as
satisfactory and that all energy will
be used to proceed against the Spar
tacists and the leaders of the move•
ment. The people of Berlin need not
believe that the leaders, who for the
time being have evaded arrest, will be
able to enjoy life elsewhere. The next
days will show that the situation has
become critical for them." (Quoted in
ibid., p. 296.)
63 For details of the arrest of Le
debour and Meyer, see Bernstein, op.
cit., p. 164; Richard Mueller, Der
Buergerkrieg, p. 71; lllustrierte Ge
schichte, pp. 286-87. For Jogiches' and
Eberlein's arrest, see Froelich, Rosa
Luxemburg, p. 345. Jogiches was re
leased but re-arrested again and mur
dered in the police prison on March
10 by a plain-clothes man named Tam-
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not found until the end of May. Pieck's escape without being
harmed by the troops has caused considerable speculation. 64
schick; the same man also shot the
former leader of the People's Naval
Division, Dorrenbach, when he "at
tempted to escape." (Ibid., p. 351-52.
Also see Anton Fischer, op. cit., p.
62.) Eichhorn's escape is mentioned
in Bernstein, op. cit., p. 164. Radek
eventually was arrested by government
troops on February 17, 1919, when he
attended a meeting of the "Red Sol
diers' League." (Stuemke, op. cit., p.
206.)
64 The Communists c Ia i m that
Pieck convinced Captain Pabst of the
Guard-Cavalry-Rifle-Division that he
was really somebody else. He alleged
ly was transferred to a jail from which
he managed to escape. (lllustrierte
Geschichte, p. 298; see also Fritz Er
penbeck, Wilhelm Pieck [B e r Ii n :
Dietz Verlag, 1952], pp. 99-101.)
Since Wilhelm Pieck is a prominent
contemporary political figure in the
Communist world - he is President
of the "German Democratic Republic"
- Erich Wollenberg's report of this
incident is interesting. A G e r m a n
Communist leader, Hans Kippenber
ger, who was in charge of the "Under
ground Military Apparatus" of the
KPD from 1928 to 1935, was ordered
in 1930 by the leader of the KPD,
Ernst Thaelmann, to investigate the
Pieck incident of January, 1919. Pieck
allegedly was a Ir e a d y standing up
against a wall to be shot when he re
quested to see an officer alone. This
request was granted and subsequently
Pieck was permitted to leave the Eden
Hotel with a letter of protection signed
by the intelligence officer of the
Guard-Cavalry-Rifle Division. A 11
this occurred prior to the murder of
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. The
results of Kippenberger's investigation
were never published or made known.
After the arrest of Thaelmann in
March, 1933, Jonny Scheer took over
the leadership of the Party, and after
Scheer was taken into custody by the

Gestapo, Walter Ulbricht - the pres
ent Secretary General of the Socialist
Unity Party of Eastern Germany ascended to the Party's leadership. He
ordered the headquarters of the "Un
derground Military Apparatus" to be
moved abroad. Its central office was
o r g a n i ze d in Paris. Kippenberger
moved to Paris in 1934.
Great differences developed between
Ulbricht and Kippenberger. Ulbricht
ordered that Trotskyites and other op
positional Communists be denounced
to the Gestapo in order to put them
out of the way. When Kippenberger
refused to relay this order, Ulbricht
relieved him of his functions and sent
him to Moscow to report. There, Kip
penberger was arrested in 1936 by the
Russian Secret Police and upon the
request of Wilhelm Pieck, who from
1934 on had been the representative
of the KPD leadership with the Com
munist International, was liquidated
by a shot in the neck. The elimination
of Kippenberger was a welcome de
velopment for Pieck who thereby eli
minated a person who knew too much
about him. (Wollenberg, op. cit., pp.
576-78.)
The text of the official government
announcement about Liebknecht's and
Luxemburg's murders is quoted in
Runkel, op. cit., pp. 217-20. Accord
ing to this announcement, Liebknecht
was shot when he tried to escape and
Luxemburg was lynched by the angry
masses in front of the Eden Hotel. On
January 17, the USPD organ Freiheit
challenged this version. (See ibid., pp.
220-22.) Later, the USPD published
a pamphlet containing the facts of the
investigation about the murder as well
as the trial held against the murderers.
(Freiheit, Der Mord an Karl Lieb
knecht und Rosa Luxemburg [Berlin:
Verlagsgenossenschaft ' ' F r e i h e i t, ' '
1920].) For example, the Majority
Socialist version is presented in Her
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 271-79 and
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When the news of the murder of the two leading Commuruscs
became known, the leaders of the USPD and the Central Com
mittee of the KPD called the workers to a general strike in Berlin.
The response to this summons for a protest demonstration was
very poor. It came too close on the heels of the January defeat
which had temporarily diminished the fighting strength of Berlin's
workers.65
The death of these two outstanding Communist leaders was
of great significance not only for the immediate future of the
KPD but was of even greater importance for its long-run develop
ment. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg might have been
able to prevent the Russian Bolsheviks from becoming the con
trolling power of the German Communist movement. 06
In the middle of January, the Majority Socialist government
appeared outwardly as the unquestionable victor of the fight with
the left wing radicals. In truth, the January events made "the
Ebert government even more dependent on the Army than be
fore, and wh�n the National Assembly met at Weimar on
February 6, 1919, it was under the protection of Maercker's
bayonets."67 It has been repeatedly asserted, therefore, that the
real victors were the political reactionary forces, represented by
the confessedly anti-republican Free Corps and the remnants of
regular units, upon which the SPD leaders had primarily relied
in suppressing the revolutionary left wing opposition. The pat
tern set in Berlin was soon followed in many other parts of
Germany.ea
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 165-71. Repre
sentative Communist accounts can be
found in Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 150-55
and lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 292307. Oertzen's version of the incident
is based on his own investigation. He
completely exonerates the officers of
the Guard-Cavalry-Rifle-Division; oth
erwise his version comes very close to
that of the leftist opposition. (Oertzen,
op. cit., pp. 284-89.)
e5 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger
krieg, p. 83.

66 Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 205, and
James, op. cit., p. 102.
07 Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 37.
Wheeler-Bennett means here under
"Army" not the regular army units,
but the newly founded Free Corps
which were commanded by national
istic former imperial officers.
68 Waite claims that the Free Corps
were strongly supported by industry
and landed interests. The political
and financial independence of the Free
Corps was convincingly demonstrated

.
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when many of these volunteer units
refused to join the Provisional Reichs
wehr (Germany Army), which was
formed on March 6, 1919. Most of the
Free Corps preferred to maintain their
independence. One year later, in
March, 1920, these forces staged the
ill-fated Kapp-Luettwitz Putsch which
attempted to overthrow the Weimar
Constitution and government and put

a military dictatorship in its place.
(Waite, op. cit., pp. 78, 137, 140-67,
189-90.) Waite presents in the ap
pendix of his book (pp. 285-96) a
long roster of Free Corps leaders who
played significant parts in both the
Free Corps Movement and in the fu
ture Nazi Party or its military or
ganizations, the SA and SS. (See also
Ebenstein, op. cit., p. 196.)
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The Revolution
in Retrospect

Throughout the inter-war period, the November Revolution
and the January Uprising remained highly controversial issues
between the German socialists and Communists, since both sides
considered these events as having determined to a very large de
gree the further development of the German labor movement and
the nature of the Weimar Republic. The Communists continued
to accuse the SPD leaders of having consciously betrayed the
revolution and of having cooperated closely with the reactionary
forces in willfully suppressing the revolutionary workers. The
SPD leaders insisted that the Communists' putschist activities had
forced them to defend their own revolutionary concepts.
The Communists considered the actions of the Majority So
cialists as the primary cause for the failure of the German Revo
lution. The actions and concepts of the Spartacists also became
the targets of Communist criticism. The Spartacists were ac
cused of having neglected organizational work among the work
ers in spite of the fact that Lenin himself had urged Rosa Lu
xemburg to break with the reformists of the socialist movement. 1
1 Lenin allegedly pressed the Spar
tacists to break with the USPD, but
Rosa Luxemburg refused to do so.
Then the Communists accused Rosa
Luxemburg of failing to understand
the necessity of creating an organiza
tion with clearly defined principles
and aims, which could have served as

a collecting point for revolutionary
workers who were discontented with
the Social Democratic Parties. (James,
op. cit., p. 96. See also Ulbricht, Der
Zusammenbruch, p. 6.) The Com
munists' claim that Lenin had advo
cated the split of the Second Interna
tional and of the European Social
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The Communists asserted that this fateful omission was the reason
why the German revolutionary workers were left without the
leadership of a genuinely Marxist-Leninist party. The self
criticism, practiced by the Communists, also served to convince
the KPD members of the absolute superiority of Bolshevik con
cepts upon which the successful Russian Revolution was based
over the ideological misconceptions introduced by Rosa Luxem
burg into the German party. The Communists claimed that not
until 1925, when Ernst Thaelmann ascended to the leadership
of the KPD, was the Party finally able to acquire a genuine
Marxist-Leninist character.2
After World War II, the German Communists, primarily in
the Soviet Zone of Occupation, undertook a new analysis of the
November Revolution of 1918. Otto Grotewohl, one of the
leading functionaries of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany .
Democratic parties before 1914 is
repudiated by Paul Froelich, who re
ported that the · Russian Party his
torian Sluzki found that Lenin did
nothing of the kind. Lenin allegedly
did not support the fight of the Ger-.
man radical left against the SPD Cen
ter of Kautsky whom he regarded then
as the leading socialist theorist. Sluzki
claimed that it was Stalin's idea to use
Lenin as the authority for the concept
of splitting the European labor move
ments. Sluzki was liquidated in the
Great Purge of 1936 to 1938. (Paul
Froelich, "Wie die SED Rosa Luxem
burg ehrt," Der Kochel-Brief [Ober
bayern: January-February, 1953], p.
7.)
2 Matern, op. cit., p. 13. Thaelmann
was credited with eliminating the rem
nants of "Luxemburgism" in the KPD,
the name given to the heresy of the
followers of Rosa Luxemburg, Oelss
ner considers "Luxemburgism" as a
variation of S o c i a I Democratism.
(Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 212-13.) Lu
xemburg's mistakes were summarized
by Thaelmann in 1932 as follows:
"We must frankly state that in all

questions in which Rosa Luxemburg
held an opinion different from that of
Lenin, her opinion was wrong; there
fore, the entire group of German left
wing radicals in the period before and
during the war remained, in clarity
and revolutionary steadfastness, con
siderably behind that of the Bolshe
viks.
"Only this knowledge gives us an
understanding of why the split between
revolutionary M a r x i s m and petit
bourgeois opportunism or its Centrist
accomplices within the labor move
ment came so late in Germany. Rosa
Luxemburg's invalid concepts of the
theory of accumulation [of capital],
the agrarian question, the nationality
issue, the questions concerning prob
lems of the revolution, the question
of the proletarian dictatorship, the
question concerning organization, the
problems related to the role of the
party, respectively to the spontaneity
of the masses - all resulted in a series
of blunders, which prevented Rosa
Luxemburg from reaching the clarity
Lenin did." (This is a quote from
Ernst Thaelmann, Der revolutionaere
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( SED) ,3 explained the "compelling reasons" for a study of the
revolution of 1918:
A thorough examination of the German November Revolution of
1918, its causes, its objectives, and its effects is of urgent necessity for
the German working class. [The analysis of the revolution] not only
satisfies historical interest but is of the greatest current political sig
nificance because it provides doctrines for the further struggle.
The German labor movement - and thereby the entire German
people - today faces tasks similar to those facing it in 1918 ....4
A resolution of the Executive Committee of the SED, issued
on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the 1918-19 Revolution
on September 16, 1948, formulated the purpose of the study of
the November Revolution as follows:
The historical development after 1918 and the horrible catastrophe
of 1945 which stood at the end of this development, demands that
we occupy ourselves with the causes, objectives, and effects of the
November Revolution in order to draw lessons from these experiences
for our further struggle and to protect the German working class from
once more following the same incorrect and therefore disastrous road.
It is necessary to understand completely the background, the
course, and the effects of the November Revolution in order to draw
from it the essential lessons. A thorough study of these issues will
assist us to train the Party within the spirit of Marxism and Leninism.
Therefore, the Party's Executive Committee assigns the entire Party
Ausweg und die KPD [Berlin, 1932],
pp. 71-72, quoted in Oelssner, op. cit.,
p. 214.}
3 The German term for the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany is Sozialis
tische Einheitspartei Deutsch/ands. Its
abbreviation SED will be used here
after. The SED came into existence
at a joint congress of the SPD and
KPD of the Soviet Zone. The formal
announcement of the merger of the
two parties and of the formation of
the SED was made on April 21, 1946.
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-

lands, Dokumente der Sozialistischen
Einheitspartei Deutsch/ands [Berlin:
Deitz Verlag, 1952], I, pp. 5-10, [here
after cited as SED, Dokumente].)
Otto Grotewohl, referred to above,
was one of the left wing SPD pro
tagonists of the merger. He was the
chairman of the SPD of the Soviet
Zone before the merger. Afterwards,
he became the second secretary of the
SED. Since 1949 he has been Prime
Minister of the German Democratic
Republic.
• Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 9.
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the task of studying the lessons of the November Revolution at con
ferences, in meetings, and in educational courses, on the basis of these
directives. A correct knowledge of the lessons of the November Revo
lution of 1918 and of the Weimar Republic is a prerequisite for the
creation of a party of the new type. 5
Thus, the analysis of the revolution, allegedly serving the pur
pose of discovering the major causes for its failure, enabled the
SED to claim in its propaganda that the new party was basing
its contemporary program on these "scientific" findings. Many
of the premises upon which this analysis was based were arbitrary
assumptions ascribed by the Communists to the post-World War
I situation whether they corresponded to the actual conditions or
not. For example, the SED reported the demands of the Spar
tacist League as being those made by the German soldiers and
workers and created thereby the false impression that the "broad
masses" expected the following fundamental changes:
(a) Immediate establishment of a close alliance with the [Rus
siaµ] Soviet Republic in order to provide the German Revo
lution with a broad international basis and to create a
counter-weight to the imperialism of the Entente;
(b) immediate cessation of hostilities on all fronts and punish
ment of persons responsible for having brought about the
war and of war criminals;
(c) destruction of the Junker-bourgeois state apparatus, and es
tablishment of the rule of the workers' and soldiers' councils;
(d) completion of the middle-class revolution by confiscating
large landed estates and by transforming it into a socialist
revolution [ as part of] the struggle for the political rule of
the working class;
(e) assumption of control by the people of the large factories,
banks and loan-banks, concerns, trusts, and mines as a pre
requisite for the socialist revolution.
None of these demands was realized in the 1918 revolution in
spite of the fact that the broad masses clamored for these measures
5

SED, Dokumente, II, p. 107.
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and the vanguard of the working class conducted heroic fights for
their realization.6

The SED practice of building on false premises was most
likely little more than a convenient tool in their conscious attempt
to falsify the facts to make them fit preconceived propaganda
patterns. It is also possible, however, that the Communist leaders
were deceiving themselves and had become captives of their own
system of re-interpreting history. Regardless of the motivation,
the end product of the SED's evaluation of the revolutionary
events of 1918-19 is of extreme interest because it provides an
insight into a number of current problems, e.g., the problem of
the unity of the working class, the present role of the SPD, and
the "dangers" which "U.S. imperialism" holds for the revolution
ary proletariat.
According to the Communists, the most important lesson
learned from their investigation of the German Revolution was
that to be victorious the working class must be united and must
be led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party. Contemporary
Communist leaders stress that the German Revolution confirmed
that the left wing radicals should have broken with the "op
portunists and reformists" of the SPD before World War I. Wal
ter Ulbricht expressed this view as follows:
The class struggle which increased in intensity from the beginning
of the imperialist period called for an organization which was capable
of leading the working class to victory under these new conditions.
The creation of a revolutionary party of the working class was the
order of the day in Germany as in all capitalist countries. 7
6 Ibid., p. 115.
7 Ulbricht, Der Zusammenbruch, p.
7. Oelssner, one of the leading SED
theorists, considers the failure of the
German left wing to sever relations
with the "opportunists" and its failure
to found a revolutionary party as its
"greatest historic guilt." These errors
left the masses to the continued influ
ence of t h e "opportunist" leaders.

(Oelssner, op. cit., p. 84.) Otto Grote
wohl emphasizes that approval of the
war appropriations by the SPD lead
ers on August 4, 1914, should have
made it obvious to the radical social
ists that the German workers lacked
a revolutionary Marxist party to guide
them in their future struggle. (Grote
wohl, op. cit., p. 53.)

203

204

THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF

1919

In the opinion of the Communists, there was a definite and
direct correlation between the failure of the German Revolution
of 1918-19 and the lack of a revolutionary Marxist party. 8
Another aspect of the organizational problem of the German
labor movement which was greatly influenced by the November
Revolution - the complex problem of the unification of the
divided working class - can be treated here only in a cursory
manner.
As has been pointed out before, the bloody fighting during
and after the November Revolution resulted in a deep cleavage
within the German labor movement. 9 The Communists believed
that the German workers were dissatisfied with a divided labor
movement, which resulted in a considerable weakening of their
position in relation to other social classes and political forces.
The KPD proposed to capitalize on this alleged discontent by
posing as the protagonists of a re-united labor movement, and
thus theoretically increase its influence among the working class.
Throughou! the period of the Weimar Republic, the Com
munists shifted their tactics directed at the unification of the Ger
man working class. At times, the Party pursued the policy of
forming a united front from above by attempting to reach an
. agreement with the leadership of the SPD on the basis of a spe
cific action program. At other times, they appealed directly to
the Social Democratic workers, inviting them _to join a united
front, in spite of their leaders' refusal to make common cause
with the KPD against the growing dangers of German Fascism.
This policy was referred to among the Communists as the united
8 SED, Dokumente, II, p. 117; Ma
tern, op. cit., p. 13; Ulbricht, Zur Ge
schichte, pp. 39-40, 48; Karl Radek,

Die Entwicklung der Weltrevolution

{Moscow: Westeuropaeisches Sekre
tariat der Kommunistischen Interna
tionale, 1920), p. 21. See also the
book Der Einfluss der russischen Fe

bruarrevo/ution und der Grossen So
zia/istischen Oktoberrevolution auf die
deutsche Arbeiterklasse, by the re-

search assistant of the Marx-Engels
Lenin-Stalin Institutes in East Berlin,
Klaus Mammach, which was published
late in 1955.
9 During the period of the Weimar
Republic, the two major socialist par
ties were the SPD and the KPD. The
USPD, which had played an important
part during the Revolution and short
ly thereafter, split in October of 1920.
Its leaders and members eventually
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front from below. 10 Both the united front from above and below
(such as the Communist sponsored Anti-Fascist Front) failed
to attain their avowed objective of bringing the workers of both
parties closer together. This was due, in part at least, to the fact
that the KPD appeared to have been primarily interested in utiliz
ing the "nonpartisan socialist combat organization" as a means
of alienating the Social Democratic workers from their leaders,
whom the Communists referred to as Social Fascists.
That the divided German socialist movement facilitated the
growth of Nazi Fascism is generally accepted as valid. The Com
munists blame the split of the labor movement entirely on the
SPD. A post-World War II Communist view indicates that same
hatred:
The victory of Fascism in Germany was not inevitable. The im
perialist finance capital was able to bring the Fascist war party into
power because of the Social Democracy's policy of division [ of the
German labor movement] . The lessening of the split of the working
class and the creation of a unity among the workers on a revolutionary
basis were prerequisites for the prevention of a Fascist victory. Under
the leadership of Ernst Thaelmann, the KPD fought ceaselessly for
this aim. The Social Democracy prepared the road for Fascism and
is therefore responsible for the defeat of the German working class. 11
Not even the Hitler period put an end to the antagonism be
tween the two rival workers' parties, which were then forced unjoined either the SPD or the KPD.
(Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 70; Matern,
op. cit., pp. 12-13.)
10 The first KPD attempt to form a
united front from above was made as
early as January, 1921. The SPD lead
ers refused the offer possibly because
they either recognized the real inten
tions of the Communists or they be
lieved that the KPD was then too small
and insignificant to deal with. How
ever, not all Communist offers in the
following years were rejected. For
example, in 1922 the KPD succeeded
in forming a united front with the

SPD for a short time. (Flechtheim, op.
cit., pp. 72, 83.) For information
about the discussion within the KPD
about their different united front tac
tics, see ibid., pp. 85-87. A third meth
od of re-uniting the German labor
movement would have been organiza
tional unity, the merger of both par
ties. However, this could not be ac
complished on a voluntary basis as
long as the members of the two work
ers' parties remained loyal to their re
spective organizations.
11 Matern, op. cit., p. 7.
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derground. They continued to accuse each other of having brought
on the catastrophe which had befallen the German people, es
pecially the workers. Among the emigres the old hostilities con
tinued with unrelenting vigor. 12 However, many of the rank:-and
file members of both illegal parties, who were persecuted by the
Gestapo and frequently suffered side by side in the Nazi concen
tration camps, came to believe that a united working-class party
would be to the advantage of the workers.
When a Socialist Unity Party was founded in the Soviet Zone
of Occupation after the war, under the sponsorship of the KPD
and the Soviet Military Administration, this party was primarily
the product of Communist pressure exerted by the KPD and the
Soviet authorities. However, there were a number of left wing
SPD leaders and many Social Democratic workers in the Eastern
Zone who welcomed a unified socialist party because they saw
in the merger an important and desirable strengthening of the
German labor movement. Otto Grotewohl's views on this sub
ject are as follc:>ws:
After the destruction of Hitler Fascism in 1945, virtually no one
believed it possible or desirable to return to the era of fratricide in the
German labor movement. On the contrary, among the masses of
workers and employees, the conviction of the need for both workers'
parties to act in harmony was widespread. From this conviction, the
will developed [ to move] from common action to common organiza
tion. The desire for unity was at first a natural reflex of the German
working class from the dreadful and inhuman twelve-year Hitler
period, and it corresponded to the pure class feeling of the German
worker. The task of the present Socialist Unity Party of Germany,
which united both workers' parties in the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
consists in transforming the natural class feeling into a Marxist class
consciousness. 13
12 It is reported that Communist
functionaries resorted to such incred
ible moves in their fight to eliminate
Social Democratic influence among
the workers as to denounce SPD un-

derground leaders to the G e r m a n
Secret Police. Cf. above, p. 195, n.
64, referring to the same practice, but
directed against Communist elements.
13 Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 134-35.
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The SEO resolution referred to above summarizes the ex
periences of the November Revolution as they relate to the issue
of the unity of the working class:
The experiences of the November Revolution of 1918 and of the
Weimar Republic teach that only the working class is capable of lead
ing the masses in the struggle for a democratic system and for social
ism. The renunciation of this important role by the working class
leads without fail to the destruction of democracy and to the rule of
imperialistic reaction. . . .
In the East Zone, the class-conscious Social Democrats and Com
munists kept the oath which, under the Hitler regime, they took in
prisons, in concentration camps, and in the illegal resistance move
ment: to end once and for all the division of the labor movement.
The working class has become considerably stronger by overcoming
the split and has thereby gained for itself decisive influence for its
further development. The present task is to establish the unity of the
working class ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Ideo
logical compromises are not permissible. Only in this manner can
the working class realize its leading role.
The experience of the November Revolution of 1918 and of the
Weimar Republic teaches that the working class cannot be victorious
without a party which understands the necessity of mobilizing and
organizing the class and masses for the revolutionary struggle and of
leading them in this fight to victory. It must be a party which unites
The same developments also took
place in the satellite countries. In Po
land and the Balkan countries, the
Soviet authorities "promoted" the mer
ger of the Socialist and Communist
parties following "liberation" by the
Red Army. A short time after the
fusion, the Social Democratic com
ponents lost their entire influence and
for all practical purposes, the new par
ties were continuations of the former
Communist parties under different
names. Also in these instances, a num
ber of the left wing Social Democratic
leaders actively supported the Com
munist endeavor of creating "unity

parties." Whether these Social Demo
crats acted under pressure, or were
fearful that the Social Democratic
movement would be stamped out, or
were opportunists, or were genuinely
ideologically convinced cannot be de
termined on the basis of the material
available. Among the leading Social
Democrats who advocated the fusion
of the Socialist and Communist par
ties were Zdenek Fierlinger of Czecho
slovakia, Arpad Szakasits of Hungary,
and Dimitri Neikov of Bulgaria. (An
drew Gyorgy, Governments of Danu
bian Europe [New York: Rinehart &
Co., 1949], pp. 43-44.)
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the best elements of the working class, which stands on the revolution
ary theories of Marxism and Leninism, and which insists on strict
discipline based on the conviction of all members. It must be a party
which is built on the principle of democratic centralism; in which,
through the use of criticism and self-criticism, all hostile and harmful
elements are eliminated; and which, through its own example, gains the
sympathy of the broad masses of the working people and understands
how to win the majority of both the working class and toilers. The
absence of such a party in 1918 was the decisive reason for the defeat
of the revolutionary working class.
Therefore the most important lesson learned from the November
Revolution of 1918 is to make our Socialist Unity Party into a revo
lutionary fighting party based on Marxism and Leninism. H

The merger of the two German labor parties was, as far as the
Communists were concerned, an extremely important achieve
ment of the period following the defeat of the Nazis. It assured
them control of the labor movement and thereby greatly facili
tated the establishment of an indigenous administration com
pletely subservient to the Soviet government.
SED propaganda efforts to discredit the SPD have also made
considerable use of the lessons learned from the analysis of the
, November Revolution. According to the SED resolution, the
SPD leaders refused to learn from the grim experiences of the
past and continued to pursue the very policies which brought
disaster to the German working class. 15
... In West and South Germany, with the active assistance of
the Western occupation powers, the same disastrous policy, like that
of 1918, is being followed again. Under the leadership of Schumacher
and Ollenhauer, the SPD has adopted anew the same fatal policies of
the leaders of 1918. The right wing SPD leaders in West Germany
14 SED, Dokumente, II, pp. 122-24.
The SED resolution repeats the
traditional Communist accusations
against the SPD, beginning with the
assertion that the SPD leaders had
15

caused the fateful split of the German
labor movement by their actions of
supporting the imperialist war and the
Imperial German government. (Ibid.,
pp. 112, 115, 117.)
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and in Berlin are full of the same blind hate against the Soviet Union
as were the leaders of 1918. They continue with the greatest zeal the
Nazis' lie campaign against the Soviet Union - an infallible sign of
the reactionary forces - and thereby work in the interest of monopoly
capitalism and reactionary elements. Through their acceptance of the
Marshall Plan, the right wing SPD leaders submit the German people
to Dollar imperialism and thereby betray their national sovereignty.
The revival of imperialist reaction in these parts of Germany and the
danger of a new world war are the inevitable consequences of this
policy
. . . While keeping up the division of the labor movement, the SPD
continues its coalition policy which made the party nothing but an
appendage to the reactionary bourgeois parties. 16
16 Ibid., pp. 120-22. M. D. Zebenko
went one step further in his condem
nation of the Social Democratic par
ties in Western Europe. In his pub
lication, Die reaktionaere ldeologie
der Rechtssozialisten im Dienste des
amerikanischen lmperialismus (Ber
lin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 3., he
"proved" that the Social Democratic
p a r t i e s operated in the European
countries for many years as the
"agencies of the imperialists within
the labor movement."
Present Communist propaganda at
tempts to utilize every opportunity to
discredit the United States. In 1951,
a Soviet historian, A. E. Kunina, in
her book dealing with "American
plans to conquer the world" during
the years from 1917 to 1920, pre
sented the material which Oelssner
and other Communist authors needed
to link "United States imperialism"
with the failure of the German Revo
lution of 1918-19. A. E. Kunina, Pro
val amarikanskikh ulanov gavoevaniia
mirovege gospodstva v 1917-1920 gg
[The collapse of American Plans of
World Conquest in the Years 19171920] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe iz
d a t e I's t v o politicheskoi literatury,
1951). In the introduction to the
second edition of his book about Rosa

Luxemburg, Oelssner pays the high
est tribute to the contribution of Ku
nina: "In this book, with the use of
American documents, it is proved that
the bloody defeat of the revolutionary
movement in Germany in the years
from 19 I 8 to 1920 and the murders
of the leaders of the revolutionary
proletariat was not alone the deed of
the G e r m a n counterrevolution but
that the agents of American imperial
ism were actively engaged in it as
instigators and helpers." (Oelssner, op.
cit., p. 5.) For more details on Oelss
ner's utilization of Kunina's material,
see ibid., pp. 145-47. Karl Obermann,
Professor of Contemporary History in
Eastern Germany, in his book Die
Beziehungen des amerikanischen lm
perialismus zum deutschen lmperia
lismus in der Zeit der Weimarer Re
publik (1918-1925) (Berlin: Ruetten &
Loening, 1952) undertakes to investi
gate the first contacts of United States
imperialism with German imperial
ism to determine to what extent the
political developments in the Weimar
Republic were caused by the coopera
tion of German and American capi
talists. (Ibid., pp. 7-8.) Obermann also
makes considerable use of Kunina's
"contributions."
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has been concerned with the crisis of the German
socialist movement which commenced during World War I
and came to a climax in January of 1919 in Berlin with the
bloody fighting between the Majority Socialists - supported by
regular army units and by the notorious Free Corps - and the
left wing radicals. Interpretations dealing with the Spartacist Up
rising usually contain one of the following two assertions: ( 1)
The uprising was a deliberately planned and organized attempt
by the German Communists and their allied revolutionary organ
izations to overthrow the provisional Majority Socialist govern
ment and to create a Soviet-type proletarian dictatorship. (2)
The insurrection was a defensive action of the Berlin proletariat
which was deliberately provoked by the government into open
rebellion in order to furnish the government forces with a pretext
to crush the revolutionary workers and their organizations prior
to the elections for the national assembly on January 19, 1919.
The first of these interpretations is found in the writings of
Social Democratic authors like Bernstein, Hermann Mueller, and
Noske, and in the accounts of exponents of the political right such
as Volkmann, Oertzen, and Runkel. The second interpretation
is that of the left wing radicals, for example, Richard Mueller,
Barth, and Eichhorn, and, of course, of the Communists. An
interesting position is maintained by former KPD members who
were in the Party during its early period. Representatives of this
group, such as Ruth Fischer and Paul Froelich ( who are un
doubtedly most sincere in their opposition to contemporary Mos
cow-directed parties), go out of their way to report events which
HIS STUDY
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occurred during the time they belonged to the Communist move
ment in a manner which makes their own contemporaneous ac
tions appear consistent with their present altered views. For ex
ample, Ruth Fischer's account, which factually is highly inaccur
ate, lends itself to strengthening her argument favoring the Com
munist interpretation of events as far as the guilt of the Majority
Socialists is concerned. Her evaluation, along with that of Paul
Froelich, concerning the philosophy and program of Rosa Lu
xemburg are, however, at great variance with those of the Com
munists, who place much of the blame for the failure of the Ger
man socialist revolution on the ideological and tactical mistakes
of the early party leaders. 1
Several "scholarly" interpretations of the Spartacist Uprising
are marked by the fact that they are based on incorrect facts and
1 Compare, for example, the fol
lowing account of Ruth Fischer with
the events as they can be discerned
from documentary sources generally
available and reported in this study:
"... Deliberately to provoke the Shop
Stewards, on January 4 Ebert ordered
Eichhorn to leave the police presidium
and appointed as his successor Social
Democrat Eugen Ernst. On January
5, Noske ordered the attack on the
police presidium and on the newspaper
building. The Executive Committee
of the Shop Stewards, recognizing the
importance of this test, decided to
fight to retain Eichhorn. The Spar
tacist [sic] Central Committee, meet
ing on the same day, passed a motion
denying support to Eichhorn because
this might lead to the fall of the Ebert
government. When they later reversed
their position, they stated explicitly
that they were still opposed to over
throwing the cabinet.
"Thus, the first and most important
group of German resistance to the
restoration of Kaiserlich (Imperial)
imperialism, the Shop Stewards, had
to act alone, estranged from all party
leadership and organization. T h e y
gave the Ebert cabinet an ultimatum,

demanding that Eichhorn be main
tained and the army be disarmed and
disbanded immediately (together with
the usual host of social demands).
The Shop Stewards, however, did not
call for the resignation of the Ebert
cabinet; (and of course they did not
know of the agreement between Ebert
and the army) that Comrade Ebert
was really their enemy. [sic] They ex
pected him to yield to their pressure
ultimately and accept a compromise."
(Ruth Fischer, op. cit., pp. 83-84.)
Equally interesting is Ruth Fischer's
evaluation of the possible effects of
an overthrow of the Ebert government
upon the general political development
in Germany. She bases her conjec
tures on an over-estimate of the po
tentialities of the "revolutionary situ
ation," just as the left radicals did dur
ing the January crisis.
"The rapid overthrow of the Ebert
cabinet, the establishment of a work
ers' government in Berlin would have
acted like a bellows to the smoldering
fires in Germany. Once the industrial
centers were set in motion, the de
moralized military would have been
unable to regroup enough cadres. They
would have lost their chance to march
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consequently lead to erroneous conceptions about the event.2
German historians, sociologists, and political scientists of the post
World War I and post-World War II periods fail to deal adequate
ly with what Professor Werner Conze calls "the second revolu
tionary wave" which commenced after the USPD left the cabinet.a
Generally, there is a peculiar lack of German works which attempt
to provide accurate background information and careful inter
pretation of the revolutionary events of 1918-19 and of the Wei
mar Republic. This is true in spite of the fact that it is generally
recognized that these evaluations are essential for an analysis of
the Third Reich and the most recent political developments in
Germany. 4 It is hoped that the analysis of the January Uprising
on Berlin. Just this was their cauche
mar [nightmare]. In 1919, in spite of
all their shortcomings, the Shop Stew
ards could have crushed the counter
revolution with a minimum of effort
and sacrifice. In the continuing duel
between the Berlin workers and the
General Staff, the officer corps was at
its most disadvantageous point since
the foundation of the Reich." (Ibid.,
p. 83.) See also E. H. Carr's remarks
on Ruth Fischer in his Studies in Revo
lution (London: MacMillan & Co.,
Ltd., 1950), pp. 187-89.
2 For example, A. J. P. Taylor
states: "Berlin ..., turned mainly to
the Spartacists, who were radical Ger
man nationalists; the rest of Germany,
indignant at the failure of the Reich
to which everything had been sacri
ficed, turned mainly to the Indepen
dents."
"Rosa Luxemburg .. ., intended to
make her peace with the Independent
Socialists - a development w h i c h
would have ruined the plans of Ebert
and Groener. Therefore, in December,
1918, the Provisional government
broke the stalemate which had lasted
since November, and took the offensive
against the Spartacists in Berlin. The
High Command by a refinement of
political strategy took no part in the
operation beyond dispatching its bless-

ing. The 'bloodhound' of order was
a Social Democrat, Noske, and his in
strument the 'Free Corps,' organiza
tions of out-of-work officers, who
would fight against anyone - at first
the Spartacists and Independents, later
against any democratic government,
true condottieri, without any principle
or belief other than that of the bullet
in the back. . . .The Spartacists were
broken; but broken too was the life
of the German republic, for it could
not exist without a united Socialist
movement, and now the blood of Lieb
knecht and Rosa Luxemburg ran for
ever between the associates of Ebert
and the men of the Left." (A. J. P.
Taylor, The Course of German His
tory [London: Hamish Hamilton,
1951], pp. 182-83.)
a Werner Conze, "Die Weimarer
Republik 1918-1933,'' Deutsche Ge
schichte im Ueberblick, ed. by Peter
Rassow (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, l 9 5 2 - 5 3), p.
618. However, Professor Conze him
self only superficially treats the events
connected with this "second revolu
tionary wave." (See ibid., pp. 61820.)
4 Karl
Dietrich Brachner, "Zurn
Verstaendnis der Weimarer Repu
blik," Politische Literatur, No. 2 and 3
(Frankfurt a.M., 1952), pp. 69-70.
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contained in this study will serve to correct some of the miscon
ceptions concerning the background, nature, and significance for
the over-all course of the German Revolution.
Contrary to the widespread assumption that the January Up
rising was the product of a deliberate plan (formulated either by
the Majority Socialists or by the left wing radicals), this study in
dicates that it was an outgrowth of the tensions which existed
between the highly antagonistic camps within the socialist move
ment. In the opinion of this writer, the showdown of forces in
January was planned neither by the Majority Socialists nor by
the left wing radicals. It was a violent outburst of the sharp
hostility which then existed between the socialist factions. The
immediate cause was an incident which probably in a different
situation would have failed to produce such a serious political
crisis.
In order to bring the January insurrection into proper relation
ship with the over-all crisis of the German socialist movement, an
attempt has be�n made to trace the development of the division
of the German labor movement from its beginning down to the
eventful January of 1919. This division resulted.from the growth
of various factions within the Social Democratic Party. These
, factions advocated different political policies for the SPD on the
basis of their own philosophy of the party's mission, of the work
ing class within the bourgeois state, and of the methods to be
Dr. Bracher states: "An examination
of the literature concerning the de
velopment after the first World War
reveals that, besides a wealth of me
moirs and political tracts, only legal
istic discussions about constitutional
and administrative questions . . .,
showed any activity which, however,
never transcended the most restricted
specialists' circles. On the other hand,
scientific attempts of historians, so
ciologists, economists, and political
scientists who after all are of con
siderable consequence for the over-all
evaluation of the development as well

as for the formulation of political
views, are still less numerous." (Ibid,,
p. 70.)
Some well-known German historic
al accounts, such as that of Bruno
Gebhardt, Handbuch der Deutschen
Geschichte (2 vols.; Stuttgart-Berlin
Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsge
sellschaft, 1931) do not even mention
the January Uprising. Others, such as
Erich Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer
Republik (Vol. I; Erlenbach-Zuerich
and Stuttgart: Eugen Rentsch, 1934)
treat this event in a very superficial
manner.
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employed in bringing about socialism. The anti-war issue had
also worked within the Social Democracy to break up the unity
of the party.
In November of 1918, when the war-weary German soldiers
and substantial parts of the disillusioned urban population seized
the initiative in order to end hostilities, the various factions of the
German socialist movement attempted to superimpose their re
spective political aims upon the revolutionary developments. This
writer has concluded that the socialist movement, because of its
traditional position of opposition to the Imperial authorities and
because of its ability to provide the masses with an alternative
political myth, could have given form and aims to the revolution
beyond the immediate objectives of ending the war and removing
the Imperial government. The German socialists failed in this
task because of their own disunity and their refusal to com
promise with each other. The Majority Socialists, possibly with
such noted exceptions as Noske and others who had completely
accepted the values of the "bourgeois" state as superior to the
ideals of socialism, were no less sincere in the pursuit of their
evolutionary policies toward the ultimate goal of socialism, than
the leftist groups with their revolutionary approach.
The outcome of the conflict was that none of the socialist
factions was able to gain a dominant influence over German po
litical developments. Thus the victor of the internal struggle was
not the SPD or KPD but the nationalistic, reactionary forces
which, because of the divided labor movement, were able to re
establish eventually their former position of political hegemony.
The Spartacist Uprising as such did not bring about the re
organization of the counterrevolutionary powers, as has been
asserted in some interpretations; they were by that time already
in the process of being built-up. Contrary to another frequent
misconception about the January events, the Free Corps, which
constituted the most tangible manifestation of the anti-socialist,
anti-democratic, anti-republican forces, did not become involved
in the January Uprising until the very end, when the defeat of
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the revolting workers had already been accomplished by remnants
of regular army units and Social Democratic fighting forces. In
one important respect most interpretations, including that of this
writer, agree: The January Uprising deepened the cleavage within
the German labor movement and thereby greatly reduced its over
all strength during the period of the Weimar Republic.
This study has also attempted to indicate that a number of
specific conceptions relating to this critical phase of the German
labor movement are incorrect. For example, the Spartacist League
( and subsequently the KPD in its early phase) and the center of
international Communism were independent organizations. This
study has sought to demonstrate that the alleged direction of the
German Communists by Moscow was non-existent during the
period under discussion.
This fact is important because it explains the foundation for
the later criticism of Luxemburgism, the German ideological de
viation from Marxism-Leninism, by the Communist International.
It is also significant because it disproves the charges that the
Spartacist Uprising was ordered and directed by the Russian Bol
sheviks.5 Apparently the only official representative of the Rus
sian "brother" party during this eventful period was Karl Radek.
The personalities of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht,
leaders in their own right who could not easily be persuaded by
foreign direction, also made f or the independence of the young
KPD.
Last but not least, the findings of this study confirm, in the
case of Germany, the validity of assertions made by such leading
experts in the field of Communism as Franz Borkenau and Hugh
Seton-Watson, that during the first phase of international Com
munism from 1918 to 1920, foreign revolutionary movements
were not directed by Moscow. 6
5 See, for example, Bernstein, op.
cit., pp. 145, 188. Bernstein even has
Russians participating in the uprising.

6 Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. xii; Borkenau, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

Summary

N NOVEMBER of 1918, the socialists came to power in Ger
many in the wake of the German Revolution which was started
by a spontaneous mass uprising of war-weary sodiers, sailors, and
large parts of the urban civilian population. Spontaneous mass
actions, beginning with a mutiny of German sailors at Kiel and
spreading rapidly over the rest of Germany, had as their major
aim the ending of the hopeless and costly war. As a secondary
objective, the masses were determined to abolish all those in
stitutions which they regarded as obstacles for obtaining peace
from the Allies. A growing majority of the German people had
come to believe that the Emperor himself was one of the main
obstructions, and that he had to be removed, together with the
Imperial government and the Supreme Command of the military
forces. Both of these institutions had lost the people's confidence,
largely because of the military defeat.
The German socialists formed a revolutionary, provisional
government in spite of the fact that the German Revolution was
definitely not inspired by socialist ideas. They were able to as
sume power simply because the masses believed that for over two
years they had been opposed to a continuation of the war and had
been working toward the conclusion of an early armistice. Con
sequently, the socialists were the only organized political groups
acceptable to the majority of the people because presumably they
- and only they - could bring peace, the major objective of
the mass uprising.
At the end of the war, the German socialist movement was
..:omprised of two mass parties, the Majority Socialists (SPD I
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che successor to the former Social Democratic Party of Ger
many) and the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany
(USPD) . The movement also included several other political
factions, of which the Spartacist League and the Revolutionary
Shop Stewards were the most important. When the Majority
Socialists took over the government from the last Imperial Chan
cellor, Prince Max von Baden, they were uncertain as to the
strength of their influence among the people. They did not know
whether the workers' and soldiers' councils - the real power
factors in Germany at the moment, which were created spon
taneously wherever the revolutionary masses removed the Im
perial and state authorities - were willing to cooperate with the
new Reich government. It was thought possible that the councils
might consider a Majority Socialist cabinet as undesirable com
petition to their own revolutionary ambitions. In order to broaden
its base among the people, the Majority Socialists invited the
Independents to participate in the government on the basis of
parity. For oyer a month, Germany was ruled by a socialist
coalition cabinet, which, in the interest of appealing to the revolu
tionary forces, had assumed the radical-sounding name of Coun
cil of People's Commissars. It was a fragile coalition, however,
. because both parties attempted to impose their respective political
concepts on the revolutionary changes. The dissension which de
veloped within the cabinet was further aggravated by a number
of bloody clashes between the Majority Socialists, who were sup
ported by remnants of the regular army, and the left wing radical
workers. This led to the withdrawal of the Independents from
the government in December, 1918. From that time until the
formation of the so-called Weimar Coalition (SPD and a num
ber of democratic "bourgeois" parties), which took place after
the general elections in January, 1919, the Majority Socialists
occupied a position of political monopoly in the Reich cabinet.
The fight among the socialist factions for a dominant position
in order to influence the development of the German Revolution
was also carried on within the revolutionary agencies created by
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the mass uprising, the workers' and soldiers' councils. The latter
had formed a pyramidal structure which reached its apex at the
Reich level in the so-called Central Council, the permanent
executive committee of the First Reich Congress of Workers' and
Soldiers' Councils. (Prior to the First Reich Congress of Councils, held December 16-24, 1918, the Berlin Workers' and
Soldiers' Council with its Executive Council had usurped authority for all of Germany.) Within the council system, the
Majority Socialists succeeded in occupying the controlling positions after the Independents' refusal to participate in the Central
Council because of their opposition to the Majority Socialists'
program endorsed by the Reich Congress. Thus the two parallel
governmental structures - the old state apparatus headed by
the Provisional government, the Council of People's Commissars,
and the new council system with the Central Council at its helm
,- cooperated effectively in most localities throughout the Reich.
The general tendency was to shift more and more governmental
functions to the traditional agencies and to consider the councils
as supervisory or controlling organs of the revolutionary masses.
The Majority Socialists, who considered themselves only as
trustees of the people until general elections could be held, used
their power to consolidate the political, social, and economic
gains made in the course of the German Revolution. These ef
forts of the Majority Socialists were in complete agreement with
their ideological concepts and with their confidence in the su
periority of evolutionary and democratic reform methods in
achieving improvements for the lower social classes. They were
effectively supported by the influential trade union leaders; they
were violently opposed, however, by the left wing radical forces
such as the Spartacist League, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards,
and the Berlin organization of the USPD.
A severe crisis in the socialist movement had already started
during the war as the result of factional differences in matters of
ideology and policies. The strong anti-war attitude of the leftist
opposition elements, which openly defied SPD policies supporting
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the war, had led to a division of the party in April, 1917. This
ended the formal monopoly position of the SPD within the so
cialist movement. A second Social Democratic mass party, the
USPD, entered the political stage. However, the advent of the
German Revolution brought these two socialist parties together
for a short time. Factional strife concerning the aims of the revo
lution aggravated earlier tensions. The Majority Socialists ac
cused the left wing radicals, especially the Spartacists, of plotting
to overthrow the Provisional government and of intending to
erect a proletarian dictatorship in the form of a government by
councils. The left wing radicals, in turn, charged the moderate
socialists with betraying the proletarian revolution by attempting
to arrest its developments and by making common front with the
avowed enemies of socialism. In January, 1919, the mounting
tension between the two hostile camps within the socialist move
ment burst into open hostilities. Berlin witnessed a general strike
combined with an armed uprising lasting from January 6 to 13.
This event is u�ually referred to as the Spartacist Uprising, in
spite of the fact that an ad hoc revolutionary committee which
charged the workers in Berlin to overthrow the Majority Socialist
government was dominated not by the Spartacists but by the
Revolutionary Shop Stewards.
This study attempted to investigate the nature of this crisis in
the German socialist movement in the light of contemporaneous
power relations and to determine its influence upon the further
course of the German Revolution of 1918-19. A re-examination
of the evidence appeared desirable because most of the available
interpretations are either based on erroneous factual premises or
are highly influenced by the political views of their authors.
To provide a basis for conclusions concerning the nature of
this insurrection, an attempt has been made to trace the growth
of those political concepts of the left wing which have a direct
bearing upon the theories guiding the left wing radicals, primarily
the Spartacists, in the formulation of their policies and actions.
Contrary to the assertion of the moderate socialists, the political
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�octrines of the Spartacists did not envisage the use of a coup
d'etat, a violent overthrow of the government by a determined
minority, as a method of acquiring political power. The political
concepts of the Spartacist leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht, stressed that only when the "revolutionary proletarian party" had succeeded in obtaining the support of the majority of the proletariat would the party, as the vanguard of the
workers, assume political power from the bourgeois or quasibourgeois government and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht emphasized that
this situation had not been realized in Germany at the end of
1918 or the beginning of 1919. The revolutionary party had just
been founded. The masses of workers still followed the alleged
treacherous SPD leaders. Therefore, they believed the main task
of the young KPD was to educate the workers and make them
understand that their interests were being betrayed by the SPD
and USPD and that only the KPD was working consistently for
the socialist revolution.
An examination of the events leading to the January fighting
does not support the second assertion either. One of the most
convincing arguments that the Majority Socialists did not in
tentionally start the series of events is the almost complete lack
of physical forces available to the government at that time. When
the position of power began to change in favor of the Majority
Socialists, however, the determination to settle the basic issue
with the revolutionary troublemakers won the upper hand.
Thus, contrary to the widespread assumption that the January
Uprising was the product of a premeditated plan (by either the
Majority Socialists or the left radicals), this study has indicated
that it was an outgrowth of the tensions which existed between
the highly antagonistic camps within the socialist movement. It
was a violent outburst resulting from the sharp hostility between
the socialist factions. Its immediate cause, the Eichhorn incident,
would probably have failed to produce a similar serious political
crisis in a different situation.
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The defeat of the insurgents in Berlin is often credited with
having ended the opportunity for the extreme left to prevent the
consolidation of the German Revolution. Following the January
crisis the revolutionary organizations were considerably weak
ened, and the government, by contrast, had the newly-formed
military force, the notorious Free Corps, at its disposal to deal
forcefully with the leftist opposition elements.
The outcome of the violent conflict was that none of the
socialist factions was able to gain a dominant influence on German
political developments. The real victor of the struggle was neither
the SPD nor the KPD, but the nationalistic and reactionary
forces which came to the assistance of the Majority Socialist gov
ernment. Because of the divided labor movement, they were able
to survive the German Revolution and eventually to re-establish
their former position of political hegemony. This was most cer
tainly one of the major contributing factors to the growth of
German Fascism and the ascendance of National Socialism.
This.study has also provided some insight into the early phase
of the German Communist movement. Among other things it
has revealed a German Communist position completely indepen
dent in ideological and tactical matters from that of the Russian
· Bolsheviks. (The Communist International was not founded un
til March, 1919.)
The events of the German Revolution of 1918-19 still play
an important part in contemporary Communist propaganda in
Germany. The Socialist Unity Party (SED) of Eastern Germany
emphasizes that the working class grows in proletarian wisdom
by studying the effects of past theories and tactics. The SED
points out that the most significant lesson to be learned from the
German Revolution is the need for a united working class led
by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party. The catastrophe which
befell the German labor movement under National Socialism is
related directly to the divided socialist movement. Thus, at the
end of World War II, when a Socialist Unity Party was proposed
by the German Communists and the Soviet Military Adminis-
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tration, this new idea found favorable response among some of the
German Social Democratic leaders and some of the rank-and-file
members of the SPD. When these well-meaning Social Democrats
awakened to the fact that the new party was not the product of
a merger of the SPD and KPD on a co-equal basis but a continuation of the KPD under a different name, it was too late to do
anything about it.
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